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I. INTRODUCTION
After a prolonged lull in the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) renewed prosecutorial interest in civil and criminal
enforcement of the foreign bribery/corrupt foreign payments provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1 In the February 1997 case SEC
v. Triton Energy Corp.,2 the SEC brought its first FCPA corrupt foreign
payments civil enforcement action in over a decade.3 SEC v. Triton Energy
'Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)) [hereinafter FCPA].
2See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); see also In re David Gore, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); SEC v. Triton Energy Corp.,
(Richard L. McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,446
(D.D.C. June 26, 1997).3Prior to the Triton Energy civil enforcement action, the last FCPA bribery civil en-
forcement action brought by the SEC had been filed against Ashland Oil, Inc. in 1986 in a
case involving allegedly corrupt foreign payments to a government official in the Emirate of
Oman. See SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc. & Orin E. Atkins, No. 86-1904, SEC Lit. Release No.
11,150 (D.D.C. 1986), reprinted in 2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Rep. (Business Laws,
Inc.) 697.06, 696.95 (Oct. 1, 1986) [hereinafter FCPA Rep.].
Prior to and shortly after the passage of the FCPA, during the 1970s, the SEC had liti-
gated over 40 domestic and foreign bribery civil enforcement actions involving pre-FCPA
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Corp. involved payments made to a foreign agent in Indonesia in connec-
tion with an oil and gas concession operated and developed by Triton En-
ergy's subsidiary, Triton Indonesia, and an Indonesian government agency.
The SEC alleged that payments were illegally passed on to Indonesian gov-
ernment employees/officials, and concealed by misbookings in the books,
records and accounts of Triton Indonesia. A few months earlier, in SEC v.
Montedison S.P.A., the SEC, lacking jurisdiction for an FCPA bribery
charge, brought a civil injunctive enforcement action against an Italian cor-
conduct alleging either Rule lob-5 anti-fraud violations, or related violations of the corpo-
rate reporting or proxy rules pursuant to sections 12, 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act. See, e.g.,
ARTHUR F. MATHEWS, Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in A.B. LEVENSON
ET AL., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS 199, 219-20
(1980) (hereinafter FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978). See also [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,485 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (consent injunction); SEC v. Int'l Tel. & Telegraph Corp., [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,586, and 96,452 (D.D.C. 1978); ARTHUR F.
MATHEWS, NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS & TACTICS FROM SETTLING
CIVIL INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS 10-69, 347-581 (1979). In addition, the DOJ pursued at least 12
criminal prosecutions for pre-FCPA foreign bribery activities in the 1970s, alleging such
felonies as conspiracy to violate, and substantive violations of the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, the Federal False Statements Act
(false statements to the Export-Import Bank; false statements to the Agency For International
Development), and conspiracy to defraud the Federal Maritime Administration. See Richard
S. Shine, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Background; Pre-FCPA Prosecutions, FCPA Re-
view Procedure, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra, at 58-60; United States v. United
Brands Co., Crim. No. 78-538 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
For background material beginning with questionable or illegal corporate political contri-
butions and slush funds publicized in the Watergate revelations, covering the SEC's pre-
FCPA "sensitive payments" enforcement cases and the SEC's "voluntary disclosure" pro-
gram, and leading up to eventual passage of the FCPA in 1977, see generally REPORT OF THE
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE (Oct. 1975); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC
REPORT]; ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN
PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION (1977); Ed-
ward D. Herlihy & Theodore A. Levine, Corporate Crisis: the Overseas Payment Problem,
8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 547 (1976); R. Ferrara & B. Brandon, Questionable Foreign
Payments Decried and Decreed: Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Actions,
ALI-ABA Course of Study, Materials, Fraud, Inside Information, and Fiduciary Duty Un-
der Rule lOb-5 (Wash. D.C. 1977); Ralph C. Ferrara & Daniel L. Goelzer, Saints and Sinners
Concluded: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Materials,
Fraud and Fiduciary Duty Under the Federal Securities Laws (Wash. D.C. 1978); Lewis D.
Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1 (1976); Note, Disclosures of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the
Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1848 (1976), Judson J. Wambold, Note, Prohibiting For-
eign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
321 (1977); Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 BUS. LAW. 53
(1976); James C. Scanlon, Note, Bribes to Foreign Officials by Multinational Corporations:
Disclosures Under the Federal Securities Laws, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 428 (1976); James C.
Scanlon, Note, Materiality As It Relates to Questionable and Illegal Foreign Payments to
Officials, 10 LINCOLN L. REv. 85 (1977); Ronald P. Kane & Samuel Butler III, Improper
Corporate Payments: The Second Half of Watergate, 8 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1976).
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poration alleging violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal
accounting controls provisions, as well as Rule 1Ob-5 fraud, in connection
with bribes paid to Italian politicians and government officials. 4 In January
1995, the DOJ obtained a guilty plea by Lockheed Corporation to charges
of conspiring to violate both the bribery and books and records/internal ac-
counting controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with bribes paid for
business in Egypt.5 And in February 1998, the DOJ charged the CEO of
Saybolt, Inc. with FCPA bribery crimes relating to an alleged bribe of gov-
ernment officials in Panama to secure valuable Panamanian government
concessions.
6
DOJ officials have acknowledged the existence of a number of current
grand jury investigations involving potential FCPA bribery violations.7
4 SEC v. Montedison, S.P.A., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,374 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1996).5 Lockheed allegedly paid a $I million bribe to Dr. Leila I. Takla, a member of the Peo-
ples' Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt, for the purpose of obtaining a $79 million
contract for the sale to Egypt of three C-130-H-30 Hercules aircraft. Pursuant to its plea
agreement, Lockheed paid a $21.8 million criminal fine and an additional $3 million in
resolution of DOJ civil claims. See United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. 1:94-CR-226-01,
reprinted in 3 FCPA Rep. 696.175 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 1995). In a related case, Allen R.
Love, a retired executive of Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, pled guilty to a false
filing misdemeanor pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1018 in connection with funding of the aircraft
sales to Egypt by loans and grants from the Foreign Military Financing Program of the U.S.
Department of Defense. See United States v. Allen R. Love, No. 1:94-CR-226-03, reprinted
in 3 FCPA Rep. 699.187 (N.D. Ga.. Jan. 27, 1995). Love was sentenced to a $20,000 fine.
In another related case, Suliman A. Nasser, a regional vice-president for Lockheed Interna-
tional, who had been a fugitive until arrested in Syria, voluntarily returned to the United
States and pled guilty to a felony FCPA bribery count. See United States v. Suliman A. Nas-
ser, No. I:94-CR-226-MHS (N.D. Ga.. July 31, 1995). Nasser was sentenced to 18 months
in prison, and fined $125,000. He was the first person ever imprisoned for an FCPA bribery
conviction.6See Federal Officials Charge Texas Executive With Paying Cash Bribe To Panamanian
Officials, 12 CORP. CRIME REP., Feb. 9, 1998, at 1; see also Ralph Ranalli, CEO Charged
Vith Allegedly Bribing Panama Official, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 3, 1998, at 13, available in
1998 WL 7336432. David H. Mead, the president and chief executive officer of Saybolt,
Inc. was arrested on FCPA bribery, conspiracy, and racketeering enterprise charges. Saybolt
and Mead allegedly paid a $50,000 bribe to Panama's Minister of Mines and Minerals in the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce in return for the award of new business with the gov-
ernment of Panama, substantial tax breaks and a coveted lease of land along the Panama Ca-
nal.7See Wendy C. Schmidt & Jonny J. Frank, FCPA Demands Due Diligence in Global
Dealings, NAT. L. J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B16:
Until recently, only a few prosecutors in the Criminal Division of the DOJ's Fraud
Section had responsibility for FCPA cases. Now all of them, as well as prosecutors
in field offices of the U.S. Attorney, are authorized to investigate potential FCPA
violations. DOJ sources indicate that at least 75 cases are under investigation, and it
is anticipated that this number will increase significantly by the end of the decade.
The DOJ, moreover, is using far more aggressive tactics to investigate potential
FCPA violations, including consensually monitored telephone conversations and
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Elsewhere, in the past two years, government bribery allegations have been
published in one form or another in Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Italy,
Germany, South Korea, Pakistan, Brazil, Japan, Israel, the Bahamas, Bel-
gium, India, Ireland, Indonesia, Russia and China.!
search warrants. More investigations, and these kinds of techniques, can be expected
as U.S. businesses expand overseas.
Id.
The SEC's FCPA enforcement investigations are also increasing in number. See SEC
Enforcement: SEC Official Predicts More FCPA Cases in Near Future, 29 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 607-8 ( May 2, 1997) (Mary Keefe, Director of the SEC's Midwest Regional
Office stated: "as globalization of the economy increases, we at the commission are begin-
ning to see what we think is a resurgence of [FCPA] case[s].... [The] number of emerging
markets in which American companies are trying to gain footholds may be a factor in the in-
creased number of investigations the commission's enforcement staff has into questionable
foreign payments by public companies. We have a number of these cases under investiga-
tion .... )
5See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, Occidental Petroleum Conducts Inquiry Into Overseas Finan-
cial Transactions, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1997, at A3 (possibility of questionable payments in
Congo, Qatar, Bangladesh, Yemen, Malaysia and Russia); Italy Convicts Fiat Chairman;
Bars Him From Corporate Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1997, at D5 (illegal political dona-
tions in Italy); Brandon Mitchener, Germany Says Business Bribes on the Rise: Probe of Al-
leged VW Kickbacks Spotlights U.S. Complaints, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A12
(reporting business bribes in Germany); Michael Schulman, Corruption in South Korea Isn't
Gone Yet: Hanbo Scandal Shows Kim's Reform Falls Shy of Goals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,
1997, at A18 (describing bribes-for-loans scandal in South Korea); John Mintz, Korean
Legislator Alleges Bribery in Sale of F-16s: General Dynamics Denies Paying Ex-President
Roh $100 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1995, at DlI; Steve Blain, South Koreans Say
Bribes Are Part of Life: Probe of Ex-President Doesn't Touch Systematic Graft, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 21, 1995, at A13 (noting that bribery is so prevalent in South Korea that companies
keep three sets of books - one for the accountants, one for the banks, and one for the
chairman's office); Gabriel Escobar, Ex-Officials of IBM Argentina Are Indicted in Payoff
Probe, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al (reporting that the DOJ and the SEC are investi-
gating whether IBM Argentina violated the FCPA by paying bribes to obtain a $250 million
contract to modernize computer systems of Banco de la Nacion, a large Argentina state-
owned bank); Jonathan Friedland, Did IBM Unit Bribe Officials in Argentina to Land a
Contract? WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1995, at Al; Matt Moffett & Jonathan Friedland, New Latin
America Faces Devil of Old: Rampant Corruption, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1996, at Al ("A
dozen Argentine officials have been indicted on charges of committing a multimillion-dollar
fraud in connection with an International Business Machines contract"); Paul Lewis, A
World Fed Up With Bribes: Nations Begin Following U.S. Curbs on Corruption, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1996, at Dl (noting corruption scandals involving Benazir Bhutto, Prime
Minister of Pakistan; Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister of Italy; Fernando Collor De Mello,
President of Brazil; Chun Doo Hwan and Rho Tae Woo, former Presidents of South Korea;
Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan; Prime Minister Charles Haughey of Ireland;
also noting that in a 1995 report then-U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor said Ameri-
can companies lost $45 billion of overseas contracts the previous year due to foreign bribery
by competitors; and stressing that "[b]ribery and kickbacks have become common in former
communist countries as they embrace free enterprise. The spread of democracy can create
new incentives for corruption as competing political parties seek campaign contributions.");
Neil King Jr., Momentum Builds for Corporate Bribery Ban, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1997, at
A16 ("German companies alone spend as much as 10 billion marks ($5.6 billion) a year on
bribes to foreign officials, most of it added to the contract price and then written off on their
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taxes."); UTC's Pratt & Whitney To Pay $14.8 Million To Settle Israeli Slush Fund Claim,
11 CORP. CRMIE REP., May 26, 1997, at 5 (reporting that Pratt & Whitney Group of United
Technologies Corporation agrees to pay United States "$14.8 million for allegedly conspir-
ing to divert $10 million in United States military aid into a slush fund subject to the exclu-
sive control of an Israeli Air Force officer" Rami Dotan); Boeing Under FBI Scrutiny For
Involvement In Bahamian Bribe Scheme, Paper Reports, 10 CORP. CRIME REP., May 20,
1996, at 1; Boeing Unit Paid Bribes to Bahamian Politicians To Secure Plane Contract,
CBC Reports, 8 CORP. CRpmE REP., Oct. 17, 1994, at 40(1) (reporting that Bahamian Com-
mission of Inquiry concluded that Boeing's former Canadian subsidiary de Havilland, Inc.
paid more than $1 million in bribes to secure airplane contract with Bahamas Air); John Ur-
quhart, Canadian Police Probe Alleged Bribes by Former Boeing Unit to Win Order, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996, at A4; U.S. Is Investigating If an Ex-Boeing Unit Paid Bribes for a Job,
WALL ST. J., May 14, 1996, at AS; Anne Swardson, Canada Alleges Mulroney Bribery Role:
Former Prime Minister Denies Accusations, Will Sue, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at Al
(reporting allegation that former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney accepted a bribe
from Airbus Industries); John Urquhart, Former Premier Sues Canada for Libel in Probe of
Alleged Airbus Kickbacks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1995, at A13; Martin DuBois & Mark M.
Nelson, Belgium Pursues Corruption Probe Involving Dassault, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1996,
at A16 ("Belgian investigators said they are pursuing strong evidence of corruption involv-
ing French aircraft maker Dassault Aviation SA in a scandal that last year prompted the res-
ignation of Willy Claes as secretary general of the North American Treaty Organization");
Julia Preston, Despite Scandals, Brazil Exudes Political Health: Nascent Democracy Stable,
Public Irked by Corruption, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1992, at A30 ("Government contractors
routinely expected to pay 2 percent commission to any bureaucrat who helped them land a
job. But businessman say that associates of Farias, who is accused of masterminding a vast
kickback network within the government, demanded as much as 30 percent."); Miriam Jor-
dan, India's Growing Bribery Scandal Snares Four More Ministers, Threatens Reform,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1996, at A8 (reporting that twenty-four politicians in India charged
with taking bribes including four ministers, one the chief of urban affairs and another the
chief of textiles); Miriam Jordan, Court Orders Arrest of 3 Ex-Cabinet Ministers, Politicians
Charged in India's Bribery Scandal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1996, at Al0; Edward A. Gargan,
Family Ties That Bind Growth: Corrupt Leaders in Indonesia Threaten Its Future, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1996, at Dl ("Some things never seem to change in Indonesia, where nepo-
tism, favoritism and corruption long have been ubiquitous.... Indonesia is, in the view of
Transparency International, a Berlin-based watchdog organization, the most corrupt country
on earth.") Whitacre Told FBI of Wide Range of Alleged lllegal Activity by ADM and Ex-
ecutives, Document Shows, 11 CORP. CRiME REP., Oct. 6, 1997, at 1, 3 (reporting that FBI
affidavit filed in federal court in the Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) criminal anti-trust case
alleges that government informant Mark Whitacre reported to the FBI that: (i) ADM execu-
tives paid politicians in Russia "to facilitate ADM's business ventures in that country;" (ii)
"illegal kickbacks were part and parcel of ADM's corporate culture;" (iii) "ADM engaged in
other irregularities including "payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash to various
political candidates and political action committees;" and (iv) "Whitacre was aware of pay-
offs to Indonesian politicians -- "the payments represented compensation in exchange for the
non-Payment of taxes" and to help "procure environmental permits.");" Michael R. Gordon,
Russia's Former Head of Privatization Faces Bribery Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997, at
A7 (question whether $100,000 "book advance" was a "bribe" paid by Uneximbank through
a Swiss intermediary in return for Uneximbank winning auction to purchase 25% of Russia's
state telecommunications monopoly). See also JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN,
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL
ECONOMIES 9-11 (1996):
The corrupt payment issue is not confined to a few countries. In just the last few
years, major corruption investigations, often involving foreign companies, have arisen
in every comer of the world, ranging from Germany, England, Italy, France, Canada,
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
In light of these suggestions of continuing corruption in international
business transactions, U.S. multi-national corporations must be prepared to
effectively defend SEC or DOJ/grand jury FCPA investigations, and to
conduct related corporate internal investigations in a manner that best
achieves compliance with the law while simultaneously serving appropriate
shareholder and corporate business interests. 9
Belgium, and Spain in the West, to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa in the
South, and to South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Singapore, and
Japan in the East.
Id. (citations omitted).
IT]he corruption problem is most prevalent in the world's transitional economies ....
the demand for illicit payments has significantly increased in recent years as these mar-
kets have opened their doors to foreign investment and procurement. From Russia to
Eastern Europe to China, western businessmen are seeking to participate in these
,growth markets, thus creating significant opportunities for payments.
Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
The problem is perhaps most acute in post-communist societies....
There have been reports of corruption throughout Central Europe and the former So-
viet Union, including Hungary, Poland, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Latvia, and the former
Czechoslovakia, as well as other transitional economies such as India, Vietnam, and
numerous countries in Africa.... The problem remains particularly acute, however, in
two of the biggest transitional economies: China and Russia.
Id. at 13-15 (citations omitted).
9The establishment and continuing implementation of adequate corporate compliance
programs are an indispensable element of proper corporate stewardship at the board of di-
rectors level. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §
4.01 (a)(1)-(2) cmt. c, (b) cmt. b. (1994); American Bar Association, Section of Business
Law, Corporate Director's Handbook, 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1267 (rev. ed. 1994); Statement
of the Business Roundtable, the Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2101 (1978). James L. Griffith, Jr., Di-
rector Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards and Legislative Controls on Li-
ability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653 (1995); Charles Hanson, The Duty of Care, the Business
Judgment Rule, and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus.
LAW. 1355, 1359-60 (1993). The adoption of the federal corporate and organizational sen-
tencing guidelines, which encourage internal corporate compliance programs, see, e.g., U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 & § 8A1.2 application note 3(k), is causing
courts to pay significant attention to the efficacy of compliance programs in assessing pri-
vate damages liability of corporate directors for injuries caused by corporate torts and
crimes. For example, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery in approving the settlement of shareholder claims, analyzed the ob-
ligations of corporate directors to monitor corporate operations. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996). Analogizing to the federal corporate sentencing guidelines, the Chancery Court held
that directors of Delaware corporations may incur personal liability for losses arising out of
employee misconduct if the directors fail "to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system [aimed at detecting misconduct], which the board con-
cludes is adequate, exists..." Id. at 970. In Caremark, the company had pled guilty to
criminal mail fraud charges and paid $250 million in fines and restitution in a federal crimi-
nal prosecution and related civil enforcement actions encompassing Medicare and Medicaid
fraud. The shareholder lawsuits sought to recover these corporate losses from the directors,
alleging they breached their duty of care by failing to actively monitor corporate perform-
ance and properly supervise corporate employees. Chancellor Allen agreed that plaintiff's
theory would warrant recoveries from corporate directors in some cases. The court refused
to find that the 1963 Delaware Supreme Court precedent in Graham v. Allis-Chahners
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This article will summarize the foreign bribery/corrupt foreign pay-
ments provisions of the FCPA, briefly survey the related books and records
and internal accounting controls provisions, analyze available defenses to
civil and criminal FCPA charges, and explore sensitive substantive and
strategic issues that arise in the defense of SEC and DOJ/grand jury investi-
gations and in the conduct of related corporate internal investigations. This
article will also analyze the recent SEC consent decree settlements in the
Triton Energy/Indonesia case, and explore the types of defenses that might
be pursued if an FCPA foreign payments case like Triton were litigated
rather than resolved by settlement.
Manufacturing, Co., automatically precluded potential director liability. Id. The Graham
Court had stated that "absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no
reason to suspect exists." 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). But Chancellor Allen in Caremark
narrowly construed this language:
A broader interpretation of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers - that it means that a corporate
board has no responsibility to assure that appropriate information and reporting systems
are established by management - would not .... be accepted by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in 1996, in my opinion.... I start with the recognition that in recent years
the Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear.. the seriousness with which the cor-
poration law views the role of the corporate board. Secondly, I note the elementary fact
that relevant and timely information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the
board's supervisory and monitoring role under Section 141 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Thirdly, I note the potential impact of the federal organizational
sentencing guidelines on any business organization. Any rational person attempting in
good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take
into account this development and the enhanced penalties and the opportunities for re-
duced sanctions that it offers.
In light of these developments, it would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude
that our Supreme Court's statement in Graham concerning 'espionage' means that cor-
porate boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the
corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist
in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to
the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the
board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corpora-
tion's compliance with law and its business performance.
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969-70.
Chancellor Allen made it clear that if a plaintiff can establish a "sustained or systematic
failure... to exercise reasonable oversight," id. at 971, then good faith is lacking and a di-
rector may have personal liability. After analyzing the discovery record in Caremark, Chan-
cellor Allen accepted a settlement that dismissed the directors from personal liability, finding
that the directors had paid some attention to Caremark's law compliance responsibilities
prior to the company's unlawful conduct and had reacted promptly to improve compliance
practices and procedures once the company's misconduct was revealed. Id.; see also Carole
L. Basri et al., Corporate Compliance After Caremark, in Practicing Law Institute, Corpo-
rate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-995 (1997).
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II. SCOPE OF THE FCPA °
The FCPA regulates the business conduct of American corporations in
two significant respects: First, it proscribes bribery of foreign government
or political officials, and related corrupt foreign payments, for the purpose
of obtaining or retaining business.11 Second, it requires SEC-registered or
reporting issuers, i.e., most public companies, to make and maintain accu-
rate books and records and to implement adequate internal accounting con-
trols.12 The bribery provisions apply solely to foreign business activities
that implicate corrupt payments to foreign government or political officials.
The books and records and internal accounting controls provisions are
much broader. They extend to all of a company's business, domestic as
well as foreign, legitimate as well as corrupt; they are not limited to ac-
counting for corrupt foreign payments. 13 The DOJ can prosecute criminally
any person or company for violations of either the bribery provisions or the
books and records and internal accounting controls provisions. Since the
1988 amendments to the FCPA, the DOJ can also pursue civil injunctive
and/or penalty actions against "domestic concerns" for FCPA bribery vio-
lations. 4 The SEC can pursue civil and administrative enforcement actions
for violations of both the bribery and corrupt foreign payments provisions
and the books and records and internal accounting controls provisions
against issuers, but has no jurisdiction whatsoever over criminal prosecu-
tions, or over domestic concerns. This split of enforcement authority be-
tween the DOJ and the SEC leads to parallel and overlapping SEC and
DOJ/grand jury investigations of corporate FCPA compliance.
III. FCPA BRIBERY PROVISIONS
In planning the defense of an FCPA investigation, it is helpful to re-
view carefully each element of a civil or criminal violation of the FCPA
'0 FCPA, supra note 1. Prior to the passage of the statute in 1977, the SEC civilly, and
the DOJ criminally, pursued a number of enforcement actions involving foreign bribery alle-
gations pursuant to Sections (10)(b), 12, 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act and Rule 1Ob-5 thereun-
der, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 781, 78m, 78n (1994), as well as the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, 18 U.S.C §§ 1341, 1343 (1994). See SEC REPORT, supra note 3.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78kk-2 (1994).
12Section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2) (1994).
13See, e.g., STEPHEN F. BLACK & ROGER M. WIT'EN, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, chs. 5, 6 (1997); DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, ch. 3 (1995); Donald R. Cruver, Complying With The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. Bus. LAw. 20; A. B. LEVENSON ET AL.,
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977: Do You KNow This ACT COVERS
DOMESTIC BUSINESS ACTIVITIES? (1978) [hereinafter THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
OF 1977].
1415 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994).
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corrupt foreign payments provisions.15 The government must establish the
following seven elements to prove an FCPA bribery violation:
(i) any U.S. person or entity, including "issuers" and "domestic con-
cems," and any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder of an is-
suer or a domestic concern even if a foreigner;
(ii) through use of the mails or means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in furtherance of;
(iii) corruptly;
(iv) making an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
payment, or gift of money or anything of value;
(v) to a foreign government official, or a foreign political party, or of-
ficial of a foreign political party or a candidate for foreign political office,
or to any person (i.e., a foreign agent) while knowing that all or a portion of
such money or thing of value will be offered or given to a foreign govern-
ment official, foreign political party, or official thereof, or a foreign politi-
cal candidate;
(vi) for the purpose of influencing any official act or decision, or in-
ducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to do
or omit any act in violation of his lawful duty, or to induce the foreign offi-
cial to use his influence to affect or influence a foreign government act or
decision;
(vii) to assist the issuer or domestic concern in obtaining or retaining
business or in directing business to any person.
16
IV. "GREASE," "FACILITATING," OR "EXPEDITING" PAYMENT EXCEPTION:
"ROUTINE GOVERNMENT ACTION"
The bribery proscription does not apply "to any facilitating or expe-
diting payment to a foreign official, political party or party official the pur-
pose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of routine
government action by a foreign official, political party, or party official."' 7
ISThe FCPA does not contain an express private damages cause of action for nongov-
ernmental persons, and the courts have refused to recognize an implied private damages
cause of action for FCPA bribery violations. See ZARIN, supra note 13, § 11.7; see also
Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v.
Western Oil & Refining Co., 771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); J. S. Service Center Corp.
v. General Electric Technical Services Co., 937 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); McLean V.
International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987); Daniel Pines, Amending the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right ofAction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185 (1994).
1615 U.S.C. §§78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1994).
1715 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b) and -2(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Prior to the 1988 Amend-
ments to the FCPA, the "grease" payment exception was governed by the nature of the duties
of the foreign government employee. If the employee's duties were "essentially ministerial
or clerical," the employee did not fall within the definition of "foreign official," and, conse-
quently, payments to such ministerial or clerical employees were not proscribed. See
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
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A "grease" or "facilitating" payment is meant to embrace payments that
"Gmerely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision."'1 8
The grease payment exception "permits U.S. companies to make mod-
est payments to low-ranking government officials, to speed up or secure the
performance of something that the party is already entitled to obtain. The
typical example of a facilitating payment is a modest payment to a customs
official to speed up the processing of entry papers."'19 There are to date no
judicial precedents interpreting the grease or facilitating payment exception.
"Routine government action" is defined in the statute as:
[A]n action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official
in -
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to tran-
sit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and un-
loading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterio-
ration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.20
For the purpose of determining the legality of a grease payment, the
term routine governmental action does not include any decision by a foreign
ACT ANTiBRIBERY PROVISIONS (Feb. 1992) at 5 [hereinafter DOJ & Dep't of Commerce bro-
chure].
Determining whether a given employee's duties were "essentially ministerial or cleri-
cal" was a source of ambiguity, and it was not clear whether the Act prohibited certain"grease" payments, such as those for expediting shipments through customs or placing
a transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police
protection. Accordingly, recent changes in the FCPA focus on the purpose of the pay-
ment, instead of the particular duties of the official receiving the payment, offer, or
promise of payment, and there are exceptions to the antibribery provision for "facilitat-
ing payments for routine governmental action.
Id.
ISH.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
19 ZARIN, supra note 13, §5.1, at 5-3:
The facilitating payments exception is intended to permit modest payments to of-
ficials to speed up or secure the performance of essentially clerical activities, which
do not involve the exercise of discretion....
[A] payment to a customs official to come in to work over the weekend to proc-
ess custom documents for a company (i.e., to do what he would otherwise be re-
quired to do on Monday) would not be prohibited under the FCPA. On the other
hand, permissible facilitating payments would not include payments to customs offi-
cials for a reduction in tariffs, since that would involve the exercise of discretion by
a governmental official.
2015 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A)(1994).
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official to award new business to, or to continue business with, a particular
party.
2'
There is no monetary cap on the amount of a lawful grease or facili-
tating payment. However, such facilitating payments are customarily quite
small, i.e., amounts less than $1,000. The larger the amount of the pay-
ment, the more likely the DOJ or the SEC will contend it is an unlawful
bribe rather than a lawful facilitating payment. For example, it is doubtful
whether a $50,000 payment, or even a $10,000 payment, would ever be
viewed by the DOJ or the SEC as a lawful grease payment.22
One commentator points out:
[A]t a conference on the FCPA held in Washington, D.C. on April 10, 1995, a
Justice Department official was asked about the situation where a foreign gov-
ermnent official offered to expedite the processing of VAT refunds, for a per-
centage of each refund. Under the local law, the U.S. company was entitled to
the refunds, but there was substantial delay in processing the paperwork. The
payment to the official was intended only to expedite the processing of what
the company was legally entitled to. Despite the fact that the payment appears
on its face to meet the requirements of the facilitating payments provision, the
Justice Department official responded that such payments would attract the
Department's attention and would be unlikely to be viewed as facilitating
payments. The apparent rationale is that the official is exercising discretion in
deciding whose application to process first. Yet, to some extent, such an ac-
tion is inherent in expediting the processing of any government papers. While
the determination of a facilitating payment does not turn on the amount of the
payment, the substantial amounts being paid and the continuing nature of the
payment were clearly of concern to the official. Also, the Justice Department
official viewed this situation as involving a decision by a foreign official con-
ceming the retaining of business, and therefore outside the purview of the ex-
ception for facilitating payments.23
21See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(B), 2(h)(4)(B); see also DOJ & Dep't of Commerce bro-
chure, supra note 17, at 3.
22In opining that a $15,000 payment is probably too large to be a lawful "facilitating
payment," Black & Witten state:
While the FCPA's facilitating payments exception contains no per se limit on the
amount of a payment, focusing instead on the intent of the payor and the purpose of
the payment, many practitioners believe it permits only relatively small payments to
help push a ministerial act along. The $15,000 amount... seems too large.
BLACK & WrrrEN, supra note 13, § 4:08, at 4-9 to 4-10 (citation omitted).
Prior to the 1988 Amendments, one Congressman (Howard Berman) suggested the
grease/facilitating payment exception ought to be framed in terms of the size of the payment.
Congress failed to adopt that approach. See The Foreign Trade Practices Act: Hearings on
H.R. 2157 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 285 (1983) (statement of Congressman Berman: "What is the
reaction to the idea... of forgetting the level of official and the purpose of the money, and
instead just saying... [b]y definition, if you pay less than $10,000 or $5,000, it is not a bribe.
If you pay more, it is.").
23ZARIN supra note 13, § 5.1, at 5-3 to 5-4 (citation omitted).
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The DOJ clearly takes the position that a payment to a foreign gov-
ernment official to secure and expedite payment to the issuer of an undis-
puted debt due and owing by the foreign government to the issuer pursuant
to an existing or completed contract, is not a lawful grease payment. Thus,
in United States v. Vitusa Corp., the DOJ successfully prosecuted the Vi-
tusa Corporation and its president, Denny J. Herzberg, for FCPA bribery
when they paid, or promised to pay, $50,000 to a government official of the
Dominican Republic to obtain payment by the Dominican Republic gov-
ernment of a business debt due and owing to Vitusa Corporation:
24
Even though the debt was undisputed and the money was intended to expedite
and secure payment, the Justice Department treated the $50,000 as an unlawful
payment to induce an official to use his influence to obtain or retain business
(i.e., the full amount of the debt). Accordingly, the payment to a foreign offi-
cial to collect on monies due and owing to a U.S. company by a government
entity would be viewed by enforcement authorities as an illicit bribe, even
though it was only for the collection of monies due and owing. The collection
of money is part of obtaining or retaining business, and a payment to achieve
that end is not a facilitating payment.2
The author disagrees with this analysis. The Vitusa Corporation pay-
ment should not have been deemed to be for the purpose of "obtaining or
retaining business," and instead should have been treated as an acceptable
grease payment.
One further caveat about grease or facilitating payments is appropriate.
While lawful under the FCPA, particular grease or facilitating payments
may or may not be lawful under applicable local foreign law, and may or
may not be customarily prosecuted when unlawful, by foreign prosecutory
officials.2 6
V. STATUTORY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The 1988 Amendments added two explicit affirmative defenses to the
FCPA bribery provisions, namely: (i) legal under local law, and (ii) reason-
able and bona fide expenditures. To date there are no judicial precedents
interpreting either of these two affirmative defenses.
A. Legal Under Local Law
It is an affirmative defense to a civil or criminal corrupt foreign pay-
ment charge if "the payment, gift, offer, or promise, of anything of value
24 See Indictment and Plea Agreement, United States v. Vitusa Corp., Cr. No. 93-253
(D.N.J. 1994), reprinted in 3 FCPA Rep. 699-155; Indictment and Plea Agreement, United
States v. Herzberg, Cr. No. 93-254, reprinted in 3 FCPA Rep. 699-165.
25
ZARIN, supra note 13, § 5.1, at 5-4 to 5-5.
26See, e.g., ZARIN, supra note 13, § 5.1, at 5-5 n.10: "[I]n such countries as Indonesia,
India, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines, facilitating payments are technically unlawful
but the rules are rarely enforced. On the other hand, in Singapore facilitating payments are
unlawful and enforcement is strict."
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that was made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the
foreign official's, political party's, party official's, or candidate's coun-
try.I
The "normal rules of legal construction would apply" in interpreting
which payments are lawful in a particular foreign country. 28  This affirma-
tive defense is not available in countries without written laws. 29 A formal
legal opinion of local foreign counsel is helpful evidence to establish this
defense. 0
B. Reasonable and Bona Fide Expenditures
It is also an affirmative defense to a civil or criminal corrupt foreign
payment charge if:
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, in-
curred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate
and was directly related to -
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services;
or
(B) the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government
or agency thereof.
3 1
This affirmative defense would apply to paying the travel and lodging
expenses to bring foreign officials to the United States to inspect domestic
plants and interview management before approving the building of a plant
in the foreign country by the U.S. issuer.3 2 Pursuant to this affirmative de-
fense, the DOJ has approved annual training costs of $250,000 as "neces-
sary and reasonable" when a U.S. petroleum exploration and production
company was providing technical and management training to employees of
a foreign government pursuant to a foreign local law provision requiring the
27 15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2(c)(1)(1994).
28 BLACK & WIrEN, supra note 13, § 2.10[l], at 2-10 (citing H.R. Con. Rep. 100-576, at
922, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1955).
29See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 923 (1998), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1956-57.
30 See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release Nos. 80-02 (Oct. 29, 1980), 88-1 (May 12, 1988)
and 93-2 (May 11, 1993); see also DOJ & Dep't of Commerce brochure, supra note 17, at 7:
Whether a payment was lawful under the written laws of the foreign country may be
difficult to determine. You should consider seeking the advice of counsel or utilizing
the Department of Justice's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure review
procedure for such issues as (a) the issuance of an advisory opinion by a foreign gov-
ernment agency; (b) the issuance of regulations by a unit of local government; and (c) a
course of conduct of a foreign government or government agency indicating that the
ayment is legal.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (1994). Even before the 1988 Amendments, the DOJ viewed
these types of payments as lawful. See, e.g., DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release Nos. 82-02
(Dec. 11, 1981), 82-1 (Jan. 27, 1982), 83-2 (July 26, 1983), 83-3 (July 26, 1983), and 85-1
(July 16, 1985).
32 See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 85-1 (July 16,1985).
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company to provide such training.33 The DOJ appears to concede that bona
fide promotional expenses mar include reasonable reimbursement of inci-
dental entertainment expenses.
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The general federal criminal five-year statute of limitations contained
in 18 U.S.C. § 3282 applies to FCPA criminal prosecutions.3 5 However, by
virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3292, the DOJ can seek a court order suspending the
running of the statute of limitations for three years when necessary evidence
for a criminal prosecution is in the process of being obtained from a foreign
country. Thus, in some cases the five-year statute of limitations can be
stretched to eight years. Section 3292 only applies in instances in which a
federal grand jury has been impaneled but has not yet returned an indict-
ment. The DOJ must file its extension request in "the district court before
which a grand jury is impaneled," and the court may grant the request if it
"finds by a preponderance of the evidence" that; (i) "an official request has
been made for such evidence," and (ii) "it reasonably appears, or reasonably
appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in
such foreign country.
'3 6
It is unclear what statute of limitations applies to an SEC civil injunc-
tive and/or penalty action for FCPA bribery allegations. The SEC seeks
both injunctive relief and civil monetary penalties in these cases.37 Courts
likely will hold that a five-year statute of limitations applies to the civil
monetary penalty aspect of an FCPA case, but to date courts have held that
no fixed limitations period applies to the SEC's request for injunctive re-
lief.38 The author believes that the injunctive remedy in an FCPA case
33See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 92-1 (Feb. 1992).34See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release Nos. 82-1 (Jan. 27, 1982) (payment of travel,
lodging, meals, and entertainment expenses of 10 foreign officials); 83-2 (July 26, 1983)
(payment of travel, lodging, meals, and entertainment expenses of foreign official and his
wife); 83-3 (July 26, 1983) (payment of travel, lodging, meals, and entertainment expenses
of foreign official).
35See BLACK & WiTEN, supra note 13, § 2.11.
3618 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 830 F.2d 1073 (9th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Bischel, 61 F.3d 1429 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Neill.,
940 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 952 F. Supp. 831 (D.D.C. 1996).
37In the most recent SEC civil injunctive/penalty action involving FCPA bribery allega-
tions, i.e., SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Richard L. McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,446 (D.D.C. June 26, 1997), the matter was resolved by set-
tlement; consequently any statute of limitations questions were not litigated. For an analysis
of the SEC's enforcement actions seeking civil monetary penalties, see generally Arthur B.
Laby & Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil
Monetary Penalties, 58 ALBANY L. RaV. 5 (1994).
38See, e.g., SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); SEC v. Williams, 884 F.
Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1995); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Toomey,
866 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); SEC
v. Glick, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,535 (D. Nev. June 12, 1980).
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ought to be subject to the equity doctrine of laches, but many lower courts
have held that not even laches can be a time bar defense in an SEC civil in-
junctive enforcement action, including one seeking the additional ancillary
relief of disgorgement.3 9
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) does not contain
any express statute of limitations generally governing SEC civil enforce-
ment actions whether the relief sought is injunctive or a civil fine.40 How-
ever, all federal civil enforcement actions seeking "penalties, fines or
forfeitures" are barred by a general five-year statute of limitations contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 if the particular statute authorizing the relief does not
contain a specific limitations bar.4 1 This five-year limitations period would
clearly apply to an SEC civil enforcement action seeking civil monetary
penalties for an FCPA bribery violation.42 It is unclear whether section
See also Elizabeth S. Stong, Basics of the SEC's Disgorgement Remedy, 43 PRAc. LAW. 67
(1997); Christopher R. Dollase, The Appeal of Rind: Limitations ofActions in Securities and
Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Actions," 49 Bus. LAW. 1793, 1798 (1994). How-
ever, none of these decisions deal with a claim by the SEC for civil monetary penalties in a
civil injunctive enforcement action. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Sat. 4677 (1988), added Section 21 A(d)(5) to the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78u-
1 (d)(5) (1994), which specifically provides that a five-year statute of limitations is applicable
to SEC enforcement actions for penalties against insider-trading violations. See SEC v.
Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing SEC enforcement action for
civil monetary penalties against insider-trading violations on basis of five-year time bar of
Section 21A(d)(5)). Apart from insider-trading civil penalty cases, the Exchange Act does
not contain any specific time bar provisions as to other civil monetary penalty cases.39See, e.g., SEC v. Keating, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,906
(C.D. Cal. July 23, 1992); SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1167 (C. D. Cal. 1995); SEC v.
First Jersey Sees., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1185, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd inpart, rev'd inpart
on other grounds, 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Condron, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,095 (D. Conn. June 11, 1985); SEC v. Gulf & West-
ern Indus., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1980). See also cases cited in supra note 38.40One section of the Exchange Act authorizing the SEC to obtain treble civil monetary
penalties in "insider-trading" cases does contain an express five-year statute of limitations.
See Section 21A(d)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 78 uA(d)(5) (1994).4 1See, e.g., 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.2d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).42 Cf Catherine A. Maxson, The Applicability of Section 2462's Statute of Limitations to
SEC Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990, 94 MICH. L. REv. 512 (1995).
Indeed, some commentators argue that SEC civil injunctive enforcement actions should also
be barred by the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. This view assumes that
the injunctive remedy is really "punitive," not merely "remedial," due to the severe direct
and indirect adverse collateral consequences stemming from imposition of an injunction
against a regulated person or entity. For an analysis of such adverse collateral consequences,
see Thomas J. Andre, The Collateral Consequences of SEC Injunctive Relief. Mild Prophy-
lactic or Perpetual Hazard, U. ILL. L. REv. 625 (1981). This view is strengthened by a re-
cent D.C. Court of Appeals decision, Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996), where
the D.C. Circuit applied the five-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to an SEC
broker-dealer administrative disciplinary proceeding in which the SEC had suspended a
branch manager from association with a broker-dealer for six months based upon failure to
supervise charges.
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See David M. Becker & Michael E. Herde, D.C. Circuit Holds Five-Year Limitations Pe-
riod Applies To SEC Administrative Proceedings, in WLMER, CUTLER & PICKER1NG,
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS (June 25, 1996):
[Tihe defense bar can be expected to use Johnson to argue that any sanction, even an
injunction, imposed more than five years after the underlying conduct occurred may be
punitive and therefore barred by Section 2462.
Federal courts in the election and environmental area have begun to apply Section
2462 to injunctive actions, though not based on the "penalty" reasoning of Johnson.
See Federal Election Comm n v. National Right to Work Comm., 916 F. Supp. 10, 14-
15 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that § 2462 bars not only Federal Election Commission
(FEC) action seeking civil penalties for conduct occurring more than five years previ-
ously, but also actions seeking merely declaratory and injunctive relief); United States
v. Telluride Co., 884 F. Supp. 404, 409-10 (D. Colo. 1995) (§ 2462 limitations period
barred injunctive relief in Clean Water Act enforcement action); United States v. Wind-
ward Properties, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 690, 693 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (same); but see Federal
Election Comm n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 20-21
(D.D.C. 1995) (holding that § 2462 barred FEC action for civil penalty, but not for de-
claratory/injunctive relief). The three decisions applying section 2462 to injunctive ac-tions rely on a 1947 Supreme Court decision holding that "when legal and equitablerelief are available concurrently, equity will withhold its relief.., where the applicable
statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy." National Right to Work
Comm., 916 F. Supp. at 14-15 (citing Cope v. Anderson 331 U.S. 461,464 (1947)).The Johnson decision, holding that enforcement actions based on stale conduct are pre-sumptively punitive, provides an additional argument for applying Section 2462 to SEC
injunctive actions. (citations omitted.)
See also James E. Day, D.C. Circuit Holds Five-Year Statute of Limitations Governs SEC
Administrative Suspensions And Censures, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1996, at 30:
Certainly, there have been a limited number of decisions holding that a civil action for
an injunction and disgorgement are not subject to § 2462, or that a civil action seekingan injunction alone is not subject to § 2462. The D.C. Circuit [in Johnson], however,
cited only one of these cases (SECv. Lorin) and only for theproposition that an action
for disgorgement is not subject to § 2462. This suggests that the D.C. Circuit is uncom-
fortable with the notion that a civil injunctive action will, in all cases, be outside the
purview of § 2462 (citations omitted.).
Of course, an injunction by its very nature is based, in part, on a finding that there is
a likelihood a person will further violate the securities laws. Nevertheless, when an in-
junction is supported by nothing more than activity than five years old and
the defendant is still in the securities business, Johnson suggests that such an action is
prohibited by § 2462.
A court asked to enter such an injunction may look to the same factors Johnson found
persuasive with respect to an administrative sanction. As an initial matter, a court may
make the same inquiry the D.C. Circuit did in Johnson how a person could pose a
'current risk' when it took the Commission over five years to file a proceeding.
Moreover, a court may consider the severe collateral consequences that visit any person
enjoined. As a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and a number of lower
courts have recoguized, an injunction has serious collateral consequences for a defen-
dant in the securities industry that make it a 'drastic remedy'. An injunction can lead to
an administrative sanction or bar, the very remedy the D.C. Circuit construed to be a
'penalty' in Johnson, and license revocation by the states; it automatically requires the
issuer to forfeit an exemption from registration under Regulation A of the Securities
Act of 1933 in cases in which the broker is an underwriter; and it results in an automatic
disqualification under Section 9(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. These
consequences suggest that an injunction is more than 'remedial' and thus provide a sub-
stantia argument, consistent with the rationale in Johnson, that an injunction should be
povemed by § 2462 when it is based on conduct that occurred more than five years be-
tore the case was initiated. (citations omitted).
See also E. Brodsky & S. A. Eggers, The Statute ofLimitations in SEC Civil Enforcement
Actions, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 123 (1995); C. R. Dollase, Comment, The Appeal of Rind, Lmi-
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2462's five-year bar would be applied by the SEC or the courts to an SEC
administrative cease and desist proceeding, a type of enforcement remedy
sometimes sought by the SEC in FCPA cases. 43 Since the SEC cannot im-
pose civil monetary penalties in administrative cease and desist proceed-
ings,44 the issue of whether section 2462's five-year time bar applies turns
on whether a cease and desist order is "punitive" rather than "remedial. '45
tations of Actions in Securities and Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Actions, 49
Bus. LAW. 1793 (1994); R. L. Stone & A. Jaroslawicz, Statute of Limitations on Actions
Brought by SEC, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at 1; G. Naftalis & M. Headley, SEC Actions
Seeking to Bar Securities Professionals, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1995, at 1; John F.X. Peloso & S.
Samoff, The Statute of Limitations for Actions Brought by the SEC, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1995,
at 3.
43See, e.g., In re David Gore, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,404 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997) (administrative cease and desist proceedings in the Triton
Energy/hndonesia FCPA case brought against former Triton Energy and Triton Indonesia of-
ficers and employees alleging violations of the books and records and internal accounting
controls provisions of the FCPA). SEC administrative law judges disagree as to whether
section 2462's time bar applies to administrative cease and desist proceedings. See the dis-
cussion of the Johnson decision and the reaction to it by SEC Administrative Law Judges in
various types of SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings including cease and desist pro-
ceedings, contained in Neil S. Lang & Robyn J. Lipton, Litigating Administrative Proceed-
ings: The SEC's Increasingly Important Enforcement Alternative, in KIRKPATRICK &
LOCKHART LLP, THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 239, 255-56 nn.65-79 (Richard M.
Phillips ed., 1997). See also the cases discussed in John H. Sturc & Michael Yoch, Securi-
ties Enforcement: What Hath Johnson Wrought?, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1997, at 12.
For articles describing the nature of SEC administrative cease and desist proceedings, see
Steven Hansen, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Use of Cease and Desist
Authority: A Preliminary Appraisal, 20 SEc. REG. L. J. 339 (1993); Bruce Hiler & Neil K.
Gilman, The SEC's Use of Its Cease and Desist Authority: A Survey, 23 SEC. REG. L. J. 235
(1995); Lang & Lipton, supra, at 259-62, 298-99; Gary P. Naftalis & Mark J. Headley, SEC
Cease and Desist Powers Limited, N.Y.L. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at 1, 7.
For articles analyzing the issues posed by the Johnson decision, see Jonathan N. Eisen-
berg & Benjamin J. Haskin, Statute of Limitations Made Applicable to SEC Actions, 8
INSIGHTS 4 (1994); Sturc & Yoch, supra at 12;
44See Lang & Lipton, supra note 43, at 262 n.98.
45Id. at 256 n.74; see also Jeffrey B. Maletta, Litigating SEC Injunctive Actions: The
SEC's Traditional Enforcement Action, in KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 43, 201,
222-23:
The Johnson decision has opened the door to challenges of injunctive actions, as
well as other enforcement actions, based on stale claims, although the standards to be
applied are far from clear. As Johnson illustrates, the application of § 2462 will depend
on whether the sanction sought by the Commission is remedial or punitive....
An injunction by itself may be characterized as 'punitive' because of the severe
collateral consequences it produces. This suggests that an injunctive action may be
subject to § 2462 under the Johnson rationale at least under circumstances in which the
collateral consequences of the injunction outweigh its remedial benefits. On the other
hand, an injunction may be deemed remedial because of its purpose in preventing the
defendant from committing future violations of the securities laws....
(citations omitted).
See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997) (exploring distinctions be-
tween different categories of sanctions - punitive versus remedial, and civil versus crimi-
nal).
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VII. DEFENDING ON THE MERITS: REFUTING THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF AN FCPA CIVIL OR CRIMINAL VIOLATION
The successful defense of an FCPA investigation by the DOJ or the
SEC, or of an ensuing civil enforcement action or criminal prosecution re-
quires defense counsel to closely scrutinize each legal element of an FCPA
bribery violation and to meticulously develop appropriate facts in an at-
tempt to refute each necessary element.
A. Any U.S. Person or Entity, "Issuers" and "Domestic Concerns" and
Their Officers, Directors, Employees, A ents or Stockholders Even if
Foreigners'
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions apply to U.S. "issuers," any officer,
director, employee, or agent (including foreign a ents) of such issuer, or
any stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer, and to "domestic con-
cerns."48 An "issuer" is a publicly held company that is subject to either the
registration or reporting provisions of the Exchange Act. A "domestic con-
cern" is any business with its principal place of business in the United
States or that is organized under the laws of the United States, its territories,
possessions, states, or commonwealth, and any individual who is a citizen,
national or resident of the United States.49
While the FCPA applies to foreign agents of an issuer or domestic
concern,s ° it does not apply to a foreign official who is bribed. Nor can theforeign official be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the FCPA.5 1
1. Repeal of Eckhardt Amendment Defense 2
As a result of the so-called "Eckhardt Amendment," the original FCPA
as enacted in 1977 prohibited the civil or criminal prosecution of low-level
employees or agents of issuers or domestic concerns unless the issuer or
domestic concern itself was found to have violated the foreign bribery pro-
scription. The original 1977 Act did allow prosecution of officers, directors
and other persons in corporate policy-making positions, without prior or
contemporaneous prosecution of the issuer or domestic concern. Thus, a
person acting in his or her role solely as a nonmanaging employee or agent
of an issuer or domestic concern could not be prosecuted if the employer-
46See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.02.
4115 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1994).
41 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(10)(B) (1994).49 For an example of an individual who was indicted and criminally prosecuted as a do-
mestic concern, see United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).50See, e.g., Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992).
5'See United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), affd sub nom.;
United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991).
'2See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 923-24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1956-57.
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business was not also prosecuted. 3 The purpose of this provision was "to
prevent businesses from scapegoating employees who violated the FCPA
while carrying out the company's mission.,54 This defense was repealed in
the 1988 Amendments.55 Thus, low-level agents and employees can now
be prosecuted for FCPA bribery even though the government does not
prosecute the involved issuer or domestic concern employer.
A foreign corporation, even if it is a subsidiary of a U.S. parent corpo-
ration, is not directly subject to the FCPA, unless the corporation is a U.S.
"issuer" or has its principal place of business or is incorporated in the
United States. However, U.S. issuers and domestic concerns may be vi-
cariously liable for the acts of foreign corporations and subsidiaries if they
are used as conduits to make proscribed foreign bribes. 6 Not only may for-
eign individuals who act as agents for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns
be subject to the FCPA's bribery provisions. In addition, "U.S. citizens or
residents who act in violation of the FCPA on behalf of foreign corpora-
tions may be liable as domestic concerns." 7
B. Use of Jurisdictional Facilities "In Furtherance of'58
Unless it is entirely outside the United States, virtually any use of the
mails, telephone, fax, wire communications or methods of interstate trans-
portation will trigger application of the FCPA. However, the use of juris-
dictional facilities must be "in furtherance of' an illegal offer or payment.
There are no litigated cases interpreting the "in furtherance of' lan-
guage of the FCPA, and the legislative history merely reiterates the lan-
guage of the provision. 9 The "in furtherance of' language stands in stark
contrast to the broad jurisdictional grants contained in other provisions of
the various federal securities statutes. 60 "In furtherance of' logically pre-
supposes a temporal progression. The jurisdictional means must be used
before the proscribed conduct is complete and irrevocable in order to be "in
furtherance of' that conduct.
53See United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1984).
54 BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.02, at 2-2 n.5.
55H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 923-24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1956-57.
56123 CONG. REc. 38,779 (1977) (statement of Rep. Eckhardt) ("The scope of the bill is
sufficient to reach any U.S. company which uses its foreign subsidiary as a conduit for such
[corrupt] payments.").
57
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.02, at 2-2; see also id. § 3.02; H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 95-83 1, at 14 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4126.
58See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.08.
59H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 12 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4124
("use of interstate commerce need only be in furtherance of making the corrupt payment").
6OSee, e.g., Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78, (1994) (proscribing unlawful
"use" of jurisdictional means); Section 17(a) of 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (pro-
scribing unlawful "use" ofjurisdictional means).
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This reading is consistent with the interpretation that the Supreme
Court has accorded to the language of this requirement's closest statutory
analog, the jurisdictional grant in the federal mail fraud statute. The mail
fraud statute proscribes use of the mails "for the purpose of executing" a
scheme or artifice to defraud.61 The Supreme Court has held that this lan-
guage requires that the use of the mails be "part of the execution of the
scheme," "incident to an essential part of the scheme," or "a step in [the]
plot," and has made clear that mailings unnecessary to the execution of the
fraud are insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction.62 Thus, while use ofju-
risdictional means to authorize payment, to transmit payment instructions or
to transfer money to make a payment all would be "in furtherance of' a
payment, after the fact discussion that a payment had been made would not
and could not be in furtherance of that payment.
The SEC recently was very innovative in pursuing a civil enforcement
action embracing foreign bribes in a case where the SEC could not directly
charge a substantive violation of the FCPA's foreign bribery provisions be-
cause it could not establish sufficient use of U.S. jurisdictional facilities in
furtherance of the allegedly corrupt foreign payments. In SEC v. Monte-
dison, S.P.A., 63 the SEC did not have a jurisdictional basis to sue an Italian
company for FCPA bribery violations because the numerous payments to
bribe Italian government officials or politicians were made either in Italy or
through off-shore companies, with no funds or instructions emanating di-
rectly or indirectly from the United States. Nevertheless, the SEC sued
Montedison for FCPA books and records and internal accounting controls
violations based upon the fact that American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
of Montedison were traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).6
61 "Mails" although undefined in the FCPA provisions or in the Exchange Act otherwise,
means the United States mails. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4109 (no jurisdiction where there "is no nexus with U.S. interstate com-
merce or the use of U.S. mails"). The Exchange Act defines "interstate commerce" to mean,
inter alia, "communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any
State," and includes intrastate use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as a
telephone or facsimile machine. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17), 78j (1994). The 1934 Act defines
"State" to mean "any State of the United States...." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(16) (1994).6
1See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-15 (1989); see also Badders v.
United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94-95 (1944);
Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 392-93 (1960); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395,
402-03 (1974).63SEC v. Montedison, S.P.A., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,374 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1996).
64Since the ADRs were registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act,
Montedison was required to, and did, file annual reports on Form 20-F with the SEC pursu-
ant to Section 13(a). The SEC's civil complaint charged that Montedison violated the
antifraud provisions of Rule lOb-5 by engaging in a fraudulent scheme to materially misstate
its financial condition and results of operations on its books and records and in its SEC-filed
reports. The scheme allegedly concealed hundreds of millions of dollars of payments from
1988 to 1993 that were used to bribe politicians and government officials in Italy. As a re-
sult of the scheme, Montedison's assets were allegedly overstated on its books and records
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Thus, in addition to charging Rule lOb-5 violations, the SEC complaint al-
leges violations of Section 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B) and Rules 12b-
20 and 13-1, and seeks civil monetary penalties against Montedison pursu-
ant to Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act.65 The Montedison litigation is




The use of facilities of interstate commerce in furtherance of a payment
to a foreign official is an FCPA violation only if done "corruptly." From
the defense attorney's perspective, the "corrupt" requirement is the most
important element of an FCPA bribery violation. Both the SEC in civil en-
forcement actions and the DOJ in criminal prosecutions must prove corrupt
intent.
The FCPA does not define "corruptly." However, the legislative his-
tory of the statute, as well as case law precedent relating to domestic bribery
crimes, provide helpful guidance. 67 "In general terms, the FCPA criminal-
izes foreign corporate bribery."68 Thus, the requisite intent for an FCPA
corrupt foreign payments violation is the same as under domestic bribery
law:
The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose such as that required
under 18 U.S.C. 201(b) which prohibits domestic bribery. As in 18 U.S.C.
201(b), the word "corruptly" indicates an intent or desire wrongfully to influ-
ence the recipient. It does not require that the act he [sic] fully consummated
or succeed in producing the desired outcome.
69
and in its financial statements for its 1988 through 1991 fiscal years. See generally Julianna
Ryan & Wayne Borgeest, Director and Officer Liability Arising from Trading in American
Depository Receipts, 5 ICCLR 166 (1997); American Depository Receipts, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,750 (1991).6SThe SEC complaint alleged two examples of Montedison's fraudulent conduct: the
"Exilar Loan" and the "ENIMONT Affair." The Exilar Loan was allegedly a fraudulent ac-
counting entry used to disguise and aggregate as an asset on the company's balance sheet
numerous questionable payments or bribes made from 1988 through May 1993. In late
1993, Montedison "determined" that the Exilar Loan was uncollectible, and took a write-
down of 435 billion lire (approximately $272 million, at $1 equals 1,600 lire) for fiscal 1992.
The ENIMONT Affair involved fraudulent accounting entries relating overstated real estate
values to disguise numerous bribes on the company's books and records during 1990 to
1992. The fraudulent entries resulted in a write-down on the company's 1993 financial
statements of 202 billion lire (approximately $126,250,000).
66 BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, §2.07; ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.3.
67See, e.g., Gary M. Elden & Mark S. Sablemann, Negligence Is Not Corruption: The
Scienter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 819
(1981); ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.3; Orro G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHTE
COLLAR CRIE: BusINEss AND REGULATORY OFFENSES Ch. 16 §16.01 [3][b], at 16-6 (1997)
[hereinafter OBERIAIER & MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME].
68Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928, 940 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
69H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); see also S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10-11 (1977), re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108:
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A payment is made "corruptly" if the payor specifically intends to in-
fluence the recipient in the performance of an official act.7° As the Fifth
Circuit has stated, for a finding of "corrupt intent" there must be an element
of quidpro quo, and establishment that the payment is "the prime mover or
producer of the official act."7
There appears to be only one reported judicial decision analyzing evi-
dence sufficient to satisfy the corrupt intent element of the FCPA. 2 In
Liebo:
a corporate vice-president was found guilty of violating [the] FCPA when he
supplied air travel valued at $2,028.00 to a representative of a foreign govern-
ment for a honeymoon vacation. On appeal, the defendant argued that there
was not sufficient evidence to prove that he acted "corruptly." The Eighth Cir-
cuit disagreed because (i) the defendant's company won a contract shortly after
the honeymoon took place and (ii) the defendant concealed the true nature of
the gift by accounting for [it] as a "commission payment." The Eighth Circuit
nevertheless reversed the conviction based upon a claim of newly discovered
evidence that the corporation, and not the defendant, had actually paid the air-
fare.
73
On retrial, Liebo was convicted, but upon much broader charges in-
cluding causing over $130,000 in bribes to be paid to two officials of the
government of Niger.74
When a payment is made openly and notoriously, (i.e., with appropri-
ate notice to foreign governmental and regulatory authorities, and perhaps
notice as well to the United States embassy or consulate), rather than in a
The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment,
promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position
in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential
legislation or a favorable regulation. The word "corruptly" connotes an evil motive or
purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not require that the act
be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome.
Sections 103 and 104 cover payments and gifts intended to influence the recipi-
ent, regardless of who first suggested the payment or gift. The defense that the payment
was demanded on the part of a govemment official as a price for gaining entry into a
market or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. company
would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe. That the payment may
have been first proposed by the recipient rather than the U.S. company does not alter
the corrupt purpose on the part of the person paying the bribe. On the other hand true
extortion situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment to an offi-
cial to keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made with the
requisite corrupt purpose.
Thus, while physical extortion rebuts corrupt intent, it appears that mere economic extortion
would not do so.
7 0See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
71See United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369 (5th Cir. 1995). See also United States v.
Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding success of payment in influencing offi-
cial's decision is evidence of payor's corrupt intent).
72United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
73 OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 67, § 16.01[3][b], at 16-7.
741d. at 16-7 n. 11; see also 2 FCPA Rep. 677.97-698.16.
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concealed, clandestine manner, such disclosure should constitute strong
evidence of a lack of corrupt intent.7
D. Payment of Anything of Value
76
In addition to cash or cash equivalents, a bribe may take the form of a
potpourri of gifts or expense reimbursement." Some things of value that
have supported domestic or foreign bribery prosecutions include charitable
donations,78 travel expenses,79 loans with favorable terms,8 ° transportation
of household goods, ' services of a prostitute,82 golf outings, sports
equipment, 84 automobiles,
8 5 and college scholarships .
6
The provision of a mere "intangible benefit" may constitute sufficient
payment of "anything of value" to constitute an FCPA bribery violation.
For example,
75See, e.g., Martin J. Weinstein, A Primer On Corrupt Intent as an Element of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, in CONFERENCE MATERIALS, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
LEARN WHAT YOU CAN AND CANNOT Do (1995). "[F]ull disclosure can be incompatible
with corrupt intent to violate the FCPA. More simply, intent to misuse public office is less
likely where the business relationship is public, approved by both governments, and subject
to monitoring." Id. at 9; see also DOJ FCPA Rev. Pro. Release No. 86-1 (July 18, 1986);
WEINSTEIN, supra at 10-11: "The primary indication of corrupt intent, as with specific in-
tent, is an affirmative effort to hide the business relationship. No evidence is more trouble-
some and inconsistent with good faith than secrecy and the inevitably false documents that
follow."76ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.6.
77See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-
Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 260,
273-74 (1994).78See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that bribe con-
sisted of an agreement to make donations totaling $12.5 million to the Children's Foundation
of Caracas, whose president was the wife of the President of Venezuela in exchange for
elimination of cigarette price controls and other tax considerations).
79See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Alessio,
528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
8°United States v. Hare, 618 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1980).
81 United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
82United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Peltz,
433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), (alleging bribery of SEC employee with services of prostitutes in
return for revealing non-public "inside" information regarding a forthcoming SEC civil in-
junctive enforcement action against Georgia Pacific Corporation). For the perjury prosecu-
tion of the SEC employee, see United States v. Weiner, SEC Lit. Release No. 4275
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1969), and for the parallel prosecution of another co-conspirator, see
United States v. Mandel, 296 F. Supp 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).83United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979), affd, United States v.
Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1978).
84United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
85United Sates v. Pommerening, 500 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1994).86United States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
87United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding phrase "thing of
value" includes "intangible items"under domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641).
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Kenny International Corporation pleaded guilty to charges that it had
violated the FCPA where, arguably, its only misconduct was to help provide
transportation to residents of Cook Island seeking to vote in a hotly contested
Cook Island election. The Cook Islanders, whose travel costs Kenny Interna-
tional helped subsidize, were stranded in New Zealand. The indictment al-
leged that Kenny International helped them get home to Cook Island so that, if
the ruling party were reelected, Kenny International would be assured of
maintaining its exclusive right to sell Cook Island postage stamps. In the first
plea bargain ever reached under the FCPA, Kenny International agreed to pay
a $50,000 criminal fine and restitution equivalent to the travel costs involved. 
8
E. Authorization of Payment to a Third Party Agent or Consultant While
Knowing that All or a Portion Will be Offered or Given to a Foreign
Government Official8 9
1. Knowing Authorization of Corrupt Payments by Agents
Direct payments of money or property to a foreign official by an issuer
or a domestic concern seldom occur. Possible FCPA bribery violations
usually arise in the context of an issuer's vicarious liability for payments
made by its foreign agents or consultants. An issuer violates the FCPA
when it authorizes or ratifies a proscribed foreign payment made by its third
party agent or consultant:
Authorization can be explicit or implicit. Implicit authorization occurs when
an issuer or domestic concern makes a payment to an agent "knowing" that all
or part may be used in violation of the FCPA. U.S. individuals may also be li-
able for authorizing corrupt acts. In addition to knowing approval, authoriza-
tion may encompass knowing acquiescence or tacit approval by persons who
88 Gary P. Naftalis, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP. 1,
at 2-3 (1997); see also United States v. Kenny Int'l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep 649 (D.D.C. Aug. 2,
1979). Kenny International's plea agreement also required Finbar B. Kenny, the company's
CEO and President, a U.S. resident, in lieu of extradition to the United States, to voluntarily
appear in the High Court of Cook Islands and enter a guilty plea in his individual capacity to
a Cook Islands criminal charge embracing "his participating in a scheme whereby money
payable to Her Majesty the Queen was fraudulently used for private purposes, namely to fi-
nance the charter of aircraft." Id. at 656. Finbar Kenny was also required to voluntarily
travel at his own expense to the Cook Islands to cooperate with Cook Island and New Zea-
land prosecutors, and to give testimony in any civil or criminal proceedings related to pay-
ments made in connection with the March 1978 Cook Islands election. Id. The Cook
Islands is an independent South Pacific nation of 18,000 persons freely associated with New
Zealand for purposes of external affairs and defense. Id. at 649; see United States v. Finbar
B. Kenny & Kenny Int'l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. at 656-60 (D.D.C. 1979). The plea agreement
also required Cook Islands Development Co., Ltd., a Cook Islands corporation which does
business in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands as the Cook Islands Philatelic Bureau and which
was controlled by Finbar Kenny, to plead guilty to a Cook Islands criminal charge identical
to Finbar Kenny's guilty plea. See Kenney, 2 FCPA Rep., at 657.
89 BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.04, § 2.05.
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could have prevented the course of conduct. Ratification of corrupt practices
may also lead to liability.90
When originally passed in 1977, the FCPA proscribed payments to in-
termediaries, i.e., third party agents or consultants, by the U.S. person or is-
suer while "knowing" or "having reason to know" that the agent would use
the monies in whole or in part to bribe a foreign official. The statute, as
originally enacted, did not define "knowing" or "reason to know." U.S. is-
suers and their management were fearful that the "reason to know" lan-
guage could expose them to FCPA criminal liability for mere negligence.
For this reason, in the 1988 Amendments, Congress deleted the phrase "rea-
son to know," and added a definition of "knowing." 91
A person's state of mind "is knowing" with respect to a proscribed
payment by an agent or other intermediary if such person:
(i) "is aware" that the payment is being made, or that the payment "is
substantially certain to occur;" or
(ii) has "a firm belief' that the payment is being made, or "is substan-
tially certain to occur;" or
(iii) "is aware" of "a high probability" that the payment is being made,
or wi I occur.
92
"Knowing" is thus broader than actual knowledge. It encompasses
"conscious disregard," "willful blindness," and "deliberate ignorance," but
does not encompass "simple negligence" or "mere foolishment.
9 3
Two commentators (the author's law partners) list the following "red
flags" that, in combination, might put an issuer on notice that an agent is
bribing a foreign official:
Country: the county involved has a history of widespread corruption,
bribery, and/or FCPA violations.
Industry: the industry involved has a history of FCPA violations. For
example: defense, aircraft, oil, and construction.
Refusal of certification: an agent refuses to certify that he will abide by
the FCPA.
Ties to government: an agent has family or business ties to a government
official.
Anonymity: an agent insists that his identity not be disclosed.
Recommendation by customer: a potential foreign government customer
recommends the agent.
Lack of capability: an agent lacks the staff or facility to perform his
services.
9 Id. § 2.04, at 2-4 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
9'15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)-(B) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 919-21
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1952.
9215 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)-(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
93H.R. CoNF. RE'. No. 100-76, at 920 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1553.
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Agency is illegal: it is illegal under local law for the agent to act as an
agent.
Statement by agent: the agent has stated that a particular amount of
money is needed for him to "get the business" or "make the necessary ar-
rangements."
Size ofpayment or commission: an agent requests a payment or commis-
sion substantially above the going rate or requests a substantial up-front pay-
ment.
Method of payment: an agent requests that payment be made through
some indirect means; requests that the payment be in cash or that checks be
made to cash or bearer; requests that the company prepare false invoices or
other false documents; requests that payments be made in a third country.
94
If an issuer is able to establish adequate "due diligence" procedures in
hiring and retaining foreign agents and consultants, and in monitoring the
on-going conduct of such intermediaries, it will make it much less likely
that "guilty knowledge" on behalf of the issuer and its management will be
inferred when the foreign agent breaches his trust and makes a foreign
bribe.9
2. Foreign Government Official
96
In 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2), "foreign official" is defined as "any offi-
cer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or in-
strumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on
behalf of any such government or department, agency or instrumentality."
State-owned entities are included in this definition. Indeed, the DOJ takes
the position that employees of a state-owned business are government offi-
cials even if local foreign law provides to the contrary.97 However, capital
contributions to, or reimbursement of, expenses of foreign joint ventures
with state-owned enterprises may not constitute corrupt foreign payments
under the statute.98
94
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.05, at 2-5 to 2-6; see also SEC REPORT, supra
note'3; Speech of Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heyman, The Justice Department's
Proposed Program to Provide Advice to Businesses in Connection with Foreign Payments
(Nov. 8, 1979), reprinted in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs, supra note 3.
95For discussion of relevant "due diligence" procedures, see John E. Impert, A Program
for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Foreign Law Restrictions on
the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009 (1990); BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, §
3.01[2][a], [b], and ch. 7. For suggestions involving an FCPA compliance program, see
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, ch. 7; ZARIN, supra note 13, ch. 10; Joseph E. Murphy,
Reducing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Risk: An Effective Self-Policing Program, in
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: How TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION THROUGH SELF-
POLICING (1996); BASRI ET AL., supra note 9, § 28, at 563.
96
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.03.
97See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release Nos. 93-1 (Apr. 20, 1993) and 94-1 (May 13,
1994).
98See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 94-1 (May 13, 1994).
Defending SEC & DOJ FCPA Investigations
18:303 (1998)
Prior to the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, if a foreign governmental
employee's duties were solely "ministerial or clerical," the employee did
not fall within the definition of "foreign official," and, consequently, pay-
ments to such ministerial or clerical employees were not proscribed.99
Since the 1988 Amendments, even government employees who perform
only ministerial or clerical functions may be considered "foreign officials"
for purposes of applying the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. The amended
statute clearly states that "[a]ny" employee may be considered a "foreign
official" when "acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of' the gov-
ernment or a state-owned company.100
That the DOJ regards officers and employees of foreign state-owned
companies as "foreign officials" is clear. For example, Goodyear Interna-
tional Corporation "pleaded guilty and paid a $250,000 fine pursuant to an
information alleging that it had used the United States mail in furtherance
of a plan to bribe officers of a state-owned company in Iraq through which
the Iraqi government purchased tires for resale.
Payments to relatives of foreign officials, hired as consultants or
agents, may, or may not, violate the FCPA, depending upon the particular
circumstances of each case.'02 For example, two DOJ FCPA Review Re-
leases sanctioned the hiring of relatives as agents of foreign government of-
99See DOJ and Dep't of Commerce brochure, supra note 17, at 5.
'0OSee Naftalis, supra note 88, at 5.
'011d. at 4; see also United States v. Goodyear Int'l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.1601
(D.D.C. 1989); the Crawford Enterprises/PEMEX cases - United States v. Crawford Enter-
prises, Inc., 735 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. McLean, 738 F.2d 655 (5th Cir.
1984); McLean v. Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 720 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc., 643
F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc. 826 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. C.E. Miller Corp. and Charles R. Miller, Crim. No. 82-
788 DW, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.(BNA) at 1681 (1982) [guilty pleas]; United States v. Mar-
quis D. King, Crim. No. 83-00020 (D.D.C. 1982) [guilty plea]; United States v. Ruston Gao
Turbines, Inc., No. H-82-207 (S.D. Tex. 1982) [guilty plea]; United States v. Int'l Harvester
Co., Crim. No. H-82-244 (S.D. Tex. 1982) [guilty plea]; United States v. Crawford Enter-
prises, Inc. , Crim. No. H-872-224 (S.D. Tex. 1982) [Indictment]; Andy Pasztor, Pemex
Bribery Case Defendants Found Guilty WALL ST. J., April 5, 1985 (conviction at jury trial of
Donald G. Crawford, Crawford Enterprises, Inc., and certain other defendants); Andy Pasz-
tor, Bribe Plan Involving Mexico Oil Firm Prompts Fines Totalling About $4 Million, WALL
ST. J., June 14, 1985, at 28.
102 See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.03, at 2-3:
P]ayments to employees of a foreign joint venture partner in joint ventures between
US. companies and state-owned enterprises are not necessarily FCPA violations. In a
number of instances, DOJ has approved such arrangements. In 1993, for example, DOJ
considered a proposed joint venture between a U.S. company and a wholly state-owned
enterprise. Under the proposed agreement, the U.S. partner would contribute manage-
ment expertise, while the foreign partner would finance the venture. The parties would
share the profits. The U.S. partner would pay the foreign directors' fees but undertook
to educate the foreign directors regarding FCPA compliance. DOJ approved the pro-
posal.
See DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 93-1 (Apr. 20, 1993).
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ficials.10 3 On the other hand, in United States v. Liebo,1°4 the DOJ success-
fully prosecuted the vice-president of a U.S. company for giving a gift to
the cousin and close friend of a foreign official. The Eighth Circuit held
that the close relationship between the cousin and the official "could have
allowed a reasonable jury to infer that [the defendant] made the gift to [the
cousin] intending to buy [the official's] help in getting the contracts ap-
proved." In fact, the president of the foreign country apgroved the contract
a few weeks after the official's cousin received the gift.
In United States v. Lockheed Corp.10 6 Lockheed was prosecuted for
continuing to pay consulting fees to its foreign agent, Dr. Leila I. Takla, af-
ter she became a member of the Parliament of Egypt. The continuing pay-
ments, and an eventual termination fee, were paid to a corporation
controlled by Takla's husband, Abdelkerim Darwish, who supposedly had
become Lockheed's successor consultant. This recent Lockheed criminal
prosecution highlights the importance of continually monitoring the status
of all foreign agents or consultants. A perfectly legal agency or consultancy
relationship may automatically become corrupt when the agent or consult-
ant thereafter becomes a government official.
107
103 DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 84-1 (Aug. 16, 1984) (company hired relative of
foreign head of state as agent; contract between relative/agent and company contained suffi-
cient precautions); DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release No. 82-4 (Nov. 11, 1982) (after comple-
tion of sale to foreign government, company learned that its agent was the brother of a
government official).
'4United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
'O'ld. at 1311.
1'6United States v. Lockheed Corp., 1 FCPA Rep. 699.176, 699.178 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
The original Lockheed foreign bribery case was an SEC civil injunctive action filed in 1976,
prior to the passage of the FCPA, and a parallel DOJ criminal prosecution filed in 1978. See
SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. et al., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,509 (D.D.C. April 13,
1976).
The matter involved the payment of huge bribes to government officials in Japan to ob-
tain contracts for the purchase of Lockheed L-10 11 Tristar aircraft. Among other Japanese
government officials who were bribed was Prime Minister Tanaka, whose government was
toppled in the ensuing investigations. Tanaka and fourteen other Japanese government offi-
cials were eventually criminally convicted for bribery-related charges in the Japanese courts.
The 1976 Lockheed case, coupled with the U.S. domestic Watergate scandal were principal
catalysts for passage of the FCPA in 1977. See, e.g., Jay S. Albanese, The Lockheed Foreign
Payments Case 10 Years Later: Bribery or Extortion? 9 INT'L J. COMP. & APP. CRIM.
JUSTICE, Spring 1985, at 111; see also Robert Shaplen, The Lockheed Incident, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 23, 1978, at 48-74; Robert Shaplen, The Lockheed Incident-Il, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 30, 1978, at 84-91; cf DAVID BOULTON, THE GREASE MACHINE (1978), ANTHONY
SAMPSON, THE ARMs BAZAAR (1978).
107For interpretations involving "foreign official," see DOJ FCPA Rev. Proc. Release
No. 82-4 (Nov. 11, 1982), 80-1 (Oct. 29, 1989), and 85-2 (Dec. 1985). See also DOJ and
Dep't of Commerce brochure, supra note 17, at 5.
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F. For the Purpose of Influencing Any Official Act or Decision
0 8
For there to be an FCPA bribery violation, the corrupt foreign payment
must be for the purposes of either:
(1) influencing any act or decision of a foreign official in his official
capacity; or
(2) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in viola-
tion of the lawful duty of such official; or
(3) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or deci-
sion of such government or instrumentality. 0 9
Payments to influence the enactment or promulgation of legislation or
regulations fall within the scope of this prohibition n ° but such legislation
or regulations must be tied into the further required element of the bribery
provisions, i.e., "obtaining or retaining business for or with or directing
business, to any person.
'' R
The 1988 Amendments, in order to conform the FCPA to the standards
contained in domestic bribery statutes, added the proscription of "influenc-
ing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, or in-
ducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the
lawful duty of such official."' 1 2 One commentator has noted that "even if a
particular official is not an important decision maker, the FCPA would ap-
ply to payments made to induce the official to use his influence with other
decision makers."
'"13
G. Obtaining or Retaining Business'
1 4
The FCPA foreign bribery proscription has a specific "business pur-
pose" requirement: the payment is illegal only if it was made "in order to
assist [the issuer or domestic concern] in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person."'" s
Black and Witten state that the "desired business need not be with the
foreign government or with the company making the payments."' 16 There
are no litigated cases interpreting this element.
This business purpose element is clearly satisfied when a payment is
made to a government official to induce that official to grant an award of a
101 ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.10.
I915 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1), 2(a)(2) (1994).
"°H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(b) (1994).
1
2H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 918 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1951.
1
3 ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.10, at 4-38.
"4 See, e.g., BLACK & WrrrEN, supra note 13, § 2.06, at 2-6.
"515 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 2 (1994).
1
6 BLACK & WrrTEN, supra note 13, § 2.06.
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contract or concession to the paying issuer or to secure the maintenance or
renewal of any such contract or concession. It is unclear whether bribes to
influence other types of governmental decisions would satisfy the business
purpose element. For example, does a bribe to a foreign legislator to secure
votes in favor of tax legislation beneficial to the issuer, violate the FCPA?
Probably not! This was the type of conduct involved in the United Brands
case, a matter pursued by both the SEC and the DOJ prior to the passage of
the FCPA.
117
United Brands had paid bribes to the President of Honduras and to
other government officials in order to obtain a lower export tax on bananas.
In 1976, after an investigation stimulated by the suicide of the CEO of the
company, the SEC obtained a consent injunction from United Brands al-
leging Rule 10(b)(5) violations based upon the failure of United Brands to
disclose the bribes in its SEC reports." 8  The DOJ followed up with a
criminal prosecution of United Brands charging conspiracy to commit mail
fraud. United Brands pled guilty to the criminal charge.'1 9
The legislative history of the FCPA as passed in 1977 indicates that the
United Brands bribe would not violate the FCPA because it did not relate to
"obtaining or retaining business."'2 ° Congress imposed the "obtain or retain
"7 SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,420 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1976); United States v. United Brands Co., Crim. No. 78-538
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"$United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,420.
"9 United Brands Co., Crim. No. 78-538 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
120See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.06, at 2-7:
Despite the United Brands precedent, both the House and Senate rejected bills that
would have explicitly prohibited corrupt payments unrelated to the award, maintenance,
or renewal of business. The House bill would have prohibited all payments to "influ-
enc[e] any act or decision" of a foreign official or government. While the Senate's final
bill, S.305, contained the ultimately enacted "business purpose" requirement as em-
bodied in the "obtaining or retaining business" language, it also expressly proscribed
payments for the purpose of "influencing legislation or regulations.' The Conference
Committee reconciling the two bills adopted the Senate's "obtaining or retaining" busi-
ness requirements, but not its additional proscription of payments to influence laws and
regulations. In so doing, the Conference Committee explained:
[T hepurpose of the payment must be to influence any act or decision of a foreign of-
ficial (including a decision not to act) or to induce such official to use his influence to
affect a government decision so as to assist an issuer in obtaining, retaining or direct-
ing business to any person.
Because Congress specifically considered and rejected the broader prohibitions con-
tained in both the House and Senate bills, there is a good argument that Congress delib-
erately limited the FCPA's prohibitions to payments intended to influence decisions
about the award or direction of business, and that it did not intend the prohibition to
reach payments to influence other governmental decisions. (citations omitted.)
See also The Foreign Trade Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 2157 Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Econ. Policy & Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 284-85
(1983) (discussing United Brands case as not violating FCPA); Lucinda A. Law & John E.
Davis, The FCPA In Investment Transactions: The Next Generation of Issues, I FCPA. Rep.
106.01, at 106.014 (1997) ("There is an argument that an attempt to influence general legis-
lation is... too removed from the obtaining of business to be covered by the FCPA. The oft-
cited example is the United Brands case....").
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business" limitation on the FCPA's proscribed foreign payments in order to
address jurisdictional principles regarding the reach of domestic legislation
over extra-territorial conduct and to provide comity at the international level
to the sovereignty of foreign nations. It was acknowledged at the time of
passage of the FCPA in 1977, that the new statute would not reach the
United Brands type of case; i.e., a bribe of a foreign government official to
obtain favorable tax legislation. Those cases were left to prosecution by the
foreign country under its local bribery laws and customs.
That the FCPA did not cover United Brands is made clear in the legis-
lative history of the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA. Indeed, this author
testified before Congress that the FCPA should be amended to proscribe
bribes to secure favorable foreign tax legislation. 21 Congress, however,
chose not to include this provision in the 1988 Amendments; it retained the
"obtain or retain business" limitation on proscribed foreign payments.
Nevertheless, commentators presently disagree as to whether the 1988
Amendments to the FCPA broadened the statute enough to proscribe the
United Brands type of bribe, or clarified the meaning of the statute so as to
embrace the prohibition of corrupt payments related solely to the carrying
out of existing business. In 1987, the House version of what became the
1988 Amendments contained a broad prohibition on all corrupt payments to
foreign officials, devoid of any "obtaining or retaining business" limita-
121 The Foreign Trade Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 2157 Before the Subcomm. On
Int 'I Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 284-85
(1983):
Conressman Howard Berman: I wanted to get into this whole notion of why is all this
restricted to obtaining and retaining business? What about that? Should you be able to
- we seem to have a general consensus that you shouldn't be able to pay money, bribe,
to obtain or retain business and a general consensus that we should be able to pay money
to get routine things which should happen anyway..., to get the goods off the dock and
into the stream of commerce, or whatever the right term for all that is.
Should you be able to pay money to get a tax break in foreign countries, to get a judge
to rule your way, to get a foreign parliament or whatever lawmaking process it is to pass
a certain law that makes your profit, some aspect of your business interest that is other
than getting the business or retaining the business? Should that be allowed?
Mr. Mathews: I would say definitely not.
Mr. Berman: Does the present law allow that, by the way?
Mr. Mathews: It is debatable. I think it does. I think the United Brands case would not
be a violation under present law. I think the United Brands type case ought to be covered
if there are changes.
Mr. Berman: Does anybody disagree with that? Mr. Feldman?
Mr. Feldman [formerly with the State Department]: I don't want to say that I disagree
with that particular example, but I do think that it was very deliberate that Congress did
not extend the extraterritorial reach of U.S. criminal law beyond the issue of competition
and award of business.
Once you start getting into the internal life [] of a country you have problems. Those
companies who are resident in a foreign country have to deal day in and day out with
every level of a bureaucracy. Should U.S. law apply to their relations? From a foreign
policy point of view, whatever benefits the FCPA has obtained, and I think there are
many in terms of corporate governance, every time the United States investigates a pay-
ment overseas, it is investigating the foreign official. That is terribly intrusive and terri-
bly damaging to American foreign policy.
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tion.122 That version was rejected, and the 1988 Amendments, as ultimately
adopted, made no change to the business purpose requirement. Neverthe-
less, the House Conference Report on the 1988 Amendments states:
[C]orrupt payments for 'retaining business' in present law is not limited to the
renewal of contracts or other business, but also includes a prohibition against
corrupt payments related to the execution or performance of contracts or the
carrying out of existing business, such as a payment to a foreign official for the
purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment.1"
As a result of this language, some commentators believe both a United
Brands type bribe to obtain favorable legislation, and corrupt payments re-
lated to the "carrying out of existing business" are proscribed, so long as
normal lobbying activities are not criminalized. 124 Don Zarin states:
Under this standard, payments made to an official with the purpose of in-
ducing the official to take an action which assists the U.S. company in carrying
out its existing business would violate the FCPA, even though the payments
were not related to the underlying transaction. For instance, payments to offi-
cials to reduce or eliminate customs duties, to change the classification of a
product, or to circumvent a quota or licensing system would violate the
FCPA. 
125
On the other hand, Black and Witten have the opposite view: "This
part of the Conference Report would appear to conflict with the language of
the statute and with the actual history of the 1988 Amendments. Accord-
ingly, the legislative history is of questionable authority. '126
To the extent that the phrase "obtain, retain or direct business to any
person" is deemed to be ambiguous, 127 it is clear that unless and until courts
122 See H.R. 3, 100th Cong. § 701(a) (1987).
123 See H.R. CONF. REP. 100-576, at 918, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1951.
124
ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.11, at 4-38 to 4-39.1251d. at 4.39 to 4-40.
126BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.06, at 2-7. The 1988 Amendments did not alter
the "obtaining or retaining business" language, and it is basic that Congress (much less a
single house or legislator) cannot amend a statute through legislative history. Central Bank
v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) ("the interpretation given by one Congress
(or a committee or member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning
the meaning of that statute" (citations omitted)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (views of subsequent Congress "form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one," (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); Rus-
sello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) ("subsequent legislative history will rarely
override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and
legislative history prior to its enactment").
127 See Law & Davis, supra note 120, at 106.014 to 106.015:
Congress focused on this ambiguity in its debate of the 1988 FCPA amendments. The
final legislation specifically rejected a House proposal that would have prohibited pay-
ments to procure 'legislative, judicial, regulatory or other action in seeking more favor-
able treatment by a foreign government.' While the conference report stated that the
FCPA prohibits corrupt payments for the 'carrying out of existing business, such as for
... obtaining more favorable tax treatment (the United Brands context),' it also makes
clear that 'retaining business' should not be construed so broadly as to prohibit compa-
nies from lobbying or other 'normal representations to government officials.'
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hold otherwise, both the SEC and the DOJ will pursue civil, administrative
and criminal enforcement actions interpreting the statute broadly to pro-
scribe any corrupt payments intended to influence any governmental deci-
sions that would favorably affect an issuer's business in any regard,
including payments to obtain more favorable tax treatment. 128 This aggres-
sive interpretation is inconsistent with the canon of statutory construction
that criminal laws are to be strictly construed against the government, and
any ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the defendant, i.e., the "rule
of lenity.''
29
Thus, in the Triton Energy/Indonesia case the SEC alleged violations
of the antibribery provisions even though the allegedly illegal payments
were made to obtain benefits from the Indonesian government other than
"obtaining or retaining business" in the strict sense. The payments were
made to change a tax audit, to get recoverable costs certified in cost audits,
to obtain tax refunds, and to obtain an adjustment in pipeline tariff rates. °
And in 1994, the DOJ criminally prosecuted, and obtained guilty pleas from
Vitusa Corporation and its president and sole shareholder, Denny J. Her-
zberg, for payments made to a government official of the Dominican Re-
public for the purpose of expediting the release of the final payment
required under an existing contract for delivering milk powder that had al-
ready been fully performed by Vitusa Corporation.
1 31
(citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 918-919 (1988) (footnote omitted)).
Whether a payment is merely part of legitimate lobbying or is violative of the FCPA is
ultimately a factual question. The risk of liability may be greater, for example, if the sought-
after legislation is a private bill rather than general legislation.
128 BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 4.10[2], at 4-1I:
DOJ and the SEC have made clear that they interpret the business purpose require-
ment more broadly - as proscribing payments intended to influence any discretion-
ary governmental decisions favorable to an issuer's or a domestic concern's
business, including payments [to secure favorable tax relief]. Representatives of
both DOJ and the SEC have indicated that they intend to initiate and conduct inves-
tigations consistent with their interpretation until the issue is resolved adversely to
the government in a litigated proceeding. (citations omitted.)
1
29See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812-13 (1971); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994); Fasulo v.
United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926). See also Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 581 (1990); Note, The Mercy of
Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule ofLenity, 29 HARV. Civ. RTs-CIv. Lm. L. REv.
197 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992); Richard A.
Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CI. L.
REv. 263, 280-81 (1982).
130See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); see also In re David Gore, [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
131 United States v. Vitusa Corp., Cr. No. 93-253 (D.N.J. 1994), 3 FCPA REP. 699.158
(1994) (criminal information); Id. at 699.155 (plea agreement with Vitusa Corporation);
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VIII. OTHER DEFENSE CONSIDERATIONS
A. "Due Diligence": Not a Defense, But a Strong Mitigation Element
Under general federal criminal law principles, a corporation is vicari-
ously liable at the criminal level for the crimes of its employees and agents
committed in the course of their employment so long as the agents intended
to benefit the corporation. 132 Thus, corporate "due diligence" generally has
United States v. Herzberg, Id. at 699.165 (plea agreement with president of Vitusa Corpora-
tion). See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 2.06, at 2-8:
Vitusa's obligations under the contract were completed and there was no prospect of
future business with the Dominican Republic. The payment, therefore, does not appear
to have been for the purpose of "obtaining or retaining business with" or "directing
business to" any person. Nonetheless, the defendants pleaded guilty. The Justice De-
partment and the SEC rely on this plea as "precedent" to support their position, al-
though the defendants did not raise the defense and the issue was not litigated.
However, absent adjudication by a court in contested litigation, SEC civil consent decrees
like those entered in the Triton case, and DOJ guilty pleas like those entered in the Vitusa
Corporation criminal prosecution, are not precedent, and should not dictate what the appro-
priate statutory interpretation really is. See, e.g., United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp.
993, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dismissing criminal charges where government's theory of li-
ability rested on uncontested settlement with the SEC); Lipsky v. Commonwealth United
Corp., 551 F. 2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47
Bus. LAw. 1083, 1141-48 (1992); In the Matter of Carl L. Shipley, 4 SEC Doc. (CCH) 476,
479-80 (June 21, 1974) ("Such orders are of little, if any, precedential weight."); In the
Matter of Bruce I. Newberg, 54 SEC Doc. (CCH) 1972, 1978 (Sept. 1, 1993) (SEC Admin-
strative Law Judge rejecting argument of SEC Staff that respondent should be barred from
securities business by virtue of agency's construction developed through settlement rather
than litigation.); Northrop Corp. v. Triad Fin. Establishment, 593 F. Supp. 928, 941 n.26
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding SEC civil injunctive consent decree "does not have precedential
value for the purposes of applying the FCPA to the Northrop Triad Agreement"); United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1975) (stating consent decrees
should be construed "basically as contracts, without reference to the legislation the Govern-
ment originally sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation").
132 See H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations For The Acts of
Their Employees and Agents, 41 Loy. L. REv. 279, 279 (1995):
Today, corporations are subject to what is in essence strict liability for the criminal
acts of employees who were acting within the scope of their employment and who were
motivated, at least in part, by an intent to benefit the corporation. Although this has
been the law for the better part of this century, corporate counsel and their clients are
often stunned and dismayed when confronted with the prospect of a criminal prosecu-
tion of the corporation resulting from the acts of relatively low level employees.
See also Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393 (1982); Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Li-
ability: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 129 (1984); James R. Elkins, Cor-
porations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Ann
Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward A Better Understanding of Corporate Mis-
conduct, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1287 (1990); Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regu-
lating Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227 (1979); New York
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); United States v. A
& P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958); Dan K. Webb et al., Understanding and Avoiding
Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 Bus. LAw. 617 (1994); Samuel R. Miller &
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not been a defense to corporate criminal liability at the federal level, 133 in
part because of strict concepts of "imputed intent" and "collective knowl-
edge.' 3 4
Thus, "due diligence" per se has not been a defense to an FCPA cor-
rupt foreign payments/bribery charge. 35 In the legislative consideration of
the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, the House bill initially provided for
establishment of a new "safe harbor"/"due diligence" defense against both
civil and criminal liability of issuers and domestic concerns for FCPA vio-
lations by their employees or agents.
[A] firm could not be held vicariously liable for... violations [of the FCPA by
its employees or agents] if it had established procedures "reasonable [sic] ex-
pected to prevent and detect" any such violation, and the officer and employee
Lawrence C. Levine, Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability, 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 41 (1984).
133At the state level, the Model Penal Code has a limited "due diligence" defense against
corporate criminal liability: If the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility
over the subject matter of the offense exercises due diligence to prevent its commission then
the corporation will not have criminal liability so long as the offense is not a "strict liability"
offense or an offense specifically defined in the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE §§
2.07(5), 2.07(l)(1) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). See I KATHLEEN F.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 3.08, at 108-09 (1992); Holland Furnace Co. v.
United States, 158 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946). The clear weight of federal authority today is to
the contrary. See 1 BRICKEY, supra, § 3.08, at 111-12; Dollar S. S. Co. v. United States, 101
F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.
1972); see also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs As a
Defense To Criminal Liability: Can A Corporation Save Its Soul? 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 605
(1995). See Brown, supra note 132, at 308-09:
A corporation's compliance efforts, including its policies and instructions to employ-
ees, should be relevant to a determination whether an employee's actions were within
the scope of employment or whether the employee was acting to benefit the corpora-
tion. However, under the current state of the law, the relevance of corporate policies
and compliance programs to the ultimate questions of liability is by no means clear.
While there is precedent to the effect that a corporation should not be vicariously liable
for the actions of an employee who violates corporate policy or who contravenes an ex-
press instruction, the prevailing view is that compliance programs and policies are not
a defense to vicarious liability. (emphasis added.)
The Model Penal Code, proposed by the American Law Institute in 1962, contained a
corporate "due diligence" defense where a corporation established that "the high managerial
agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due
diligence to prevent its commission." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
...See, e.g., 1 BRICKEY, supra note 133, § 4.05; see also Apex Oil Co. v. United States,
530 F.2d 1291, 1295 (8th Cir. 1976) ("the knowledge of the employee is the knowledge of
the corporation"); United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987),
(collective knowledge as "[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the ele-
ments of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those
components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant
whether employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activi-
ties of employees administering another aspect of the operation....").
13S See Seth Maxwell, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Arguments
Against a Due Diligence Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 UCLA L. REV. 447
(1981).
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with supervisory responsibility for the offending employee's or agent's con-
duct used "due diligence" to prevent the violation.
136
This provision was deleted when the 1988 Amendments were ultimately
enacted.
Nevertheless, the due diligence incident to the establishment and
maintenance of an effective corporate compliance program may be a princi-
pal factor that enables a corporation to avoid criminal prosecution. It may
constitute the key mitigation factor that leads a federal prosecutor to exer-
cise prosecutorial discretion not to indict the corporation, and instead to
pursue criminally solely the individual malefactors.
Even if corporate criminal prosecution is pursued, the "due diligence"
evidenced by a satisfactory corporate compliance program will be a strong
mitigating factor under the federal organizational sentencing guidelines in
assessing the severity of the criminal fine and other criminal sanctions im-
posed against the corporation.
138
136H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, at 922-23 reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1955.
137See, e.g., Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., The Decision to Indict, 24 LrrIGATION 13, 18 (1997)
(in a 1987 Memorandum to United States Attorneys, William C. Hendricks, III, Chief of the
Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, labeled the existence of a compli-
ance program a "significant factor" in determining whether to prosecute a corporation in in-
stances of voluntary disclosure). See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L. J. 1559, 1635 n.448 (1990); see also Harvey L.
Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufnanis, MischiefAfoot: The Need for Incentives to Control Corporate
Criminal Conduct, 71 B.U. L. REV. 447, 452 (1991). But see Robert E. Bloch, Compliance
Programs and Criminal AntiTrust Litigation: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 223 (1988); John H. Schenefeld & Richard J. Farretto, Compliance Programs as Viewed
from the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (1979).
The Department of Justice considers voluntary disclosure and corporate compliance pro-
grams in exercising prosecutorial discretion regarding environmental crimes. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR (199 1).
13 8 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k) (1995); JEFFREY M. KAPLAN
ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PREVENTING
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY (1993-1995); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing
Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1997); Winthrop M. Swenson & Nolan E. Clark, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Three Keys to Understanding the Credit for Compliance Programs, I CORP. CONDUCT Q. 1
(1991); Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and Re-
warding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731 (1996); Charles J. Walsh & Al-
issa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a
Corporation Save Its Soul? 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995); Richard S. Gruner, Towards an
Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law Through Federal
Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 407 (1994); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufrnanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look At Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990); John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege
and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1995); Ronald J. Maurer, Com-
ment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: How Do They Work and What
Are They Supposed To do? 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 799 (1993).
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B. The "Act of State Doctrine"
The "act of state doctrine" has been defined as one of judicial absten-
tion from an inquiry into the validity of an act by a foreign government
within the scope of its sovereignty.13  Since the bribery of a foreign gov-
ernmental official usually affects an act (or inaction) by a foreign govern-
ment within the scope of its sovereignty, the question arises whether the act
of state doctrine would be a defense against an FCPA prosecution of the
briber. To date, this defense has never been interposed in an FCPA crimi-
nal prosecution. It has been litigated, however, in parallel private litigation
in a case where the bribers pleaded guilty to the companion FCPA criminal
prosecution:
140
In 1981, Harry Carpenter, who was then chairman of the board and chief ex-
ecutive officer of... W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick), learned that
the Republic of Nigeria was interested in contracting for the construction and
equipment of an aero medical center at Kaduna Air Force Base in Nigeria. He
made arrangements with Benson 'Tunde' Akindale, a Nigerian citizen,
whereby Akindale would endeavor to secure the contract for Kirkpatrick. It
was agreed that, in the event the contract was awarded to Kirkpatrick, Kirkpa-
trick would pay to two Panamanian entities controlled by Akindale a 'commis-
sion' equal to 20% of the contract price, which would in turn be given as a
bribe to officials of the Nigerian Government. In accordance with this plan,
the contract was awarded to ... W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., International (Kirk-
patrick Intemational), a wholly owned subsidiary of Kirkpatrick; Kirkpatrick
paid the promised 'commission' to the appointed Panamanian entities; and
those funds were disbursed as bribes.... Nigerian law prohibits both the
391Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). See also Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign State is bound to respect the in-
dependence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of
by sovereign powers as between themselves."); Oetgen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
303-04 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-706 (1976). The Third Circuit, in
Envil. Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, & Co. 847 F.2d 1052, 1058 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493
U.S. 400 (1990), stated:
Although earlier formulations of the doctrine were grounded in notions of comity
among sister states, the core concern of modem act of state jurisprudence is preserving
the separation of powers between the federal judiciary and the political branches of our
government - especially, the executive branch, where primary responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs is lodged. As explained by the Supreme Court in Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398.. .(1964), the doctrine "expresses the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both
for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere." Id.
at 423.... Thus, courts are required to decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases that
may embarrass or impede the political branches of government in their conduct of for-
eign affairs. See First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-
68 ...(1972). (citation omitted).
'
4 °See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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payment and the receipt of bribes in connection with the award of a govern-
ment contract."'4 1
Carpenter and Kirkpatrick both pleaded guilty thereafter to FCPA criminal
charges.
142
Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International (Environmental
Tectonics), an unsuccessful bidder for the Kaduna contract, sued the Kirk-
patrick company, Carpenter, Akindale and others for damages. There exists
neither an express nor an implied private civil damages cause of action for
FCPA violations. 143 However, Environmental Tectonics alleged causes of
action pursuant to civil RICO, 144 the Robinson-Patman Act,141 and the New
Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act.' 46 All the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the act of state doc-
trine.
147
The District Court solicited a letter from the Department of State ex-
pressing its views as to the applicability of the act of state doctrine to the
case. Abraham D. Sofaer, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State,
advised the court:
In recent years, the United States Executive Branch has addressed the
question of whether the act of state doctrine requires dismissal of proceedings
that may call for judicial inquiry into the motivations (as opposed to the legal
validity) of the public acts of foreign states. Specifically, as the United States
stated in an amicus curiae brief before the United States Supreme Court:
"[W]hile judicial examination of purpose may on occasion implicate some of
the concerns underlying the act of state doctrine, that doctrine only precludes
judicial-questioning of the validity or legality of foreign government actions.
... None of this Court's decisions suggest that the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes all judicial inquiries that may embarrass a foreign state or affect the po-
litical branches' conduct of foreign relations. Rather, the act of state doctrine
is based on the need to avoid unprincipled decisions resulting from the absence
of legal standards, and the unique embarrassment, and the particular interfer-
ence with the conduct of foreign affairs, that may result from the judicial de-
141Id. at 401-02.
142 See United States v. Harry Carpenter, Cr. No. 85-353 (D.N.J. Oct. 1985). The Kirk-
patrick company was fined $75,000. Carpenter was fined $10,000 and sentenced to three
years probation. The bribe payments totaled approximately $1.7 million, 20% of the $10.8
million contract. The middleman, Akindele, allegedly dispersed the $1.7 million in bribes as
follows: 2.5% for himself; 5% for the Nigerian Air Force; 2.5% for the Nigerian Medical
Group; 5% for the ruling political Party in Nigeria; 2.5% for the involved Nigerian govern-
ment Minister; and 2.5% for key Nigerian defense members. See William F. Pendergast,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of Almost Twenty Years Of Foreign Bribery
Prosecutions 11 (1997), reprinted in A.B. LEVENSON ET AL., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND
THEFCPA 265, at 277 (1997); see also W. S. Kirkpatrick, & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp.,
Int'l, 847 F.2d 1052, at 1055 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988).
143See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
14418 U.S.C. § 1961 etseq.
14515 U.S.C. § 13 etseq.
146N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 41-2 etseq. (West 1995).
'47W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 402 (1990).
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termination that a foreign sovereign's acts are invalid. Judicial inquiry into the
purpose of a foreign sovereign's acts would not require a court to rule on the
legality of those acts, and a finding concerning purpose would not entail the
particular kind of harm that the act of state doctrine is designed to avoid. Dis-
missal of a complaint before the development of evidence, merely because
adjudication raises the bare possibility of embarrassment, constitutes an unwar-
ranted expansion of the act of state doctrine and is contrary to the flexibility
with which that doctrine should be applied."'
148
These statements represent our views. As the Department understands the al-
legations in the instant suit, the validity of the Nigerian Government's decision
to award the contract in question is not in question. If the adjudication of this
suit were to involve a judicial inquiry into the motivations of the Government
of Nigeria's decision to award the contract, the Department does not believe
the act of state doctrine would bar the Court from adjudicating this dispute.
Apart from the act of state question, however, inquiries into the motiva-
tion and validity of foreign states' actions and discovery against foreign gov-
ernment officials may seriously affect United States foreign relations. These
concerns, in the context of this litigation, counsel that caution and due regard
for foreign sovereign sensibilities be exercised at each relevant state in the pro-
ceedings. Moreover, the court should endeavor to assure that no unnecessary
inquiries are made, or allegations tested, during the course of discovery or
trial.
149
In considering the Department of State's views, as well as two prece-
dent cases - Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.150
148W. S. Kirkpatrick, & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 847 F.2d at 1067-68 (empha-
sis in the original) (citing to "U.S. Government amicus curiae briefs in support of petitions
for a writ of certiorari in Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); and in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1997), excerpts reprinted in 1979 DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 965 and 969, respectively").
149Envtl. Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, & Co. 847 F.2d 1052, at 1068-69 (3d Cir.
1988).
150In Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., the Ninth Circuit affirmed
dismissal of an FCPA private civil damages action based upon the act of state doctrine de-
fense; the Court did not address whether an implied private damages cause of action should
be recognized under the FCPA. 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983). The SEC, prior to the passage
of the FCPA, had sued Occidental Petroleum in a civil injunctive action under the Exchange
Act alleging illegal or questionable foreign payments. Occidental consented to a permanent
injunction and agreed to conduct an internal corporate investigation of the alleged illegal
payments and to prepare and file with the SEC a special report describing such payments.
See SEC v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation, SEC Lit. Release No. 8121 (D.D.C. May 8,
1977). On April 17, 1978, the Payments Report (Report of the Special Committee of the
Board of Directors of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Investigated Payments and Ac-
counting Practices of Occidental Petroleum Corporation) was publicized. The Report and its
annexed Source Memorandum disclosed a $200,000 payment in Switzerland of "uncertain
legality" which was inaccurately described in Occidental's books and records. This
$200,000 plus an additional $217,000 were allegedly bribes to Sheikh Sultan bin Ahmed
Muallah (Sultan), the Petroleum Minister of Umm Al Qaywayn, and his son, Sheikh Ahmed
al Mualla (Ahmed), in return for a valuable off-shore oil concession. The country of Umm
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and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America1 - the District Court
stated:
[I]f the inquiry presented for judicial determination includes the motivation of
a sovereign act which would result in embarrassment to the sovereign or con-
stitute interference in the conduct of foreign policy of the United States, in-
quiry is foreclosed by the act of state doctrine.... This has been held to be
equally true of judicial inquiries which would impugn or question the nobility
of a foreign nation's motivations.
152
This District Court, relying on Clayco Petroleum rejected the argument
that the FCPA was intended to be an exception to the act of state doc-
trine; 153 while the doctrine might well not apply to governmental FCPA en-
forcement actions, it surely was relevant to private damages actions
embracing foreign bribery. The District Court also found that "the sugges-
tion of the State Department is neither practical nor constitutional.' 54 The
court felt the State Department's views violated basic "separation of pow-
ers" principles, and would require the Court, in policing discovery efforts in
the case, to exercise executive authority relating to the conduct of the for-
eign affairs of the United States: "There is a notable absence of Constitu-
tional authority for a court to assume responsibility for the conduct of a
segment of foreign policy, which is what the State Department suggests."
155
Al Qaywayn was one of the Trucial States; it is now part of the United Arab Emirates. See
Clayco Petroleum, 712 F.2d at 405-06. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the Umm
Al Qaywayn nation is a foreign sovereign for purposes of the act of state doctrine. Id.
Clayco Petroleum Corp. sued Occidental in a federal antitrust action, alleging that it
(Clayco) was about to receive the concession, but lost it to Occidental as a result of Occi-
dental's bribes. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint based on the act
of state doctrine defense. Id. The Court specifically rejected Clayco's argument that in en-
acting the FCPA, Congress intended to abrogate the act of state doctrine in private suits
based on foreign payments. 712 F.2d at 409.
151 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976).
'52Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. 1381, 1392-93
(D.N.J. 1987) (citations ommitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 51, cmt. d.
153Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp. at 1396:
Clayco Petroleum is also significant because the Court distinguished application of
[the] FCPA and indicated the FCPA is not an exception to the act of state doctrine.
Clayco Petroleum indicates [the] FCPA was intended to stop bribery and noted both the
Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission share enforcement re-
sponsibilities under [the] FCPA. The opinion noted that any governmental enforcement
represents ajudgment of the Executive Branch on the wisdom of bringing a proceeding in
light of the exigencies of foreign affairs. Act of state concerns are thus inapplicable, to
the extent of a[n] FCPA prosecution, since the purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the
judiciary from interfering with the conduct of foreign affairs.... Clayco Petroleum also
suggests it is the screening of governmental proceedings, with State Department consul-
tation, which distinguishes FCPA enforcement from private suits. In private suits, the act
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The District Court dismissed the complaint, based upon act of state
doctrine considerations, finding that in order to prevail the plaintiff would
have to establish that:
the defendants or certain of them intended to wrongfully influence the decision
to award the Nigerian Contract by payment of a bribe, that the Government of
Nigeria, its officials or other representatives knew of the offered consideration
for awarding the Nigerian Contract to Kirkpatrick, that the bribe was actually
received or anticipated and that 'but for' the payment or anticipation of the
payment of the bribe, ETC would have been awarded the Nigerian Contract.
1 56
In reaching its decision to credit the act of state doctrine defense, the
court was particularly influenced by statements the prosecutor had made at
the criminal sentencing of Kirkpatrick that demonstrated the political sensi-
tivities of the case 
in Nigeria.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case.1 58
The Circuit Court agreed that "the award of a military procurement contract
can be, in certain circumstances, a sufficiently formal expression of a gov-
ernment's public interests to trigger application" of the act of state doc-
trine.159 However, on the facts of the case, the Court held the act of state
doctrine should not be applied. The Court relied primarily on the letter to
the District Court from the Legal Adviser to the State Department. While
not controlling, the Circuit Court found persuasive that the Executive
Branch had spoken through the State Department and had declared that liti-
gation of the case would not harm the Executive Branch's foreign affairs re-
sponsibilities.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit and allowed the litiga-
tion to proceed.' 60 The Supreme Court squarely held that "the factual predi-
cate for application of the act of state doctrine does not exist. Nothing in
1561d. at 1393 (citation omitted).
157Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven Levy had made the following representations to the
court at the Jan. 6, 1986 sentencing of Kirkpatrick:
Your Honor, I guess I would also like to say that the political impact of this
case.. .cannot be underestimated.. .I can say that the government of Nigeria as well as the
State Department [of the United States] have shown a vital interest in this case. In fact,
the State Department has been very concerned about the possible political impact upon
the Government of Nigeria if the Grand Jury disclosed certain information about who
possibly received the payments which are set forth in the memorandum that Mr. Carpen-
ter wrote to other senior officers of the corporation. I have as attorney for the Govern-
ment [of the United States], your Honor, been resisting attempts by the Nigerian
government to find out this information because I have not had a disclosure order and the
State [Dlepartment has its concerns about what would happen if the government of Nige-
ria actually knew who was involved in this scheme to sort of rip off money from this Ni-
gerian contract. This is not a case where there is not a victim. Shagarl, who was the
president of Nigeria at the time of this contract[,] is now under house arrest. Some of
these other individuals [,] and I can name them if the court is interested, are very promi-
nent military figures who are still in power in Nigeria. The Nigerian government would
certainly like to have their names....
Id. at 1387.
l58Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988).
' 91d. at 1058.
160W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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the present suit requires the Court to declare invalid... the official act of a
foreign sovereign.' 61 The Court explained that "[t]he act of state doctrine
is not some vague doctrine of abstention" but instead is a "principle of deci-
sion binding on federal and state courts alike" which assures that "the act
within its own boundaries of one sovereign state ... becomes... a rule of
decision for the courts of this country."1' 2 Since the present litigation did
not require the court to declare illegal the contract between Nigeria and
Kirkpatrick, there was no occasion to apply the act of state doctrine as a de-
fense to continued litigation of the claims. 63
The Court distilled its holding in the following conclusion:
The short of the matter is this: Courts in the United States have the
power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies prop-
erly presented to them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an excep-
tion for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but
merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid. That doctrine has
no application to the present case because the validity of no foreign sovereign
act is at issue.
164
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Kirkpatrick, it is difficult to
imagine a factual scenario in which the act of state doctrine would be a vi-
able defense in a civil or criminal FCPA enforcement action pursued by the
DOJ or the SEC.
165
C. National Security Exemption
There is a "national security exemption" from the books and records
and internal accounting controls provisions of Section 13(b)(2) of the Ex-
change Act. This exemption does not apply, however, to the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA. 66 The exemption may be invoked only when the
person claiming its benefit is acting in cooperation with the head of a fed-
eral department or agency responsible for national security matters and
when the cooperative act is performed pursuant to a specific, written direc-
tive of an agency or department head authorized by the President to issue
such directives. Any directive that triggers the national security exemption
6Id. at 405.
162Id. at 406 (quoting Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304,310 (1918)).
1631d.
:
Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide - that is, when the outcome of
the case turns upon - the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. When that
question is not in the case, neither is the act of state doctrine. That is the situation here.
Regardless of what the court's factual findings may suggest as to the legality of the Nige-
rian contract, its legality is simply not a question to be decided in the present suit, and
there is thus no occasion to apply the rule of decision that the act of state doctrine re-
quires. (emphasis in the original).
'6/d. at 409-10.
165 See, e.g., Veronica Ann DeBerardine, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
Creating an Exception to the Act of State Doctrine, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 203 (1984).
166See Section 13(b)(3)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 m(b)(3)(A) (1988).
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from the recordkeeping and accounting provisions expires one year after it
has been issued unless it is renewed in writing.
The Conference Committee Report discussing the national security ex-
emption demonstrates that it is very narrow in scope: A person or entity is
exempt from compliance obligations only with respect to matters that
"would result, or would be likely to result, in the disclosure of information
which has been classified by the appropriate department or agency for pro-
tection in the interests of the national security and then only to the extent
that such information is specifically related to the person's lawful coopera-
tion.' ' 167 Any department or agency head must submit an annual summary
of all such directives to designated congressional oversight committees. 68
Since SEC enforcement actions, as well as DOJ or Independent Coun-
sel criminal prosecutions sometimes involve CIA activity or other national
security matters, the national security exemption might be implicated in an
FCPA investigation sometime in the future.
D. The Possibility of "Cultural Defenses" When A Foreign Agent or
Consultant Is Involved in an FCPA Case
Foreign nationals and recent immigrants have from time to time at-
tempted to use various "cultural defenses" to excuse or justify criminal
acts.169  A cultural defense is an argument that a defendant's allegedly
criminal conduct was justified or should be excused because the conduct is
acceptable and legal in the defendant's native country or culture. 170 Even if
a cultural defense does not achieve an acquittal at trial, 171 it might influence
167 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, at 11 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4124.
168See Section 13(b)(3)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(B) (1994).
169 See, e.g., Charles M. Carberry & Harold K. Gordon, The Use of Cultural Defenses in
Representing Foreign Nationals, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MATERIALS, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 1997 (1997); Sharon M. Tomao, The Cultural Defense: Traditional Or For-
mal? 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241 (1966); Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts In
Court: Should The American Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize A "Cultural De-
fense"?, 99 DICK. L. REv. 141 (1994); Dorianne Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice
Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 1093 (1996); Alison
Matsumoto, A Place For Consideration Of Culture In The American Criminal Justice Sys-
ten: Japanese Law And The Kimura Case, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 507 (1995); Holly Magui-
gan, Cultural Evidence And Male Violence: Are Feminists and Multiculturalist Reformers on
a Collision Course In Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1995); Daina C. Chiu, The
Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, And Guilty Liberatism, 82 CAL. L. REv.
1053 (1994); Charles M. Carberry & Harold K. Gordon, Anatomy Of An Acquittal: The
Cultural Use of Cash, 9 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1 (Apr. 1996) [hereinafter Anatomy Of
An Aquittal]; Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1293
(1986).
170See Tomao, supra note 169, at 242; Goldstein, supra note 169, at 155.
171 See Anatomy OfAn Acquittal, supra note 169.
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prosecutorial discretion, 172 or might be a factor in mitigation at sentenc-
ing.
173
When a foreign agent or consultant is involved in an FCPA case, coun-
sel should explore whether some type of cultural defense might be pursued,
particularly if the defense would defeat establishment of the "corrupt" mens
rea required for FCPA bribery offenses: 174
In White Collar cases a frequent example of where cultural differences
are raised as a defense is in response to bribery allegations against foreign na-
tionals who attempt bribes. In these situations individuals have urged that in
their homeland, for example Nigeria, it is necessary to bribe officials to have
them do their duties. Indeed, even United States law recognizes the need to
make 'grease' payments to foreign officials in certain countries to ensure rou-
tine government actions are performed.... In addition, in other countries,
such as Turkey, receiving a bribe is illegal but making an offer to bribe is not.
The argument that based on the culture of the bribe offeror's country he be-
lieved the American bribe was necessary or not illegal is best made in an at-
tempt to convince the prosecutor not to bring the charge. However, absent
that, it may be admissible at trial to establish the defendant did not have the
intent to violate the statute.1 75
172 See The Use of Cultural Defenses, supra note 169, at E-3 and 4 (citing examples of
cases in which cultural evidence caused prosecutor to charge a reduced crime); see also
Goldstein, supra note 169, at 147-149 (discussing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985)); Matsumoto, supra note 169.
173 One court found that defense counsel's failure to offer cultural evidence at sentencing
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kwan Fai Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp.
1490, 1499-1501 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Carbonell, 737 F. Supp. 186
(E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Gariria, 804 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Matsumoto,
supra note 169, at 525-31.
174 Cf Tomao, supra note 169, at 244:
Where the subjective state of mind is an element of the crime, the prosecution is re-
quired to establish the defendant had a particular mindset at the time she committed the
wrongful act. Such state of mind must generally be inferred from the words and the con-
duct of the defendant. Where the prosecution tries to create an inference of criminal in-
tent, the defense counsel is invited to introduce evidence of extenuating circumstances,
such as the extent to which the defendant's cultural identity influenced her actions. if the
defendant could demonstrate the inference is improper given her cultural differences, the
prosecution will fail to prove the requisite mens rea.
175 The Use of Cultural Defenses, supra note 169, at E-3; cf. United States v. Yu, 954
F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048 (1993).
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IX. FCPA BOOKS AND RECORDS AND INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS
PROVISIONS.7 6
The defense of an FCPA investigation often extends beyond the for-
eign bribery provisions and embraces the statute's books and records and
internal accounting controls provisions that are contained in section
13(b)(2)-(7) of the 1934 Act. 177 The bookkeeping and accounting provisions
only apply to "issuers," not to "domestic concerns." But they apply to all of
an issuer's business activities - domestic as well as foreign - and include
all payments, transactions and dispositions of assets, not solely foreign or
domestic bribes or other corrupt payments.
178
Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires every SEC registered or reporting issuer
to "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable de-
tail, accurately and fairly reflect ,the transactions and dispositions of the as-
sets of the issuer., 179  Violation of this bookkeeping provision does not
require proof of "materiality" or proof of "scienter. ,18 The "in reasonable
176 See, e.g., BLACK & WrTEN, supra note 13, § 6.1; ZARIN, supra note 13, ch. 3; Com-
mittee on Corporate Law and Accounting, American Bar Association, A Guide to the New
Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus.
LAW. 307, 327-43 (1978) [hereinafter ABA, Guide to Section 13(b)(2)] ; Committee on Cor-
porate Law and Accounting, American Bar Association, Practical Implications of the Ac-
counting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and Recent
Developments, 35 Bus. LAW. 1713 (1980) [hereinafter ABA, Practical Implications]; Lloyd
H. Feller, An Examination of the Accounting Provisions of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 245 (1982); Daniel L. Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act - The Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control,
5 J. CoRP. L. I (1979); John W. Bagby, Enforcement ofAccounting Standards in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 21 AN1. Bus. L.J. 213 (1983); E. William Cattan Jr., Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Accounting Provisions, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 422 (1988); Mary Jane Dundas
& Barbara C. George, Historical Analysis of the Accounting Standards of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST U. L. REv. 499 (1980); Note, The Accounting Provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Alternative Perspective on SEC Intervention in Cor-
porate Governance, 89 YALE L.J. 1573 (1980); George J. Siedel, Internal Accounting Con-
trols Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Federal Law of Corporations, 18 AM.
Bus. L.J. 444 (1981); Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara C. George, Responsibilities of Domestic
Corporate Management Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv.
865, 871-85 (1980); The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An
Analysis, Exchange Act Release No. 17,500, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,632H, at 17,231
(Jan. 29, 1981).
'715 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)-(7) (1994).
1782 BRICKEY, supra note 133, § 9:20, at 279:
Indeed, the recordkeeping and accounting requirements imposed by the Act apply
to domestic corporations that conduct no business abroad and conduct no business
with foreign entities here in the United States. The accounting control requirements
thus may operate independently of the antibribery provisions and of the concerns
that led to their enactment.
179 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1994).
'SSee SEC v. World-Wide Coins Inv., 567 F. Supp. 724, 729 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also
Exchange Act Release No. 15,770 (SEC explaining noncriminal violation of Section
13(b)(2) and the rules thereunder do not require proof of scienter).
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detail" phrase substitutes for materiality,181 and has as its purpose "to effec-
tively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes" through
the requirement of the establishment and maintenance of a system of re-
cording financial transactions in accordance with accepted accounting and
auditing methods.11
2
Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires SEC registered or reporting issuers to:
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances that - (i) transactions are executed in accordance
with management's general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are re-
corded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in con-
formity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and (I) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's gen-
eral or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is
compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate ac-
tion is taken with respect to any differences.
183
In the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, Congress clarified the "reason-
able detail" phrase in Section 13(b)(2)(A), and the "reasonable assurances"
phrase in Section 13(b)(2)(B), by stating in newly added Section 13(b)(7)
that if the degree of detail or assurauce "would satisfy prudent officials in,, . ,,184
the conduct of their own affairs," then it is "reasonable. Congress also
provided in the 1988 Amendments that criminal liability may not be im-
posed for violating the recordkeeping provisions of Section 13(b)(2)(A) or
the internal accounting provisions of Section 13(b)(2)(B) unless the violator
"knowingly" falsifies any book, record or account required to be kept, or
"knowingly" circumvents or "knowingly" fails to implement the required
system of internal accounting controls."' The addition of the knowledge re-
quirement for criminal enforcement was intended to provide a means of
preventing the imposition of criminal misdemeanor or felony penalties for
"insignificant or technical infractions or inadvertent conduct."'8 6 Section
13(b)(2)(A) and (B) impose the bookkeeping and internal accounting re-
quirements solely on "issuers." However, Section 13(b)(5), added to the
statute in the 1988 Amendments, provides: "No person shall knowingly
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal accounting
controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account described in
...See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-831, at 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121, 4122
(adding the "in reasonable detail" qualification "in light of the concern that such a standard,
if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic.").
1821d.
1315 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1994); see ZARIN, supra note 13, § 3.2, at 3-15.
18415 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (1994).
185 See Sections 13(b)(4)-(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(4)-(5) (1988).
18615 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (1994); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)-(5) (1994); 134 CoNG.
REc. H2115 (1988). This provision was also intended to assure that criminal penalties
would be imposed for deliberate efforts to evade the accounting provisions. Id.
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[Section 13(b)(2)].', 187 By reason of this provision, officers, directors, em-
ployees, agents of the issuer, and other natural persons, can be criminally
prosecuted for Section 13(b)(2) violations. The SEC has consistently taken
the position that it can bring civil and administrative enforcement actions
against individuals who "cause" an issuer to violate Section 13(b)(2).
188
Section 13(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, added to the statute in the 1988
Amendments, clarifies the responsibilities of issuers for Section 13(b)(2)
compliance by their subsidiaries and joint venture partners" It has always
been assumed that an issuer is liable for Section 13(b)(2) compliance by its
controlled (i.e., over fifty percent ownership) subsidiaries.'90 However,
during the first decade of the administration of the FCPA, it was unclear
whether, and, if so, when an issuer would be liable for Section 13(b)(2)
violations by a subsidiary or a joint venture partner that the issuer did not
control. 191 Section 13(b)(6) provides that where an issuer holds fifty per-
cent or less of the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm
(i.e., a noncontrolled subsidiary or joint venture partner), Section 13(b)(2)
(encompassing both the bookkeeping and internal accounting controls pro-
visions)
require[s] only that the issuer proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the
extent reasonable under the issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic or
foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
consistent with [Section 13(b)(2)]. 92
Section 13(b)(6) further provides that the reasonableness of the issuer's
good faith efforts include consideration of such circumstances as:
the relative degree of the issuer's ownership of the domestic or foreign firm
and the laws and practices governing the business operations of the country in
which such firm is located.... An issuer which demonstrates good faith ef-
forts to use such influence shall be conclusively presumed to have complied
with the requirements of [Section 13(b)(2)].
193
The SEC has promulgated two 1934 Act rules to effectuate the book-
keeping provisions of Section 13(b)(2)(A), and has publicly identified "five
conceptual elements" that an issuer and its management and auditors should
take into account in evaluating whether an internal accounting controls
system satisfies Section 13(b)(2)(B).
194
11715 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
188 See, e.g., SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Sec. Lit. Release No. 15, 266, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 74,405, at 63,476 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Sec. Lit.
Release No. 15,396, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,446 at 63,541 (D.D.C. June 26, 1997); In
re Gore, Exchange Act Release No. 38,343, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,468
(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
"915 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1994).
190See, e.g., ABA, Practical Implications, supra note 176, at 1726-30.
'9' BLACK & WiTTEN, supra note 13, § 6.02[2], at 6-4 to 6-6.
19215 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1994).
193id.
1
94See 2 BRICKEY, supra note 133, § 9:20, at 278.
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SEC 1934 Act Rule 13b2-1 provides: "No person shall directly or in-
directly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject
to section 13(b)(2)(A). . . 9 Since Rule 13b 2-1 applies to anyperson, its
proscription is not limited to persons "inside" the corporate issuer, i.e., offi-
cers, directors and employees or agents; consequently, the rule has been
used by the SEC as a basis for enforcement action against such "outsiders"
as customers and suppliers.
1 96
SEC 1934 Act Rule 13b 2-2 seeks to ensure the integrity of the audit
process. It provides:
No director or officer of an issuer shall, directly or indirectly, (a) Make or
cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement, or (b) Omit to
state, or cause another person to omit to state, any material fact necessary in
order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading, to an accountant in connection
with (1) any audit or examination of the financial statements of the issuer re-
quired to be made pursuant to this subpart or (2) the preparation or filing of
any document or report required to be filed with the Commission pursuant to
this subpart or otherwise.
19T
Rule 13b 2-2 applies to both oral and written statements made or sub-
mitted to an auditor. Thus, oral misrepresentations by an officer or director
during the course of the issuer's annual audit will violate the Rule, if the
materiality element is satisfied, and will be a criminal felony if the knowl-
edge/intent element is proven.
198
In determining whether an issuer's system of internal accounting con-
trols satisfies Section 13(b)(2)(B), the SEC has identified the following five
conceptual elements:
-First, evaluation of the overall control environment;
-Second, translation of the broad objectives of internal accounting control
into specific control objectives applicable to the particular business, organiza-
tional and other characteristics of the individual company;
-Third, consideration of the specific control procedures and individual
environment factors which should contribute to achievement of the specific
control objectives;
'9 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b 2-1 (1997); see also Promotion of the Reliability of Information
and the Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments or
Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 1979 SEC LEXIS 2141 (Feb. 15, 1979);
ZARmIN, supra note 13, § 3.1 [D][1], at 3-11.
196See, e.g., In re Ngai King Tak, Exchange Act Release No. 7443, 1997 SEC LEXIS
1759 (Aug. 28, 1997); SEC v. Mangel, SEC Litig. Release No. 15,465, 1997 SEC LEXIS
1764 (Aug. 28, 1997); In re Kuntz, Exchange Act Release No. 36,281, 1995 SEC LEXIS
2490 (Sept. 26, 1995); SEC v. Excal Enterprises, Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 14,651, 1995
SEC LEXIS 2492 (Sept. 26, 1995); In re Richard D. Russell, Exchange Act Release No.
36,280, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2489 (Sept. 26, 1995).
'9717 C.F.R. § 240.13b 2-2 (1997). See also Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 1979
SEC LEXIS 2141 (Feb. 15, 1979); ZARIN, supra note 13, § 3.1 [D][2], at 3-13.
198See 2 BRICKEY, supra note 133, §§ 9:25 and 9:26, at 284-85.
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-Fourth, monitoring of control procedures and consideration of whether
they are functioning as intended; and
Finally, consideration of the benefits (consisting of reductions in the risk
of failing to achieve the objectives) and costs of additional or alternative con-
trols.1
99
To satisfy the FCPA, an issuer's system of internal accounting controls
"may require incorporation of factors defined in auditing literature as 'ad-
ministrative controls,' which not infrequently overlap with 'accounting
controls."' 200
Two important issues under Section 13(b)(2) that remain unclear are (i)
what precisely is embraced by an issuer's "books, records, and accounts, "
20 1
and (ii) what level of detail will constitute "reasonable detail" to accurately
and fairly reflect transactions and disposition of assets of the issuer.02
The FCPA does not define "books, records, and accounts." However,
Section 3(a)(37) of the 1934 Act, added to the statute in 1975 - two years
prior to passage of the FCPA - defines "records" to include "accounts,
correspondence, memorandums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other
documents or transcribed information of any type, whether expressed in or-
dinary or machine language."20 The SEC, the accounting profession, and
the private bar have never clearly agreed on whether Section 3(a)(37) gov-
ems Section 13(b)(2), or whether some more narrow definition applies to
the FCPA's internal accounting controls provision.204 The accounting pro-
fession and the bar advocated that Section 13(b)(2)(A)'s "books, records,
and accounts" should only apply to records that are relevant to the prepara-
tion of financial statements.2  The SEC initially disagreed,20 6 but thereafter
"retreated and took a stance closer to that advocated by the private bar and
accountants." 20 7 SEC Chairman Harold Williams stated that "we believe
that records which are not relevant to accomplishing the objectives speci-
fied in the statute for the system of internal controls are not within the pur-
view of the recordkeeping provision."20 8
199Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Controls, Exchange Act Release
No. 15,772, 1979 SEC LEXIS 1673 (Apr. 30, 1979).
2002 BRiCKEY, supra note 133, § 9:20, at 279.
20 1 See BLACK & WrrrEN, supra note 13, § 6.03[1].
202 See id. § 6.03[2].
20315 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(37) (1994).
2
04 See BLACK & Wrr EN, supra note 13, § 6.03[l].
2OSSee, e.g., ABA, Guide to Section 13(b)(2), supra note 176, at 313.
206See Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 1979 SEC LEXIS 2141 (Feb. 15, 1979)
(1979); see also ABA Symposium, Practical Implications of the Accounting Provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and Recent Developments: A Program by Com-
mittee on Corporate Law andAccounting, 35 Bus. Law. 1713, 1726-30 (1980) (comments of
Edward D. Herlihy, Assistant Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
207
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.03[1], at 6-7.
2
11 Id. For an analysis of the evolution of the SEC's interpretation of the accounting
standards provision of Section 13(b)(2)(B), see Siedel, Internal Accounting Controls Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Federal Law of Corporations? 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 444,
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Black and Witten advocate a middle position:
As a practical matter, neither [the SEC nor the accounting profession/bar]
approach is entirely satisfactory. Limiting the provision's applicability to rec-
ords necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements arguably
would mean, for example, that Section 13(b)(2)(A) did not prohibit the forging
of board minutes to reflect falsely the authorization of an expenditure. Such a
falsification of corporate records is arguably well within the intent of the ac-
counting provisions. On the other hand, expanding the provision's applicabil-
ity to every scrap of paper or electronic bit of information that enters a public
company, as the SEC Staff has suggested, imposes an obligation far broader
than Congress could have intended and compliance with which may well be
impossible.
The best interpretation, and the one that provides useful guidance for the
vast majority of situations, is that Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires issuers to
maintain accounting and other records that reflect accurately the economic
events and activities of the corporation. This definition encompasses within
"books, records, and accounts" those accounting records necessary to prepare
financial statements in accord with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Thus, not only internal corporate records, such as ledgers and journal entries,
but also records of corporate transactions with third parties, such as agreements
with third party vendors, would be covered. It also encompasses other corpo-
rate records and documents relating to the official business of the corporation,
including for example, minutes of board meetings and board resolutions. It
would not, however, cover every memorandum or note taken by an employee
relating to any business matter.
The "in reasonable detail" language of the books and records provision
is not intended to impose upon issuers an unreasonable duty of care; rather,
it is intended to "make[ ] clear that the issuer's records should reflect trans-
actions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events
and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of
bribes. 2 10 In the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, Congress defined "rea-
sonable detail" to mean "such level of detail ... as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct of their own affairs." 211 Congress specifically de-
clined to include a cost-benefit analysis in the definition of "reasonable de-
tail.
212
459-65 (1981). See also Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara George, Historical Analysis of the
Accounting Standards of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 499
(1980); Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara George, Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate Man-
agement Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 865 (1980).
209
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.03[1], at 6-7 to 6-8.2
'0 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-831, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4122.
211 15 U.S.C. §78m (b)(7)(1994).
212H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576 (1988), at 917, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1950:
The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to clarify that
the current standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude or precision.
The concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the weighing of a number of
relevant factors, including the costs of compliance. The Conferees therefore deleted the
Senate cost-benefit language as superfluous and in response to concerns that such a
statutory provision might be abused and weaken the accounting provisions at a time of
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The FCPA's accounting provisions have provided the basis for a broad
array of administrative, civil and criminal enforcement actions by the SEC
and the DOJ. 213 Section 13(b)(2) violations were alleged as a principal part
of the SEC's recent civil and administrative enforcement actions in the
Triton Energy/Indonesia case.214
A. New Section 1OA of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 1OA-1
215
The importance of the books and records and internal accounting con-
trols provisions of Section 13(b)(2) is highlighted by new Section 10A of
the 1934 Act, added to the statute as part of the Private Securities Litigation
increasing concern about audit failures and financial fraud and resultant recommenda-
tions by experts for stronger accounting practices and audit standards.
See also the October 1987 "Treadway Commission" Report: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL
REPORTING (1987). For a synopsis of what constitutes "internal accounting controls," and
what controls the statute requires, see BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.04[l] & [2].213See, e.g., SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
SEC v. Montedison, S.P.A., SEC Litig. Release No. 15,164 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1996); SEC v.
Ferrofluidics Corp.., SEC Litig. Release No. 15,508, SEC LEXIS 1998 (Sept. 25, 1977);
SEC v. Oracle Systems Corp., SEC Litig. Release No. 13,808, 1993 SEC LEXIS 2569 (Sept.
29, 1993); In re Platinum Software Corp., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 37,185, 1996
SEC LEXIS 1292 (May 9, 199); In re Kurzweil Applied Intelligence, Inc., SEC Exchange
Act Release No.36,021, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1874 (July 25, 1995); SEC v. Bradstreet, SEC
Litig. Release No. 14,571, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1927 (July 26, 1995); In re Maynard, Exchange
Act Release No. 36,022, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1894 (July 25, 1995); United States v. Brad-
Street, SEC Litig. Release No. 15,187, 1996 SEC LEXIS 3407 (Dec. 16, 1996) (indictment
of Kurveil officials for lying to auditors; at trial on May 14, 1996, Kurzweil's President,
Bernard Bradstreet was convicted; Kurzweil's Vice President of Sales, Thomas Campbell
was convicted; Kurzveil's Vice-President of Operations was acquitted); United States v.
Bradstreet, 1998 WL 25231 (Ist Cir. 1998) (affirmance of criminal convictions); United
States v. Harry Scharf, No. CR-84-7b (N.D. Ohio 1984), 2 FCPA Rep. at 696.72 (criminal
prosecution of Rule 13b2-2 violation for falsely certifying to outside auditors that company
management was not aware of any illegal corporate payments). In re Rangos, SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 35693, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1113 (May 9, 1995); In re Maury, SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 23, 067, 1986 SEC LEXIS 2229 (March 26, 1986); In re Diag-
nostek, Inc., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 36877, 1996 SEC LEXIS 490 (Feb. 23, 1996).
Like the FCPA's bribery provisions, there is no express or implied private right of action
to enforce the FCPA's accounting provisions. The SEC's General Counsel's Office initially
advocated an implied private right of action, but the courts have consistently rejected this
approach. Compare Opinion of [SEC] Office of the General Counsel on the Existence of a
Private Right of Action Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,701 (1978) with Shields ex Rel. Sundstrand Corp. v.
Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 688 (N. D. Ill. 1989); Eisenberger v. Spectex Indus., Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 48, 50-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Lewis ex rel. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, 612 F.
Supp. 1316, 1326-34 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
214 See infra Parts X.A.2 and X.C.
215See Andrew W. Reiss, Powered by More than GAAS: Section 10A of the Private Se-
curities Litigaton Reform Act Takes the Accounting Profession for a New Ride, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1261 (1997).
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Reform Act of 1995.216 Section 10A requires that each audit under the
1934 Act shall include:
(1) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of finan-
cial statement amounts; (2) procedures designed to identify related party trans-
actions that are material to the financial statements or otherwise require
disclosure therein; and (3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt
about the ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing
fiscal year.217
Section 10A also imposes expanded obligations on auditors to report in
a timely manner certain uncorrected illegal acts to an issuer's audit com-
mittee or board of directors,218 and requires the issuer, or if the issuer fails
to do so then the auditor, to provide information regarding the illegal act to
the SEC.2 19
21615 U.S. C. § 78j-l(a) (1995).
217Section 10A(f) defines "illegal act" as "an act or omission that violates any law, or
any rule or regulation having the force of law." Id.; see also CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 54, § 317.02 ( Ameri-
can Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) ("the term illegal acts... refers to violations
of laws or governmental regulations.").218 5ee Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Final
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38,387, 1997 SEC LEXIS 545, at 133-34 (Mar. 12, 1997):
Under Section 10A(b), if, while conducting the audit of the issuer's financial state-
ments, the auditor becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act (whether
or not material to the financial statement) has occurred or may have occurred, then the
auditor would be required, in accordance with GAAS ... to determine whether it is
'likely' that an illegal act has occurred and, if so, its possible effect on the financial
statements (including any contingent monetary effects, such as fines, penalties, and
damages). The auditor would be required to inform the issuer's management of the il-
legal act 'as soon as practicable.' In addition, the auditor must assure him/herself that
the issuer's board of directors is adequately informed, by management or otherwise, of
any detected illegal act. (citations omitted.)219 1d. at 134:
The three conclusions set forth in Section 1OA(b)(2) that trigger the auditor's obligation
to report to the board are that: I. the illegal act has a material effect on the issuer's fi-
nancial statements, 2. senior management has not taken, and the board of directors has
not caused senior management to take, timely and appropriate remedial actions with re-
spect to the illegal act, and 3. the failure to take remedial action is reasonably expected
to warrant either a departure from the auditors'standard audit report, when made, or the
auditor's resignation from the audit engagement.
If the board of directors receives a report that the auditor has reached these conclu-
sions, then the board has one business day to notify the Commission that it received
such a report. If the auditor does not receive a copy of the board's notice to the Com-
mission within that one business day period, then by the end of the next business day
the auditor is required to furnish directly to the Commission a copy of the report given
to the board (or the documentation of any oral report). The auditor's resignation from
the audit engagement does not engage the auditor's obligation to furnish his or her re-
port to the Commission in these circumstances.
(citations omitted.)
The SEC cautions that "[t]he auditor should consider both the quantitative and qualitative
materiality of the act, including contingent liabilities that might be created by the illegal act."
Id. at 134 n.13. See also SAS 54, 13, AU 317.13 and SAD 47, Audit Risk and Materiality
in Conducting an Audit, 6 (June 30, 1984), AU § 312.06.
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Since one of the purposes of Section I0A's requirement of reporting to
the SEC is to facilitate the SEC's timely conduct of enforcement recom-
mendations, the SEC promulgated 1934 Act Rule 10A-1 to provide effec-
tive implementation of Section 10A. Rule 1OA-1 provides (i) that Section
10A notices be provided to the SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant, (ii)
that the notice be in writing, and contain certain prescribed information
about the issuer, the auditor, and the likely illegal act and its possible effect
on the issuer's financial statements, (iii) that the auditor shall have a "safe
harbor" from civil liability respecting Section 10A notices to the issuer and
to the SEC,220 (iv) that providing a Section 10A notice or report to the issuer
or the SEC does not, in any way, affect the obligations of the issuer or the
auditor to file and make all applicable public disclosures otherwise required
by SEC rules,221 and (v) that the Section 1OA report filed with the SEC
shall be deemed to be an investigative record and shall be non-public and ex-
empt from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act to the same
extent and for the same periods of time that the Commission's investigative re-
cords are non-public and exempt from disclosure under, among other applica-
ble provisions, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7) and § 200.80(b)(7) of this chapter.222
X. THE TRITON ENERGY/INDONESIA CASE
The recent SEC civil injunctive/enforcement action against Triton En-
ergy Corporation, a Dallas, Texas-based U.S. multinational issuer, and two
former senior officers of Triton Indonesia, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Triton Energy, and the related SEC administrative cease-and-desist pro-
ceedings against two former executives of Triton Energy and two former
managers of Triton Indonesia highlight the FCPA exposure of U.S. compa-223
nies utilizing the services of third party foreign agents. The SEC Com-
plaint and related administrative order/opinion alleged that in 1989 and
1990, two senior officers of Triton Indonesia, McAdoo and Keever,
220See Section 10A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (1994).
22tSee, e.g., Item 4 of Form 8-K, 17 C.F.1L § 249.308 (1997); Item 304 of Regulation S-
K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1997); Item 304 of Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228.304 (1997)
(provisions requiring issuer to file Form 8-K containing specified disclosures when auditor
resigns, declines to stand for reelection, or is dismissed).
22217 C.F.R. 240.10A-1 (1997); see also Exchange Act Release No. 38,387, 1997 SEC
LEXIS 545, 132, 134-35 (Mar. 12, 1997):
Rule 10A-1 is based on the premise that the notices and reports under Section 10A are
to assist the Commission in performing its enforcement responsibilities and, therefore,
will be non-public. Disclosure to the public of issuers' illegal acts will continue to be
made in modified audit reports, or, when the auditor has resigned, been dismissed, or
elected not to stand for reelection, on Form 8-K under the Exchange Act
(citations omitted.)
22SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Keever and McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); Triton Energy Corp. (McAdoo),
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,446 (June 26, 1997); David Gore,
Exchange Act Release No. 38343, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,404 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
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authorized certain improper payments to Triton Indonesia's foreign busi-
ness agent, Roland Siouffi.22  Siouffi served as an intermediary between
Triton Indonesia and several Indonesian government agencies with regula-
tory authority over an oil and gas recovery project being developed and op-
erated pursuant to a contract between a Triton Indonesia joint venture and
Pertamina, a national oil company owned by the Republic of Indonesia.225
Triton Indonesia can be described fairly as a "domestic/foreign" subsidiary.
It was incorporated in Delaware, but all of its personnel (including execu-
tives, employees and agents), offices, facilities, assets, and business activi-
ties were located in Indonesia.
The SEC Complaint further alleged that both McAdoo and Keever
authorized the payments to Siouffi "knowing or recklessly disregarding the
high probability that Siouffi either had or would pass such payments along
to Indonesian government employees for the purpose of influencing their
decisions affecting the business of Triton Indonesia," thereby violating the
corrupt foreign payments proscriptions of the FCPA.226 The Complaint also
alleged that McAdoo, Keever and other Triton Indonesia employees con-
cealed the nature of the payments "by falsely documenting and recording
the transactions as routine business expenditures."227
The SEC explicitly acknowledged in its Complaint that "Triton Energy
did not expressly authorize or direct these improper payments and mis-
bookings."
The allegedly illegal payments in Triton were not made for the purpose
of obtaining the oil and gas joint venture contract or any related oil and gas
concessions. Triton Indonesia had purchased its interest in the joint venture
in 1988 from the predecessor owner, Nordell International Resources Ltd., a
Canadian corporation. Pursuant to the joint venture, Triton Indonesia be-
224 SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Keever and McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]





228Id. In the companion administrative cease-and-desist order/opinion, the SEC stressed
the interrelated importance of the foreign bribery and corrupt foreign payment provisions of
Section 30A(a) of the 1934 Act, on the one hand, and the books and records and internal ac-
counting controls provisions of Section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, on the other.
Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act is comprised of two accounting provisions referred
to as the "books and records" and "internal controls" provisions. These accounting provi-
sions were enacted as part of the FCPA to strengthen the accuracy of records and to "pro-
mote the reliability and completeness of financial information that issuers are required to file
with the Commission or disseminate to investors pursuant to the Exchange Act." SEC v.
World-Wide Coins Inv. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The accounting provi-
sions were enacted by Congress along with the anti-bribery provisions [Section 30A(a)] be-
cause Congress concluded that almost all bribery of foreign officials by American
corporations was covered up in the corporations' books and that the requirement for accurate
records and adequate internal controls would deter bribery. Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp.
1316, 1333 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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came the operator of the Enim Project, an oil and gas recovery project em-
bracing oilfields on the island of Sumatra in the Republic of Indonesia. As
part of the joint venture, Triton Indonesia became party to a Rehabilitation
and Secondary Contract ("RSRC contract") with the Pertamina national oil
company. The RSRC contract governed the sale of crude oil to Pertamina,
reimbursement of costs by Pertamina to Triton Indonesia and related pay-
ments between the contracting parties. 2 9
The Enim Project was subject to taxation by the Indonesian Ministry of
Finance. Tax liability was determined by auditors from the audit branch of
the Ministry of Finance, known by the acronym BPKP. As a result of joint
Pertamina/BPKP audits, both the tax liability and cost recovery entitlement
of Triton Indonesia were determined and adjusted.230
The Pertamina/BPKP auditors, at exit meetings, presented Triton Indo-
nesia with written preliminary audit findings, which identified problems
that might have led to reductions in cost recovery. Triton Indonesia pre-
pared written responses to the preliminary audit exceptions. Thereafter,
Triton Indonesia representatives and the Pertamina/BPK.P auditors entered
into negotiations concerning the content of the final audit reports. "The
Pertamina/BPKP auditors had discretion to make a determination as to
whether audit exceptions would be included in their audit report or with-
drawn." 231 The SEC alleged in its Complaint and its related administrative
order/opinion that several payments Triton Indonesia's agent and consultant
229David Gore, Exchange Act Release No. 38343, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,469:
The RSRC contract required that all oil recovered from the project be delivered
to Pertamina through a pipeline owned and controlled by Pertamina. Triton Indonesia
paid a tariff to Pertamina for use of the pipeline. The RSRC contract obligated Per-
tamina to reimburse Triton Indonesia for certain costs incurred by the cornpany during
oil exploration and recovery. Triton Indonesia submitted monthly crude oil invoices to
Pertamina that documented, among other things, the volume of oil delivered through the
pipeline at agreed-upon rates, the pipeline fee, and a calculation of Triton Indonesia s
reimbursable monthly operating costs. After Pertamina reviewed the documents and
determined that all documentation was complete and accurate, it paid the joint venture
the invoiced amount.
' 01d. at 63,470:
Pertamina/BPKP auditors performed joint annual audits of the Enim Project. During
these audits, Pertamina and BPKP auditors reviewed the books and records of Triton
Indonesia, as well as those of its parent, Triton Energy. Pertamina auditors determined,
after reviewing documentation submitted by Triton Indonesia and examining the com-
pany's books and records, whether costs were properly claimed as recoverable costs.
BPKP auditors determined, after reviewing periodic corporate tax returns submitted by
Triton Indonesia and Nordell, and examining the Enim Project's books and records,
whether Triton Indonesia had paid the proper amount of corporate taxes. The annual
Pertamina/BPKP audits of the Enim Project determined the amount of recoverable costs
associated with the operation. Because the Enim Project never generated sufficient oil
production in relation to costs incurred, the pool of unrecovered costs increased each
year. In the annual audit for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1987, the unrecovered
cost pool was approximately $10 million. In the annual audit for the fiscal year ending
March 31, 1988, the unrecovered cost pool stood at more than $16 million. By the
March 31, 1989 audit, the unrecovered cost pool had grown to more than $21 million.
231 id.
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Siouffi made to the auditors on behalf of Triton Indonesia violated the cor-
rupt foreign payments provisions of the FCPA.
232
A. The "Questionable" Payments
1. May 1989 Tax Audit
In their preliminary May 1989 tax audit findings the Pertamina/BPKP
auditors determined that Nordell had failed to pay certain withholding taxes
due in connection with payments to it for technical services and interest on
funding. The auditors preliminarily assessed approximately $385,000 in
additional taxes relating to technical services payments, and approximately
$233,000 in additional taxes relating to interest for intercorporate funding.
In early August 1989, "Triton Indonesia agreed to pay Siouffi $165,000 for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable decision from Indonesian government
officials on the tax issue relating to technical service fees. 233 The SEC al-
leged that during the period July through October 1989, Siouffi paid one of
the auditors $120,000, and paid $40,000 to other officials/employees at
Pertamina.
On August 15, 1989, Keever wrote a two-page letter to the Pertamina/3PKP
auditors presenting Triton Indonesia's position that it should not be liable for
withholding tax on technical service fees. On August 18, 1989, the Indonesian
auditing board responded by accepting Triton Indonesia's position that the
company was not liable for any additional taxes on technical services fees. On
2321d.:
In 1988, Triton Indonesia agreed with Nordell to retain Roland Siouffi as its business
agent for the purpose of acting as an intermediary between Triton Indonesia and Indo-
nesian government agencies, including Pertamina and the Ministry of Finance. Siouffi,
a French citizen who had resided in Indonesia for twenty-five years, had been a director
and chief executive officer of Nordell at the time Triton Indonesia took over the Enim
Project.
Upon entering into the joint venture agreement, Triton Indonesia adopted existing
contracts between Nordell and entities controlled by Siouffi.. ., and later entered addi-
tional contracts with the same entities. These entities included Development Engineer-
ing and Rehabilitation Company S. A. ('Derco'), Orix Resources, Inc. ('Orix'), Sumgait
Resources Ltd. ('Sumgait'), and P. T. Windusari Danuta ('Windusari') .... During
1989 and 1990, McAdoo and Keever authorized a number of improper payments to
Siouffi entities for the purpose of influencing specific actions by various Indonesian
government agencies."
See also SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Keever and McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 at 63,476 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997):
[Diuring the years 1989 and 1990, McAdoo and Keever authorized numerous improper
payments to Roland Siouffi, Triton Indonesia's business agent acting as an intermediarybetwe  Triton Indonesia and Indonesian govenment agencies, knowing or recklesslydisregarding the high probability that Siouffi either had or wouldpass such ayrents
along to Indonesian government employees for the purpose of influencing their deci-
sions affecting the business of Triton Indonesia... [T]hese payments were made in
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
233David Gore, Exchange Act Release No. 38343, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,471.
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or about October 17, 1989, Siouffi told Keever that $120,000 had been paid to
one of the auditors and $40,000 to others at Pertamina.?
The SEC further alleged that the $165,000 paid to Siouffi was falsely
recorded in Triton Indonesia's books and records as payments to Orix, a
Siouffi company, "for the purchase of seismic data," a fictitious transac-
tion.235 The issue regarding interest on intercorporate funding remained un-
resolved.
In its reply to Keever's August 15, 1989 letter, the Indonesian govern-
ment auditing board reiterated that Triton Indonesia still owed $233,134 in
withholding tax relating to interest charges. In October 1989, Triton Indonesia
management began to discuss with Siouffi how to reduce its tax liability for the
interest charges. By November 1989, these discussions had evolved into a
plan to make a payment to obtain a favorable decision reducing the tax rate on
the interest charges. Siouffi told Keever that reducing the tax rate on interest
would cost Triton Indonesia approximately $20,000.23
6
Following Siouffi's instructions, McAdoo wrote a letter to the Indone-
sia auditing board concerning the withholding rate on interest charges,
agreeing to pay $155,423 rather than $233,144 (i.e., a reduction of ap-
proximately $80,000). "On December 12, 1989, Siouffi told Keever that a
BPKP auditor would be paid $20,000 in connection with obtaining this de-
cision to reduce taxes on interest., 237 Thereafter, the Indonesian government
accepted McAdoo's proposal, and lowered the tax liability to $155,423.
The SEC alleged that Triton Indonesia on January 4," 1990 "paid Siouffi
$22,500 for the reduction which had been obtained in the tax rate on inter-
est charges," by entering "into a sham $22,500 transaction with Windusari,
a Siouffi company.,
23 8
Murphy signed fabricated documentation relating to this payment and partici-
pated in recording falsely the expenditure as a payment for repairs of equip-
ment in the Enim oilfields. On January 6, 1990, Siouffi told Keever that the
BPKP auditor had been paid in connection with the decision on the tax audit
issue concerning the tax rate on interest payments.239
2. March 1988 Annual Fiscal 1988 Audit
The Pertamina/BPKP auditors in January-February 1989 concluded
their field work for the annual audit for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1988. In April 1989, Siouffi informed Keever and McAdoo that a payment
of $21,000 would be required to obtain a final audit report with certification
of the full cost pool. The SEC complaint and the companion SEC adminis-
trative cease-and-desist opinion do not clearly specify whether the payment
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Triton Indonesia authorized him to, pass the payment on to the Per-
tamina/BPKP auditors. Nor does the SEC allege whether the auditors or
any other government officials ever received all or a portion of the allegedly
improper payment. The SEC does allege, however, that the payment (re-
gardless of whom was or were the ultimate recipient(s)), was falsely re-
corded in the company's books and records.
Triton Indonesia paid Siouffi $21,000 for obtaining from the auditors a
favorable final report and cost certification. In September 1989, Triton Indo-
nesia entered into a fictitious $21,000 transaction with Windusari. Murphy
signed fabricated documentation relating to this payment and participated in
recording falsely the expenditure as a payment for service and repair to equip-
ment in the Enim oilfield. The auditors allowed all but $139,547 of over $8
million in unrecovered costs.240
3. March 1989 Annual Fiscal 1989 Audit
The Pertamina/BPKP auditors in November 1989 through January
1990 performed their field work for the annual audit for the fiscal year
ending March 31, 1989. The SEC specifically alleged that Triton Indonesia
management and Siouffi discussed "a payment to Indonesian officials" re-
specting this audit. In December 1989, "Siouffi informed Keever that ob-
taining a final [audit] report with full cost certification would require a
payment of $35,000 of which $28,000 would be allocated to BPKP and
$7,000 to Pertamina. ''241 The SEC further alleged that these improper pay-
ments were concealed and falsely booked in the company's books and rec-
ords in the guise of a $38,500 payment to Windusari, a Siouffi company,
supposedly for equipment repairs in the Enim oilfields. '24 - On March 8,
1990, Triton Indonesia received a favorable final audit report: "The audi-
tors made only $275,751 in reductions, while certifying over $8 million in
costs.
243
4. 1989 Corporate Tax Refund
In late 1988, Triton Indonesia engaged Siouffi to negotiate with Indo-
nesian government officials for a finding that the Enim Project should be
exempt from corporate tax, and that the company should receive a tax re-
fund for corporate taxes previously paid by Nordell. Siouffi stated that "a
payment would be necessary" to obtain the desired governmental deci-
2°Id. at 63,471-72.2411d. at 63,472.
2 42 id"
243 Id.:
Between March 2, 1990 and March 12, 1990, Triton Indonesia paid Siouffi $38,500
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable final audit report with full cost certification.
During this time, Triton Indonesia entered into several fictitious transactions with Win-
dusari in which Triton Indonesia paid Windusari a total of $38,500. Murphy signed
fabricated documentation relating to this payment and participated in recording falsely
the expenditures as payments for repairs to equipment used in the Enim oilfields.
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sions.24 In response to a December 1988 letter from McAdoo, the Mone-
tary Directorate of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, the government
agency responsible for tax collections, stated in a March 11, 1989 letter
ruling: "Triton Indonesia would not be obligated to pay corporate taxes as
long as it did not earn a profit from the operation of the Enim Project.,
245
In March and May 1989, Keever argued in letters to the Monetary Di-
rectorate that Triton Indonesia was entitled to a $94,000 refund of corporate
taxes erroneously paid by its joint venture predecessor Nordell. Siouffi in-
formed Keever and Triton's former finance manager "that obtaining a fa-
vorable decision concerning the refund would require a payment of
$7,000246 McAdoo and Keever discussed Siouffi's proposal and agreed to
make the payment.247 Triton Indonesia eventually received the full $94,000
refund from the Ministry of Finance. Neither the SEC complaint nor the
companion SEC administrative cease-and-desist order/opinion clearly
specifies whether the payments for the corporate tax exemption or refund
was intended solely for Siouffi, or whether Siouffi represented he would, or
Triton Indonesia authorized him to, pass the payments on to government of-
ficials. Nor does the SEC specifically allege whether any government offi-
cial received all or a portion of the payments actually made to Siouffi in this
regard. The SEC does allege, however, that payments were made to
Siouffi, and were falsely recorded in the company's books and records.248
5. Refund of Value Added Tax
Triton Indonesia was required to collect and pay a ten percent value
added tax ("VAT"), but was permitted to seek appropriate reimbursement
of bona fide overpayments by submitting appropriate documentation for re-
view by Pertamina. In 1989 Triton Indonesia submitted to Pertamina in-
voices and other documents relating to $119,000 VAT paid, asking
Pertamina to determine whether a refund of any amount was due.249 There-
after, "Siouffi informed McAdoo and Keever that obtaining a favorable de-
cision on the VAT refund would require a payment of $22,500. "250 Siouffi









In May 1989, Triton Indonesia agreed to pay Siouffi $7,500 for obtaining a favorable
decision on the tax refund. On or about June 1, 1989, Triton received a refund of the
full $94,000 from the Ministry of Finance. In September 1989, after Windusari had in-
voiced Triton Indonesia for approximately $24,000, of which $7,500 was for the favor-
able decision of the tax refund, Murphy signed fabricated documentation relating to this
payment and participated in recording falsely the expenditure as a payment for service
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funded approximately $109,000 to the company as a VAT overpayment.
Neither the SEC complaint nor the companion SEC administrative cease-
and-desist order/opinion clearly specifies whether the payment was in-
tended solely for Siouffi, or whether Siouffi represented he would, or Triton
Indonesia authorized him to, pass the payment on to government officials.
Nor does the SEC specifically allege whether any Government official re-
ceived all or a portion of the payment actually made to Siouffi in this re-
gard. The SEC does allege, however, that a $23,000 payment was made to
Siouffi, and was falsely recorded in the company's books and records.251
6. Pipeline Tariff Payment
The RSRC contract required the Enim Project to reimburse Pertamina
for use of Pertamina's pipeline pursuant to a Pipeline Transportation
Agreement that incorporated the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") for deter-
mining the appropriate pipeline fee. In early 1990, Triton Indonesia and
Pertamina had a difference of opinion as to whether Pertamina had used the
proper CPI figures in determining the pipeline fees paid by the company.
Siouffi offered help. "Siouffi contacted Keever and offered to assist Triton
Indonesia in obtaining a refund of the purported overcharge from Per-
tamina. Siouffi stated that obtaining a favorable decision to revise the
pipeline rates and procure a refund of the purported overpayment would re-
quire a payment of approximately $10,000.25
2
At the request of Keever, in June 1990 Pertamina recalculated the
company's pipeline fee obligation using a different CPI and reimbursed to
Triton Indonesia the purported overpayment. Triton Indonesia paid Siouffi
$10,000 regarding this pipeline fee recalculation and refund. Neither the
SEC Complaint nor the companion SEC administrative cease-and-desist or-
der/opinion clearly specifies whether the payment was intended solely for
Siouffi, or whether Siouffi represented he would, or Triton Indonesia
authorized him to, pass the payment on to government officials. Nor does
the SEC specifically allege whether any Pertamina official received all or a
portion of the $10,000 payment made to Siouffi in this regard. The SEC
does allege, however, that the payment was falsely recorded in the com-
pany's books and records. 3
251Id. at 63,473:
Beginning on October 25, 1989, Triton Indonesia paid Siouffi $23,000 for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable decision on the VAT tax reimbursement. At the same time,
Triton Indonesia entered into a $23,000 transaction with Derco, a Siouffi company.
Murphy signed fabricated documentation relating to this payment and participated in
recording falsely the expenditure as a payment for the acquisition and interpretation of
seismic data. On November 6, 1989, Pertamina reimbursed Triton Indonesia in the
amount of approximately $109,000.
252 Id.
2 3 Id.:
Between May 29 and June 7, 1990, Triton Indonesia paid Siouffi $ 10,000 for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable decision on the pipeline fee reimbursement. During
the same time, Triton Indonesia entered into a fictitious transaction in approximately
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7. "Grease," "Facilitating, " Or "Expediting" Payments
Triton Indonesia and its predecessor in the late 1980s had been making
a total of approximately $1,000 per month of "grease" or "expediting"
payments to low-level clerical employees of Pertamina to assure the timely
processing of monthly crude oil invoices. These grease payments were
falsely booked in the Company's books and records. 4 The SEC did not
charge that these payments violated the FCPA's corrupt foreign payments
provisions, but did charge their misbookings as violations of the books and
records and internal accounting controls provisions of Section 13(b)(2) of
the Exchange Act.255 Three other payments made in 1989 and 1990 -
none of them specifically alleged to have been made to government offi-
cials - were also charged as having been misbooked in Triton Indonesia's
books and records, and therefore constituted Section 13(b)(2) violations. 6
B. SEC Civil Injunctive and Civil Penalty Enforcement Action
After completion of a private SEC investigation that extended over
several years, on February 27, 1997 the SEC filed a civil injunctive and
civil monetary penalty enforcement action against Triton Energy, Keever
and McAdoo alleging violations of both the bribery and corrupt foreign
payments provisions and the books and records and internal accounting
the same amount with Windusari [a Siouffi company]. Murphy signed fabricated
documentation relating to this payment and participated in recording falsely the expen-
diture as a payment for service and repair to equipment in the Enim Oilfield. Keever
informed McClure about the true purpose of this transaction.254
id.
2551d. at 63,475.
256 Id. "McClure and Murphy initialed documents authorizing cash payments totaling
$1,000 per month to Pertamina clerical employees made for the purpose of expediting pay-
ment of monthly crude oil invoices -which Murphy falsely documented and recorded as tax
consulting fees and entertainment expenses." Id. at 63,473.
See also John F.X. Peloso, SEC Rejuvenates Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y.L.J.,
May 21, 1997, at 11:
Although these payments were not improper under the FCPA, presumably as a payment
to expedite routine government action, Triton Energy allegedly violatedthe FCPA by
falsely documenting and recording these payments as tax consulting fees and enter-
tainment expenses. Thus, legitimate business expenses apparently became the basis for
an alleged accounting violation because management was unfamiliar with the nuances
of the FCPA.
One $4,300 payment authorized by McClure and Murphy was made in connection with
the resignation of a Triton Indonesia employee, but was falsely booked and documented as a
payment to Windusari, a Siouffi company, for service and repair to equipment in the Enim
oilfield. "Keever told McClure and Murphy about the true purpose of the transaction." In re
Gore, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,473 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997). Murphy
authorized a second "$3,400 payment made for the purpose of permitting Triton Indonesia to
make tax payments in three installments which he falsely documented and recorded as a
payment to Windusari for repairs to equipment in the Enim oilfields." Id. A third $73,000
payment was made in December 1990 in connection with the termination and subsequent
reinstatement of the Company's Indonesian finance manager, but was falsely recorded as a
payment to Windusari for services and repairs to equipment in the Enim oilfield. Id.
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controls provisions of the FCPA. Neither Triton Indonesia nor Roland
Siouffi were named as defendants.257 The allegedly corrupt payments, de-
scribed above, had been made in 1989 and 1990, but the enforcement action
was not filed until 1997, well over six years after the last allegedly illegal
payment.
25 8
It is interesting to note that Triton Energy, the parent corporation was
charged directly with the books and records and internal accounting con-
trols lapses of its wholly owned "domestic/foreign" subsidiary, Triton In-
donesia.
[T]he complaint alleges, Triton Energy failed to devise and maintain an ade-
quate system of internal accounting controls to detect and prevent improper
payments by Triton Indonesia to government officials and to provide reason-
able assurance that transactions were recorded as necessary to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles.
259
The SEC's complaint sought both permanent injunctive relief and civil
monetary penalties against all three defendants.
Simultaneously with the filing of the Complaint, Triton Energy and
Keever, without admitting or denying the allegations,26° consented to per-
manent injunctive relief and the imposition of civil monetary penalties.261
Keever paid a $50,000 civil fine, and consented to a permanent injunction
embracing both the corrupt foreign payments provisions and the books and
records and internal accounting controls provisions of the Exchange Act.
Triton Energy paid a $300,000 civil fine, but consented to an injunction that
embraced solely the books and records and internal accounting controls
provisions. The permanent injunction against Triton Energy does not di-
rectly embrace the foreign bribery and corrupt foreign payments provisions
of the FCPA. This settlement concession by the SEC reflects, in part,
strong mitigation evidence presented on Triton Energy's behalf in the un-
derlying investigation. Indeed, the official SEC Litigation Release specifi-
cally acknowledged:
The complaint states that Triton Energy did not expressly authorize or direct
these improper payments and misbookings.
In accepting the settlement, the Commission has considered the fact that the
violations occurred under former management and that certain remedial actions
257 Triton Indonesia was a "domestic concern" over which the SEC had no jurisdiction to
pursue an enforcement action. Roland Siouffi is a nonresident alien, living in Indonesia,
over whom the SEC presumably would never achieve effective service of process.258 See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Keever and McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).2 591d. at 63,477.
260Id. at 63,476-77.
261Id. at 63,477.
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have been implemented by the current board of directors and senior manage-
ment.
262
McAdoo, without admitting or denying the allegations, on June 26,
1997, consented to permanent injunctive relief embracing both the corrupt
foreign payments provisions and the books and records and internal ac-
counting controls provisions of the 1934 Act. McAdoo also paid a $35,000
civil fine.263
C. Companion SEC Administrative Cease-And-Desist Proceedings
Simultaneously with the filing of the civil injunctive and civil penalty
action in federal district court, the SEC instituted companion administrative
cease-and-desist proceedings against two former managers/officers of Tri-
ton Indonesia (William McClure and Robert P. Murphy) and two former
executives of Triton Energy (David Gore and Robert Puetz).264 McClure
had been a contract auditor for, and then Commercial Manager of, Triton
Indonesia in 1990. Murphy, a, certified public accountant (CPA), had been
Controller of Triton Indonesia in 1989 and 1990. Both McClure and Mur-
phy worked at Triton Indonesia's facilities in the Republic of Indonesia.
As Commercial Manager, McClure assumed direct supervisory authority
over the accounting function at Triton Indonesia. McClure was required to re-
view and initial documents to authorize certain expenditures. These docu-
ments contained the descriptions of expenditures that determined how
expenses were recorded in Triton Indonesia's books and records. As Control-
ler, Murphy had direct responsibility for preparing entries in Triton Indonesia's
books and records. McClure supervised Murphy's preparation of entries for
the books and records of Triton Indonesia. Murphy was responsible for deter-
mining that all underlying documentation was present when a bank voucher
was issued and initialing the voucher to signify that all required documents
were present.
265
McClure and Murphy were charged with directly violating SEC 1934
Act Rule 13b2-1 and with causing Triton Energy to violate Section
13(b)(2)(A) of the 1934 Act. Section 13(b)(2)(A) is the principal books and
records provision of the FCPA: it requires issuers to make and keep books,
records, and accounts that accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of their assets. Rule 13b2-1 prohibits any person from, directly
or indirectly, falsifying or causing the falsification of any books, records, or
accounts subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A). The SEC has always contended,
and did so here, that a parent issuer (i.e., Triton Energy) has Section
13(b)(2) liability for the books and records and internal accounting controls
2621d. at 63,476-77.
263 See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Richard L. McAdoo), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
74,446, at 63,541(D.D.C. June 26, 1997).264 In re Gore, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,468 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
2651d. at 63,470. (citation omitted).
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of its wholly owned or controlled domestic and foreign subsidiaries (i.e.,
Triton Indonesia).266
The allegedly corrupt foreign payments and the misbooked grease or
facilitating payments in the Triton case did not appear to be material to
Triton Energy. They totaled approximately $400,000 in a two-year period.
However, Section 13(b)(2) books and records and internal accounting con-
trols violations do not require proof of "materiality., 267 And a civil or ad-
ministrative violation of Section 13(b)(2) does not require proof of scienter
or guilty knowledge; a negligence standard suffices. 68 The SEC, never-
266 Thus, the SEC stated flatly: "Triton Indonesia maintained books and records that did
not accurately or fairly reflect the underlying disposition of assets. Accordingly, Triton En-
ergy violated Section 13(b)(2)(a) of the Exchange Act." Id. at 63,475. See, e.g., BLACK &
WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.02[2]; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,632H (Jan. 29, 1981) (speech of SEC Chairman Harold Williams); ABA, Prac-
tical Implications, supra note 176, at 1726-30 (comments of Edward D. Herlihy, Assistant
Director, SEC Division of Enforcement). The 1988 Amendments to the FCPA appear to as-
sume that parent issuers have Section 13(b)(2) liability for wholly-owned or majority-
controlled subsidiaries. The Amendments added new Section 13(b)(6) to the 1934 Act, pro-
viding that where an issuer holds 50% or less of the "voting power" of a domestic or foreign
subsidiary Section 13(b)(2) "require[s] only that the issuer proceed in good faith to use its
influence, to the extent reasonable under the circumstances, to cause such domestic or for-
eign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with
[Section 13(b)(2)]." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6). Thus, an issuer has an affirmative defense of
"good faith" to any Section 13(b)(2) charge relating to a noncontrolled subsidiary.
267 See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.03[3]; see also SEC v. World-Wide Coin
Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (finding test is "in reasonable detail," not
"materiality"); SEC 1934 Act Release No. 17500, SEC 1981 Policy Statement, 46 Fed. Reg.
at 11,546 (speech of SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams at AICPA Annual SEC Develop-
ments Conference on Jan. 13, 1981).
268 See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 6.03; see also SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs.,
Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1983); SEC 1981 Policy Statement, 46 Fed. Reg. at
11,547. In the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, Congress added §13(b)(6) to the 1934 Act,
providing in substance that "no criminal liability shall be imposed for failing to comply with
the FCPA's books and records or accounting controls provisions unless a person knowingly
circumvents a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies books, records,
or accounts kept pursuant to Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act." H.R. CONF. REP. No.
100-576, at 916 (1988) (emphasis added.).
With regard to Section 13(b)(6), the legislative history states:
The Conferees intended to codify current Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enforcement policy that penalties not be imposed for insignificant or technical infrac-
tions or inadvertent conduct. The amendment adopted by the Conferees accomplishes
this by providing that criminal penalties shall not be imposed for failing to comply with
the FCPA's books and records or accounting control provisions. This provision is
meant to ensure that criminal penalties would be imposed where acts of commission or
omission in keeping books or records or administering accounting controls have the
purpose of falsifying books, records or accounts, or of circumventing the accounting
controls set forth in the Act. This would include the deliberate falsification of books
and records and other conduct calculated to evade the internal accounting controls re-
quirement.
Id. at 916-17, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N at 1949-50.
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theless, did charge Murphy with "knowing" misconduct, but appeared to
charge McClure on a negligence standard.2 '
Simultaneously with the issuance of the administrative order, without
admitting or denying the charges or the matters set forth in the opinion,
McClure and Murphy consented to the issuance of the administrative or-
der/opinion. The only sanctions imposed against McClure and Murphy
were administrative cease-and-desist orders prohibiting them from commit-
ting or causing any violations of 1934 Act Rule 13b2-1 and Section
13(b)(2)(A) of the 1934 Act. No civil or administrative monetary penalties
were imposed against either of them, because the SEC has no jurisdiction to
impose civil monetary penalties in an administrative proceeding against in-
dividuals who are not associated with a broker-dealer or investment adviser.
David E. Gore was a director and President of Triton Energy from
1988 until his resignation in August 1992. Robert W. Puetz became Triton
Energy's Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in
1982 and was Senior Vice President of Finance and CFO from August 1989
until his resignation in April 1993. Both Gore and Puetz worked at the
headquarters offices of Triton Energy in Dallas, Texas.2
7 0
Gore and Puetz were each members of Triton Energy senior management who
had significant responsibility for the operations of both Triton Energy and
Triton Indonesia. As president of Triton Energy, Gore was responsible for all
Triton Energy production and exploration operations worldwide. Puetz, senior
vice president and CFO of Triton Energy, had oversight for preparation of fi-
nancial statements for all foreign operations.
271
Members of Triton Energy's senior management, including Gore and
Puetz, were aware that Siouffi's role as Triton Indonesia's agent and con-
sultant in Indonesia included exerting influence with the Indonesian gov-
ernment, were aware of the contracts with Siouffi entities, and were aware
that "some Triton Energy officers and managers had concerns about the re-
lationship with Siouffi, including concerns about the vagueness of his con-
tractual duties, the large amounts of money he was receiving, how he might
be using that money, and his honesty. 272
269 hIn re Gore, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at 63,475 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997):
As Triton Indonesia's Controller, Murphy knowingly participated in creating and re-
cording false entries in Triton Indonesia's books and records. As Triton Indonesia's
Commercial Manager, McClure failed to assure that the entries prepared by Murphy ac-
curately reflected the underlying transactions. Keever informed both McClure and
Murphy that the payments were for a purpose other than what was indicated in docu-
ments presented tor their signatures. Nevertheless, Murphy signed documents author-
izing the expenditures and mischaracterizing them as legitimate business expenses. In
addition, Keever informed Murphy about the false characterization of payments which
Murphy did not have any role in authorizing. Thereafter, Murphy participated in mak-
ing false entries in Triton Indonesia's books and records characterizing the payments as
expenses incurred for the purpose indicated in fabricated documentation.270 Id. at 63,469, 63,473.2711 id. at 63,473.
2
1
2Id. at 63,469. Some Triton Energy officers and managers had related concerns about
an Indonesian finance manager for Triton Indonesia who was making cash payments to Per-
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The SEC alleged that during 1989 and 1990 Keever briefed Gore and
Puetz about certain of the Siouffi payments and related false books and rec-
ords: "The Triton Energy officers expressed concern about such practices
which they had neither directed nor authorized, but failed to require Triton
Indonesia to discontinue these practices. 27 3
The anchor of the SEC's charges against Gore and Puetz related to
their actions and inactions regarding a Confidential Memorandum from
Triton Energy's then new Internal Auditor in September 1989. The new
Internal Auditor (Calloway) had recently visited Triton Indonesia's facili-
ties in Jakarta, Indonesia as part of a worldwide introductory tour. After re-
viewing accounting documents there, and after discussions with McAdoo,
Keever and other Triton Indonesia personnel, Calloway had significant
FCPA compliance and other concerns. He wrote a September 1989 Confi-
dential Memorandum to Triton Energy's then management describing his
concerns which embraced:
1. potentially improper payments by Triton Indonesia to Indonesian
government officials;
2. his view that Indonesia was a "country of state supported corrup-
tion;"
3. his understanding that Triton Indonesia "pay[s] BPKP auditors
working on the audit of our records to determine what is cost recoverable;"
4. "what is worse, and this is extremely confidential, is that we paid the
auditors in order to have their audit exceptions taken care of;" and
5. the suspect payments were then documented in a "creative way" to
make them cost recoverable.274
The Auditor's Memorandum was distributed to Gore and Puetz, among
other members of Triton Energy's then senior management. "In October
1989, Gore, after reading the Internal Auditor's Memorandum in the inter-
nal auditor's presence, ordered the internal auditor to collect all copies of
the memorandum and destroy them. 2 75
tamina clerical employees to obtain timely payment of crude oil invoices, and who was act-
ing as the company's primary liaison to Pertamina/BPKP auditors in connection with the an-
nual audits. Keever terminated the native Indonesian financial manager in September 1990,
but in response to pressure from Pertamina he was reinstated shortly thereafter. "Despite the
objections from the Director of Internal Audit and Triton Energy's Assistant Controller,
Triton Energy's former management [i.e., Gore and Puetz] failed to remove the finance
manager from his liaison position." Id. at 63,474. The finance manager remained in a re-
sponsible position in Triton Indonesia's accounting department until some time in 1993. The
SEC alleged that these concerns "should have led to a heightened degree of vigilance about
the possibility of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.... Instead, Triton Energy




275Id. At least one copy of the Auditor's Memorandum was not destroyed, and ulti-
mately was provided to the SEC and the DOJ, as well as to Triton Energy's outside auditors.
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The SEC criticized Gore and Puetz for failing to determine whether the
Auditor's allegations were supported by facts, for dismissing the allegations
because they emanated solely from Triton Indonesia officers and personnel,
(Le., for treating them as mere rumors and innuendo), and for failing to
conduct an investigation or to revise any corporate policies or procedures to
address the Auditor's concerns.276 The SEC implied that Gore and Puetz
had a heightened responsibility to follow-up on the Auditor's Memorandum
because Keever had personally alerted Gore (in September 1989)277 and
Puetz (in January 1990)278 about certain of the questionable payments and
concomitant misbookings.
After receiving such information, Gore and Puetz failed to investigate the
potentially unlawful conduct. Instead, as the senior management of Triton En-
ergy, Gore and Puetz simply acknowledged the existence of such practices and
treated them as a cost of doing business in a foreign jurisdiction. The tolera-
tion of such practices is inimical to a fair business environment and under-
mines public confidence in the integrity of public corporations. Accordingly,
Gore and Puetz caused Triton Energy to violate Sections 30A(a) and
13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act. 79
Simultaneously with the issuance of the administrative order/opinion,
without admitting or denying the charges or the matters set forth in the
opinion, Gore and Puetz consented to the issuance of the administrative or-
der/opinion. The only sanctions imposed against Gore and Puetz were ad-
ministrative cease-and-desist orders prohibiting them from committing or
causing any violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 30A(a) of the 1934 Act.
No civil or administrative monetary penalties were imposed against either
of them,280 because the SEC had no jurisdiction to do so in the administra-
tive forum.
276 Id. When Triton Energy's outside independent auditors in their 1991 fiscal year audit
became aware of the Internal Auditor's Confidential Memorandum, the SEC alleged that
Triton Energy's then management made only "a partial disclosure [to the outside auditors],
omitting most of the improper payments and most of the false books and records," and that
"[a]t a meeting with the auditors, Keever, among others, represented that there was no evi-
dence that money was paid to Indonesian auditors." Id.
271d. at 63,474-75:
In September 1989, shortly before Gore received the Internal Auditor's Memo-
randum, Keever informed Gore that Triton Indonesia was making ayments to Siouffi
in connection with decisions by the Indonesian government and told Gore that money
may have been paid to Indonesian auditors, including payments in connection with the
predecessor's tax audit, and the corporate tax refund. Keever also told Gore that the
payments were recorded inaccurately in Triton Indonesia's books and records. Gore re-
sponded that he had worked in another foreign country and understood that such things
had to be done in certain environments.2781d. at 63,475 ("In January 1990, Keever also informed Puetz about the $23,000 prede-
cessor tax audit payment and the false entry in Triton Indonesia's books and records.").
279Id. at 63,476.280 d"
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
XI. WHAT DEFENSES MAY HAVE BEEN EXPLORED IF TRITON ENERGY
HAD LITIGATED THE SEC CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTION? OR WHAT
DEFENSES MIGHT BE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IF A COMPARABLE
FCPA CORRUPT FOREIGN PAYMENTS CASE WERE FULLY LITIGATED?
Triton Energy and its former executives and managers consented to the
SEC civil injunctive/penalty and administrative cease-and-desist enforce-
ment actions "without admitting or denying" the allegations in the plead-
ings, orders and SEC opinion.2h Had either Triton Energy, or any of the
281The "without admitting or denying" language is required in all SEC settlements by
virtue of 17 C.F.R. § 202(e). No comments in this article are intended to be statements by
Triton Energy, its executives/managers who were defendants/respondents in the civil injunc-
tive/penalty settlement or the administrative cease and desist settlement, or their attorneys,
either admitting or denying any of the SEC's allegations. When the SEC believes a settling
defendant or respondent has made subsequent public statements actually denying the allega-
tions in the settlement pleadings, contrary to the "without admitting or denying" stipulation
that is incorporated in the settlement orders, the SEC believes it has a basis to pursue addi-
tional litigation to set aside the settlement. See, e.g., SEC v. Angelos, SEC Litig. Release
No. 14886 (Apr. 22, 1996); SEC Enforcement. SEC Withdraws Unusual Motion to Vacate
Insider Suit Settlement, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 547 (Apr. 26, 1996); SEC v. Tyson,
SEC Lit. Release No. 15115 (Oct. 9, 1996); SEC Enforcement: SEC Accepts Statement By
Alleged Tippee Who Settled Action, 28 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1279 (Oct. 18, 1996);
SEC v. Fashion Two-Twenty, SEC. Lit. Release No. 8725 (Apr. 18, 1979); see also Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering Client Memorandum, Denying Misconduct Publicly Can Kill an SEC
Settlement (May 16, 1996); Milo Geyelin, SEC Cracks Down on Improper Denials, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at B2. SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas has stated:
There has been a marked and noticed increase in the number of individuals and at-
torneys who are issuing public denials of liability. It is our view that the terms of a
settlement are clear and, in the future, we will not hesitate to seek to vacate a settled
proceeding if the terms of the settlement are breached by the defendant or counsel.
William. R. McLucas & John Polise, A Critical Examination of the SEC's Enforcement Pro-
cess, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1994, at 3, 4.
Triton Energy and its counsel acknowledge that the terms of Triton Energy's settlement
with the SEC are accurately described in the following March 6, 1977 letter from William R.
McLucas, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, to Triton's counsel Robert P.
Holland III (Triton's General Counsel) and Arthur F. Mathews (Wilmer, Cutler & Picker-
ing):
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed and settled a
civil enforcement action on February 27, 1997 against Triton Energy Corporation
("Triton") in which Triton agreed to the entry of a consent civil injunction decree in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia as reflected in the attached of-
ficial SEC Litigation Release No. 15266. Pursuant to the Consent Decree, Triton has
been ordered by the Court to comply with the books and records and internal account-
ing controls provisions of Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and to pay a civil penalty of $300,000.
This action was a civil enforcement action, not a criminal prosecution. [Footnote 1:
The SEC does not have authority to pursue criminal prosecutions. Criminal prosecuto-
rial authority is exercised by the U.S. Department of Justice. The SEC Staff under-
stands that Triton has been advised by the Department of Justice that the Department
has determined it will not seek criminal prosecution of Triton based on facts arising out
of the SEC's investigation.]
The Settlement arises from the SEC staff's investigation into the activities of Triton
and Triton Indonesia ("TI"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Triton. The investigation
concerned matters related to TI's operation of an oil concession in Indonesia, which
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officer or manager defendants or respondents determined to litigate, rather
than settle, either the civil injunctive, penalty or administrative cease and
desist enforcement proceedings,282 which lines of defense explored hereto-
Triton had acquired in 1988 through a joint venture with the concession's prior opera-
tor. The SEC staff and Triton had significant disagreements over a number of legal and
factual issues arising from the investigation.
The SEC and Triton negotiated the Consent Decree in order to resolve the issues
arising from this investigation by way of a non-adjudicated civil settlement. A consent
settlement is a common means of resolving issues arising from investigations conducted
by the SC's staff. Pursuant to the settlement, Triton agreed to consent to an order of the
court without admitting or denying any of the allegations of fact or conclusions of law
set forth by the SEC in its complaint, and without any evidence having been presented
to the court. Neither the SEC's complaint, Triton's consent, nor the court's order, con-
stitute a finding of fact, a conclusion of law or a conviction under United States law.
By letter dated March 28, 1996 from Christopher L. Varner, Attorney, U.S. Department
of Justice, Criminal Division, to Arthur F. Mathews and Roger M. Witten, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, counsel to Triton Energy, the DOJ advised that Triton Energy Corporation, Triton
Indonesia, Inc., David E. Gore, Philip W. Keever, William L. McClure, Robert P. Murphy,
Jr., and two other Triton-related individuals had been
investigated for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as
amended, (15 U.S.C. § 78dd), and other federal statutes, arising from the operation of
Triton Indonesia Inc.'s Enim oil project from 1988 through 1992. As to these entities and
individuals, the Department of Justice will take no further investigative or prosecutive
steps, and the criminal investigation is closed.
By virtue of the "without admitting or denying" stipulation in the SEC Consent Decree
settlement, the Consent Injunction can have no collateral estoppel effect against Triton En-
ergy in any related or unrelated private litigation or government litigation other than its res
judicata effect solely in the SEC civil injunctive/penalty enforcement action or related pro-
ceedings brought by the SEC. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Parallel Proceedings Problems
In Securities Enforcement Matters, in ARTHUR F. MATHEWS & JUDAH BEST, SEC
ENFORCEMENT AND WHITE COLLAR C~IMEs-1981 829, 847 (1981) ("A consent injunctive de-
cree, containing 'without admitting or denying' language, will not be resjudicata or collat-
eral estoppel in a parallel civil case, but might be admissible into evidence under Rule 404(b)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in a subsequent civil or criminal case."); Lipsky v. Com-
monwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887 (2d. Cir. 1976); United States v. Cook, 557 F.2d
1149 (5th Cir. 1977); Marvin G. Pickholz, Parallel Enforcement Proceedings: Guidelines
for the Corporate Lawyer, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 99, (1979); Marvin G. Pickholz & Richard E.
Brodsky, An Assessment of Collateral Estoppel in SEC Enforcement Proceedings After
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 29 (1979).
282 For a public corporation like Triton Energy, whether to litigate with the SEC, the DOJ
or any other government department/agency/regulator, or whether to settle, is a matter of
business judgment for management and the board of directors, hopefully after informed con-
sideration of the advice of both inside and outside counsel. See generally NEGOTIATING SEC
CONSENT DECREES: TARGETS & TACTICS FOR SETTLING CIVIL INJUNCTIvE ACTIONS (Arthur F.
Mathews ed., 1979).
The corporate attorney-client privilege and related work-product protection of Triton En-
ergy was not waived as a part of the SEC investigation or settlements or as a part of the DOJ
inquiry and related nonprosecution decision. Nor have such corporate privileges ever been
waived in any related private litigation, or in any other context. There is a contrary trend
gradually arising in both DOJ and SEC enforcement actions over the past decade or two.
Apart from privilege-protected information, any disinterested observer can determine
from public information and filings several cogent reasons why a public company like Triton
Energy would choose to settle, rather than litigate, the SEC enforcement action:
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fore may have been considered or could have been explored hypothetically
as possible defense lines of pursuit in the subsequent litigation/trials? And
what types of defenses might be worthy of consideration if an FCPA cor-
rupt foreign payments civil, administrative or criminal enforcement action
is pursued by the SEC and/or the DOJ against an entity and/or related indi-
viduals involving facts or allegations comparable to the Triton case, and the
defendants/respondents choose to litigate rather than negotiating a consent
decree settlement?
A. Statute of Limitations/Laches
In the Triton case, the last allegedly corrupt payment embraced in the
SEC proceeding was a so-called "pipeline tariff' payment in May and June
(1) The Consent Injunction imposed against Triton contained no findings of fact or find-
ings or conclusions of violations of law. All such findings and conclusions were waived by
both the SEC and Triton Energy in the civil injunctive/penalty action filed against the com-
pany.
(2) The Consent Injunction against Triton Energy enjoins the company solely from fur-
ther violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal accounting controls provisions
(Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B)). It does not specifically enjoin the company from violations
of the bribery/corrupt foreign payments provisions of the FCPA (Section 30A(a)). Obvi-
ously, for an international oil and gas company doing exploration and production in a host of
foreign countries around the world, a bribery/corrupt foreign payments injunction could po-
tentially raise much more serious collateral consequences under applicable foreign law or
regulations with regard to foreign oil and gas concessions and could raise much more serious
competitive concerns, than the much more bland books and records/internal accounting con-
trols Consent Injunction actually imposed, and then, on a "without admitting or denying" ba-
sis.
(3) The DOJ had declined criminal prosecution of Triton Energy and its personnel, leav-
ing to the SEC its civil and administrative enforcement remedies to protect the public interest
to the extent the SEC deemed appropriate.
(4) The SEC did not name as defendants or respondents any current officers, directors,
managers or employees of either Triton Energy or Triton Indonesia. In addition, the SEC
Complaint and related Press Release specifically stated: "Triton Energy did not expressly
authorize or direct these improper payments and misbookings .... The Commission has con-
sidered the fact that the violations occurred under former management and that certain reme-
dial actions have been implemented by the current board of directors and senior
management."
(5) The civil penalties paid by Triton Energy ($300,000), Keever ($50,000) and McAdoo
(S35,000) far dwarfed the amounts that would have been required to be paid for attorneys
fees and related costs if the matters had been litigated through trial.
(6) Triton Energy had a restructured board of directors with several new members, a new
CEO/President, a new General Counsel, none of whom were affiliated with the company
when the underlying events transpired. (See Triton Press Release)
(7) The related private class actions for damages and derivative actions had all been ei-
ther settled and/or dismissed prior to the SEC settlement.
(8) Avoiding the continual internal corporate disruption of litigating with the federal gov-
erment for several years, in addition to "achieving peace" with a public company's princi-
pal federal regulator, can be a very positive goal in responsible corporate governance and
stewardship. This Triton Energy achieved!
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1990.283 The SEC Complaint was filed on February 27, 1997, over six
years after the last alleged payment. Thus, an argument could have been
made that the SEC's attempt to seek civil monetary penalties for any of the
alleged payments was barred by the five-year statute of limitations of sec-
tion 2462. 84
To the extent that the SEC may have alleged that the books and records
violations were not corrected or cured completely and satisfactorily until
less than five years prior to February 27, 1997, or if the SEC pursued civil
penalties for the books and records, as opposed to payments violations, it is
pertinent to note that the SEC did not have authority to seek civil monetary
penalties for Section 13(b)(2) books and records and internal accounting
controls violations until the effective date of the Securities Enforcement
Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, October 15, 1990.285 Prior
to the Remedies Act, the SEC did have authority pursuant to Section
32(c)(1)(B) of the 1934 Act to seek civil monetary penalties for corrupt for-
eign payments violations of the FCPA. It is interesting to note, however,
that prior to the Triton Energy/Indonesia case the SEC had never sought
such civil monetary penalties in an FCPA corrupt payments case.
Apart from civil penalties, in litigation the SEC would have argued that
neither the five-year statute of limitations, nor, indeed, any statute of limi-
tations whatsoever, applies to the civil injunctive remedy it was seeking.
286
A defense counter to that argument in any litigated case likely would be
two-fold: First, the requested injunction would serve as a "penalty" and
should be barred by the five-year statute of limitations. Concededly, de-
fense counsel would have to convince the court to plow new ground to
adopt such a defense. But so, too, had the defendant in the Johnson case
been required to convince the D. C. Circuit to plow new ground against the
SEC in determining that a six month broker-dealer supervisory suspension
was sufficiently a "penalty" to trigger the five-year statute of limitations.287
Second, even though no statute of limitations may apply to the equitable
remedy of injunctive relief, depending upon the nature of the government's
delay and the circumstance of a particular case, a court might be persuaded
that laches does apply directly, or at least indirectly, as an element of "a
2'3In re Gore, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 38343, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404, at
63,473 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997).
2S42 8 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) ("an action ... for the enforcement of any civil ... penalty ...
shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued"); see also Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf., 3M Co. v.
Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the use of the statute of
limitations defense, see supra Part VI.
28515 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1988), P.L. 101-429, § 1(c), 104 Stat. 931 (Oct. 15, 1990) (no
civil penalties may be imposed pursuant to the Remedies Act for conduct prior to 10/15/90).286See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp.
1117,1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
2 87Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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lack of equity., 211 And the five to six year governmental delay in filing the
case against Triton Energy or a comparable delay in a future case may have
supported or may support a laches or "lack of equity" defense.289 It should
be noted, however, that in response to any time bar defense in any case like
the Triton matter, the SEC could be expected to argue an "equitable tolling"
principle claiming that by virtue of the defendants' concealment activities
- i.e., misbookings of payments, etc. - any statute of limitations or
laches time period should be tolled, thereby allowing the SEC to proceed
with its enforcement action.
B. Lack of Equity
When the SEC seeks equitable relief in the form of an injunctive rem-
edy in a civil enforcement action in federal district court, it has the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence of two matters.290 First, that
the defendant has directly violated one of the federal securities statutes or
the rules and regulations thereunder (i.e., a "primary" violator), or has indi-
rect responsibility for the primary violator's violation by virtue of some
theory of secondary liability, usually "aiding and abetting" (i.e., a "secon-
dary" violator or "aider and abettor").291 Second, that apart from responsi-
bility for a statutory violation, there is "equity" for an injunction, i.e., that
absent imposition of the requested injunctive relief there is a "reasonable
likelihood" or "cognizable danger" that the defendant will commit or aid
and abet further violations in the future.292
288See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1485, 1492 (9th Cir. 1993) ("we hasten to add that
our holding here will not open the door to the prosecution of stale claims. A court can and
should consider the remoteness of the defendant's past violations in deciding whether to
grant the requested equitable relief.... Although no fixed period of limitations governs
Commission actions, a court may exercise its discretion to limit the Commission's power to
seek relief."); see also SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (a long time
interval between the violation and the suit may lead a court not to grant an injunction or to
issue a milder one).
289See e.g., SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (long
delay - five years to file complaint and six more years to proceed to trial, listed as factors in
court denying SEC requested injunctive relief).
290See generally Arthur F. Mathews, S.E.C. Civil Injunctive Actions (pts 1 & 2), 5 REV.
SEC. REG. 969, 949 (1972); 1 MARC I STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SEcuRITIEs
PRACTICEs FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 5.05 (1996).
" See generally Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securi-
ties Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637 (1988).
2 92
See SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1303, 1305 n.4 (July 1975) (Remarks
of Arthur Mathews) ("The SEC must prove at trial by a preponderance of the evidence that a
statutory violation has been or is about to be committed and that 'there is a reasonable ex-
pectation that the defendants will thwart the policy of the Act by engaging in activities pro-
scribed thereby'; i.e., a 'cognizable danger' or threat of future statutory violations."); see
also SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
312 F. Supp. 77, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd after remand, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd in part and rev'd in part, Chris-Craft In-
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Triton Energy could have attempted to pursue a "lack of equity" de-
fense if the litigation had not been settled. Not only were the charges over
five years stale when filed, but in the interim, Triton Energy had undergone
a nearly complete management transformation. The company appointed a
new CEO, a new CFO, a new General Counsel, and a new Controller,
among others. None of these officers were implicated in the alleged viola-
tive conduct. The company installed several new members on its board of
directors; no inside management director of the old regime was retained.
The new Board was comprised of a majority of independent directors (at
least half of whom were not on the Board at the time of events in question).
The company also appointed new outside auditors, and installed rigorous
new FCPA compliance procedures and extensive new internal accounting
controls.293
The new management hired outside counsel to conduct an extensive
internal corporate investigation, and cooperated fully with the DOJ and the
SEC in their respective investigations of the Indonesian payments. Addi-
tionally, all individuals named as defendants or respondents in the SEC's
civil and administrative enforcement actions were no longer in the com-
pany's employ.
294
dus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). In Bangor Punta, 331 F.
Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in addition to proving a past statutory violation, the court
held the SEC to the burden of establishing that defendants had a "propensity or natural incli-
nation" to violate the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, SEC Civil In-
junctive Actions - II, 5 SEC. REV. REG. 949 (1972); 4 ALAN R. BROMnERG & LEwIs D.
LOVENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, §
13.2, 13:112.11- 13:120 (1997); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. GeoTek, Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, (9th Cir.
1978); SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 588 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1977); SEC v. American Realty Trust, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,913 (E.D. Va. 1977);
SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also SEC
v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ili. 1977); SEC v. American Bd. of Trade, Inc., 751
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1984); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, sub nom. Zimmerman v. SEC, 440 U.S. 913 (1979), affd after remand, 665 F.2d
1310 (D.C. Cir. 1981); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978);
SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d
1044 (2d Cir. 1976); cert. denied, sub nom. Homans v. SEC, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250
(D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp. (Bach, Allison, and Tate), 360 F. Supp.
284 (D.D.C. 1973); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp. (Lord, Bissel & Brook et al.), 457
F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
293For a discussion of such procedures, see Robert B. Holland III, Internal Corporate
Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND THE
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All of these factors are the types of matters that courts historically have
found support "lack of equity" as a defense in an SEC civil injunctive en-
295forcement action.
C. Lack of Use of United States "Jurisdictional Means" "in Furtherance of'
the Allegedly Improper Payments
A violation of the corrupt foreign payments provisions of Section
30A(a) requires proof that the violator made "use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of' a
proscribed payment.296 Payments that make no use of the U.S. mails or
other jurisdictional means do not violate the FCPA's antibribery provi-
sions.
2 97
The SEC's injunctive complaint and cease-and-desist order/opinion in
Triton Energy embrace payments made outside the United States, in Indo-
nesia, and allege that the negotiations with Siouffi concerning the payments
also took place outside the United States, in Indonesia. The payments were
made by the subsidiary, Triton Indonesia. The SEC acknowledged that par-
ent Triton Energy's management in the United States did not have advance
knowledge of the payments and that "Triton Energy did not expressly
authorize or direct these improper payments and misbookings."
298
Depending upon the nature of proof at trial, lack of use of U.S. "juris-
dictional means" "in furtherance of' the proscribed payments, may have
served as a viable defense. An important issue that the court may have had
to resolve is whether the mere general funding of Triton Indonesia's opera-
tions by its parent Triton Energy through use of U.S. jurisdictional facili-
ties, i.e., mails, wire transfers, etc., or any specific Triton Energy fundings
of Triton Indonesia "cash calls," would provide a sufficient nexus to a
challenged payment to satisfy the FCPA's strict "jurisdictional means" re-
quirements. 99 Or would travel to Dallas, Texas by the Pertamina/BPKP
295See, e.g., SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
29615 U.S.C. § 78 dd-1(a) (1988) (emphasis added). For more discussion of the "in fur-
therance of" requirements, see supra Part VII.B.
297Cf Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944) ("federal mail fraud statute does not
purport to reach all frauds, but only those limited instances in which the use of the mails is a
part of the execution of the fraud .... ")298See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Release No. 15,266, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 (Feb. 27, 1997).
299 To hold that the mere general funding of a subsidiary's foreign operations by a do-
mestic parent corporation will satisfy Section 30A(a)'s jurisdictional means element would
be a strained interpretation of the FCPA. Mere funding without knowledge of the corrupt
payments would provide a basis to hold domestic parent companies strictly liable for their
money-losing subsidiaries' unlawful foreign payments, a result Congress clearly did not in-
tend. Such a basis for an assertion of jurisdiction would have the odd result of conferring
jurisdiction over parent corporations when money-losing subsidiaries pay bribes, but not
when profitable subsidiaries do so.
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auditors to review the records of parent Triton Energy have triggered suffi-
cient use of jurisdictional means?
However, the lack of jurisdictional means defense would not have been
a complete defense for Triton Energy even if accepted by the court. It ap-
plies only to the corrupt foreign payments charges pursuant to Section 30A;
it is not an available defense to the books and records/internal accounting
controls charges pursuant to Sections 13(b)(2) and (5).
D. Lack of "Corrupt" Intent
If the Triton Energy case had been litigated it is likely that one of the
principal defenses that would have been pursued was that Triton Energy did
not act "corruptly." Absent proof of "corrupt" intent there cannot be an
FCPA bribery violation.300
The SEC complaint alleged that defendants McAdoo and Keever,
managing agents of the subsidiary Triton Indonesia
authorized numerous improper payments to Roland Siouffi, Triton Indonesia's
business agent acting as an intermediary between Triton Indonesia and Indone-
sian government agencies, knowing or recklessly disregarding the high prob-
ability that Siouffi either had or would pass such payments along to Indonesian
government employees for the purpose of influencing their decisions affecting
the business of Triton Indonesia. ... McAdoo and Keever, together with other
Triton Indonesian employees, also concealed these payments by falsely docu-
menting and recording the transactions as routine business expenditures. 301
The Complaint further acknowledged that "Triton Energy did not ex-
pressly authorize or direct these improper payments and misbookings. '30 2
Under general federal criminal law principles of respondent superior
and corporate responsibility, a corporation is liable for the criminal acts of
its managing agents and supervisors so long as the agents acted within the
scope of their employment and intended to benefit the corporation.30 3 A
corporation may be similarly criminally liable for the crimes of its outside
agents or consultants.30 4 Thus, assuming Siouffi passed on all or a portion
300See Gary M. Elden & Mark S. Sablemann, Negligence Is Not Corruption: The Scien-
ter Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 819 (1981);
ZARIN, supra note 13, § 4.3.
30 1 See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Release No. 15,266, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997)
302
1d.
303See 1 BRICKEY, supra note 133, §§ 3.03 and 4.02; OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra
note 67, § 5.03[1]; Note, Developments, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979); James R. Elkins, Corpo-
rations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. L.J. 73, 99 (1976); Leonard Or-
land, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM.
CfIti. L. REV. 501 (1980); L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other
Groups: A Comparative View, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1508, 1516 (1982); L.H. Leigh, The Crimi-
nal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups, 9 OTrAWA L. REV. 246, 269 (1977).
34 1 BRiCKEY, supra note 133, § 3.05.
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of the payments to Indonesian government officials, any corrupt intent of
Siouffi, McAdoo or Keever would be imputed to Triton Indonesia.
Whether such corrupt intent could be imputed upstream from the subsidiary
Triton Indonesia to the parent Triton Energy is uncertain. Federal criminal
law respondent superior principles "remove any theoretical obstacles to im-
posing liability on a parent corporation for the criminal conduct of its sub-
sidiaries .... Subsidiaries may act as agents of the parent company just as
their human agents may act as subagents. '3 °5
But whether such imputation will be made upstream from subsidiary to
parent is a judge/jury question that will be factually driven in every case.
If, hypothetically, McAdoo and Keever had testified at a trial that each
of them in good faith believed that the payments to Siouffi (and presumably
these payments were passed on in whole or in part to Indonesian govern-
ment officials or employees) were legally acceptable grease or facilitating
payments and were not for the purpose of "obtaining or retaining business,"
but instead were made solely to cause the government officials and employ-
ees to do their lawful duty in a more timely manner and to reach decisions
and conclusions as to which Triton Indonesia was lawfully entitled in each
instance, then a judge or a jury could have found there existed no corrupt
intent. If the purpose of the payments solely was to cause government offi-
cials to properly perform their lawful duties, then the corrupt element
evaporates because a finding of corrupt intent requires proof that the actor
intended "to induce the recipient to misuse his official position. 30 6
To counteract a profession of good faith by McAdoo and Keever, and
to attempt to satisfy the "corrupt" hurdle, the SEC surely at trial would have
stressed the misbookings of the payments. Concealment through falsifica-
tion of books and records can be strong evidence from which corrupt intent
can be inferred.30 7
305See id. § 3.06 (in United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963). But see PMLLIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION §§ 30.08, 30.10 (1989)).306See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991); S. REP. No. 95-114,
at 10 (1977) (payment "must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official posi-
tion in order to wrongfully direct business. . ."); H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 7-8 (1977) (same);
DOJ and Dep't of Commerce brochure, supra note 17, at 5 ("[T]he payment must be in-
tended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order wrongfully to direct
business to the payor.") (emphasis in original).
307 See, e.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding
jury's finding that gift of airline ticket was made to government official "corruptly," the
court relied in part on evidence that defendant booked the cost of the ticket for accounting
purposes as a "commission payment.").
380
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E. Lawful Grease or Facilitating Payments
Since there is no statutory cap on the amount of a lawful facilitating or
grease payment, 30 8 each of the payments in the Triton Energy case was hy-
pothetically susceptible to being defended as such.
Facilitating or grease payments are made to persuade a government
servant to do rightful, not wrongful acts; i.e., to perform the government
service to which the issuer is lawfully entitled to receive. As one of the
1977 House reports explained:
In using the word "corruptly", the committee intends to distinguish between
payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free will in acting
or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those payments which merely
move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or which do not
involve any discretionary action....
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a
foreign official's duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the com-
mittee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the
world.... As a result, the committee has not attempted to reach such pay-
ments.309
When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 to codify the "grease"
payment exception, it likewise focused on the purpose of the payment as thekey issue.31 Congress, in 1988, did not define the terms "facilitating or ex-
pediting payment," and instead enumerated examples of the kinds of "rou-
tine governmental action" that such payments permissibly could
influence.311 Significantly, Congress placed no numerical limit on the law-
ful size of facilitating or expediting payments: The FCPA nowhere con-
tains such a limit, and none of the conference or committee reports or any
bills introduced in the eleven-year period between enactment of the FCPA
in 1977 and its amendment in 1988 suggest that any numerical limitation
was contemplated.
It is on this basis that courts have distinguished corrupt payments to
government officials under the domestic bribery statute from payments to
government officials that, though not corruptly motivated, are nonetheless
proscribed under that statute as illegal gratuities. 312 The FCPA, of course,
3 08 See supra Part IV.
309H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-114 at 10 (1977) (statute does not
"cover so-called 'grease payments' ... which may involve even the proper performance of
duties."); cf. S. REP. No. 94-1031, at 7 (1976) (bill would not reach payments to expedite
proper performance of duties).
31015 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b) and 78dd-2(b) (1988) (FCPA "shall not apply to any facili-
tating or expediting payment.., the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the per-
formance of a routine governmental action.") (emphasis added).
3" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(B) and 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (1988).
31218 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988). See United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ("Payments to a public official for acts that would have been performed in any
event ... are probably illegal gratuities rather than bribes."); United States v. Muldoon, 931
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proscribes only corrupt payments, and not gratuities or payments to induce
officials to perform properly their duties.3
The SEC specified five separate series of payments totaling approxi-
mately $280,000 as the "improper payments" authorized by McAdoo and
Keever in 1989 and 1990,3 4 and other additional payments totaling ap-
proximately $170,000 as improperly recorded grease or facilitating pay-
ments.315 With regard to the 1989 Tax Audit payments of approximately
$180,000, the auditors agreed to Triton's contentions (i) that Triton's
predecessor Nordell should not have been liable for withholding tax on
technical service fees, and (ii) that a lower tax rate on interest charges for
interest on funding was appropriate. If the initial tax assessments were in-
correct under applicable Indonesian tax law, and the payments were made
solely to correct erroneous tax assessments, then despite the size of the
payments - $280,000 - a judge or a jury adjudicating the case could have
found the payments to be lawful grease or facilitating payments - i.e.,
made solely for the purpose of getting the tax auditors to correctly and
timely perform their lawful duties to Triton Indonesia. If Triton Indonesia
was lawfully entitled to the amount of the refunds eventually approved,
then the payments made to achieve that result would not have been "cor-
rupt." The SEC presumably believed it could have proved otherwise at
trial. And in settling the case, Triton Energy agreed not to deny, or to ad-
mit, the SEC's allegation.
With regard to approximately $59,000 in payments in connection with
the Fiscal 1988 and 1989 Annual Pertamina/BPKP Audits, the auditors
agreed essentially to Triton's claimed amounts for the certified cost pools
for both years. So long as Triton was lawfully entitled to the amounts of
cost pools actually certified under applicable Indonesian law, regulations
and contractual provisions, then payments to get auditors to timely com-
plete audits containing proper results would not be "corrupt"; rather they
F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A]n illegal gratuity is a payment made for an act by the re-
cipient that might have been done without any payment."); United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d
993, 995 (9th Cir. 1978) (bribe requires corrupt intent that payment be primary motivator of
official act; illegal gratuity requires no such intent). Again, it is the purpose of the payment,
not the amount, that is important.
3 13Cf United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893, 998-900 (2d Cir. 1993) (despite acquittal
on bribery count, conviction on gratuities count upheld where payment made was $30,000).314 See In re Gore, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 38,343, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,404
(D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997) at "F. Specific Payments":
1. 1989 Tax Audit - a total of approximately $180,000.
2. Fiscal 1988 and 1989 Annual Pertamina/BPKP Audits - a total of approximately
$59,500.
3. 1989 Corporate Tax Refund- approximately $7,500.
4. 1989 VAT Refund - approximately $23,000.
5. 1990 Pipeline Tariff- approximately $10,000.
315See id. at "G. Triton Indonesia Recorded Other False Entries In Its Books And Rec-
ords."
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would be acceptable grease or facilitating payments. Proof of corrupt intent
would have required evidence that in return for the payments, the auditors
certified cost pools in amounts in excess of what Triton was legally entitled
to receive. This, presumably, is what the SEC believed it could prove at
trial.
The same criteria apply to the 1989 Corporate Tax Refund payment of
approximately $7,500, the 1989 VAT Refund payment of approximately
$23,000, and the 1990 Pipeline Tariff payment of approximately $10,000.
If under applicable Indonesian law, regulations, and contractual provisions,
Triton was lawfully entitled to the corporate tax refund and the VAT re-
funds in the amounts ultimately determined, and to the lower Pipeline Tariff
rate ultimately approved, then the payments could qualify as acceptable
grease or facilitating payments. So long as Triton Energy could have con-
vinced an adjudicator that these payments were made in good faith to in-
duce the auditors to timely take the actions Triton Indonesia lawfully was
entitled to, rather than being made with the intention to induce such offi-
cials to misuse their positions or to induce them to grant Triton Indonesia
something to which the company was not already lawfully entitled, the
payments would not have been corrupt; they would have been grease. Pre-
sumably the SEC believed that at trial it could wipe away or penetrate
through the grease, and establish a corrupt motive. And, in settling the
case, Triton Energy agreed to neither admit nor deny the SEC's allegations.
F. Not for the Purpose of "Obtaining or Retaining Business"
The SEC Complaint does not specifically allege that the improper
payments were made by Triton Indonesia or on behalf of Triton Energy "in
order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person."" Rather, the Complaint charges that
the payments were made:
(1) "to Indonesian government employees for the purpose of influenc-
ing their decisions affecting the business of Triton Indonesia;"'3 17 and
(2) "to Indonesian government officials to obtain favorable deci-
sions."318
In litigation, Triton Energy may have chosen to attempt to defend the
payments against the FCPA bribery charges, by arguing that none of the
allegedly improper payments were made for the purpose of "obtaining or
retaining business.0' 19 This so-called "business purpose" element of the
FCPA's corrupt payments proscriptions has never been interpreted by any
31615 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1977) (emphasis added).
317 Complaint, SEC v. Triton Energy Corp. 1. (emphasis added) [hereinafter Complaint]
(on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
318 Complaint, 53. (emphasis added).
319 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(1)(a)(B) (1977). See supra Part VII.G. for a discussion of this busi-
ness purpose element.
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court in a litigated case. The plain language of the statute suggests that it
only prohibits payments intended to influence decisions about to whom to
award contracts or direct business and with whom to renew such contracts
or other business. Payments to influence other decisions for other purposes,
while suspect or immoral, do not appear to be forbidden by the letter or
spirit of the FCPA. In the context of Triton Indonesia's business, a lay per-
son might very well understand the statutory language to mean that Triton
Indonesia could not pay an Indonesian government official to influence his
discretion in making an official decision that would award the company a
new concession, or expand the company's existing concession.
Such a construction appears to be supported by the legislative history,
which shows that Congress rejected broader prohibitions. Both the Senate
and House bills originally contained much broader prohibitions. The Sen-
ate's final bill, contained the enacted "business purpose" requirement em-
bodied in the obtaining or retaining business language, and also would have
proscribed payments for the purpose of "influencing legislation or regula-r,320 ,
tions. The House bill broadly prohibited all payments to "influenc[e]
any act or decision" of a foreign official or government.321 The Conference
Committee reconciling the two bills adopted the Senate's "obtaining or re-
tamining" business purpose requirement, but not its broader proscription of
payments to influence laws and regulations.322 In doing so, the Conference
Committee explained:
[T]he purpose of the payment must be to influence any act or decision of a for-
eign official (including a decision not to act) or to induce such official to use
his influence to affect a government act or decision so as to assist an issuer in
obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person.
32
3
Congress thus rejected the broader prohibitions contained in both bills
and limited the prohibition to payments intended to influence decisions
about to whom to award or direct business and with whom to renew busi-
ness.
3 24
Some determined House legislators tried unsuccessfully to enact a
variation of the defeated 1977 House bill as part of the 1988 Amendments
320S. REp. No. 95-114, at 17 (1977); 123 CONG. REc. 13816 (1977).
321 123 CONG. REc. 36303 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (House bill
would have prohibited payments "to influence the passage of law, regulations, the placement
of government contracts, the formulation of policy, or other discretionary governmental
functions.").
3' 2 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-831, at3 (1977).
3"Id. at 12 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N at 4124-25.
324 Although the SEC's highly publicized consent judgment in the United Brands case in
1976 was one of the enforcement matters that led to legislative consideration of the FCPA,
paradoxically, as this legislative history demonstrates, the enacted FCPA did not and does
not proscribe the type of conduct underlying United Brands, i.e., bribing a foreign official to
effect foreign tax or export legislation that would result in increased profits to the American
corporation. See SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,420 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1976).
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to the FCPA. That failing, they resorted to including the spirit of their un-
enacted bill in the legislative history to the Amendments.325 This 1988
statement is simply not relevant to interpreting the "obtaining or retaining
business" language adopted in 1977. The express statutory language of the
1988 Amendments did not alter the "obtaining or retaining business" re-
quirement, and it is basic that Congress (much less a single house or legis-
lator) cannot amend a statute through subsequent legislative history.326
Regardless, to the extent the lone statement in the 1988 legislative
history suggests an interpretation broader than the statutory language and
legislative history when that language was enacted, the interpretation is re-
futed by the changes Congress actually made. In the 1988 Amendments,
Congress created the safe harbor for "facilitating" or "grease" payments
"the purpose of which is to expedite or secure the performance of a routine
,,327governmental action. In defining "routine governmental action," Con-
gress focused, as it did in 1977, on decisions to award new business, renew
existing business, and improper influence in directing business. It did so in
part by excluding from the safe harbor payments to influence
any decision by a foreign official to award new business to or to continue busi-
ness with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official involved
in the decision-making process to encourage a decision to award new business
to or continue business with a particular party.
3 28
Thus, regardless of the erroneous statement in the 1988 report, Con-
gress as a whole did not intend that the scope of the prohibition be ex-
panded. The "rule of lenity" should also prevent application in a criminal
prosecution of the broad, expansive interpretation proffered by a few House
legislators.329
Since none of the payments embraced by the SEC Complaint (even as-
suming Siouffi passed all or a portion of them on to Indonesian government
32
5See H.R. CoNF. REP. No.100-576, at 918 (1988), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1951 (stating that "'retaining business'.., includes... corrupt payments related to the exe-
cution or performance of contracts, or the carrying out of existing business, such as a pay-
ment.., for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax treatment."). This was an obvious
effort to suggest that the United Brands type conduct was proscribed, see H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 100-576, at 918 (1988)(citing United Brands), but the 1977 legislative history makes
clear it was not and is not proscribed. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
326 Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) ("the interpretation
given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute") (citations omitted); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (views of subsequent Congress "form a haz-
ardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one") (citations omitted); see also Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) ("[S]ubsequent legislative history will rarely override a
reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative
history prior to its enactment.").
32715 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b) and 78dd-2(b) (1988).
32815 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(B) and 78dd-2(h)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
329 5ee ases and articles cited supra note 129.
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officials) appear to have been to influence a decision to award new business
to or to continue or renew an existing business relationship with Triton In-
donesia, the defense of lack of purpose to obtain or retain business likely
would have been subject to litigation had the case not settled.
The SEC appears to believe that any payment intended to influence a
foreign government official to exercise discretion favorably on a matter "af-
fecting the business" of an issuer 30 satisfies the business purpose require-
ment. Thus, the SEC Complaint alleges that the payments to Siouffi (and
likely passed on to government officials) "to obtain favorable decisions
331
and "for the purpose of influencing specific actions" like reducing tax li-
ability in a tax audit,332 obtaining audit reports certifying a favorable unre-
covered cost pool, 333 obtaining a corporate tax refund ,34 obtaining VAT
refunds,335 and obtaining a reduction in a pipeline tariff,336 all violated Sec-
tion 30A(a).3 37
The DOJ appears to concur with the SEC's broad, elastic reading of the
business purpose requirement. Both the DOJ and the SEC point to the
criminal plea bargains obtained by the DOJ in United States v. Vitusa
Corp.338 and United States v. Herzberg,339 in both of which the corporate
and individual defendants each pleaded guilty to a Section 30B(a) felony in
circumstances where the payment made to the foreign government official
was made solely for the purpose of collecting moneys due and owing on a
completed contract, with no prospect for continuing or new business.340 A
court interpreting the "obtaining or retaining business" element of the
FCPA likely would give little weight to uncontested consent settlements
such as the Vitusa Corporation and Herzberg criminal plea bargains.341
Nevertheless, Triton Energy chose to settle the case, and agreed to
neither admit nor deny the SEC's allegations. The DOJ and the SEC can be
expected to argue the Triton Energy case as well as the Vitusa Corporation
330 Complaint, SEC v. Triton Energy Corp. T 1.
331 Id. 753.
332 1d. 21 to 26.
333Id. 27 to 32.
334 1d. 33 to 36.
335Id. 7 37 to 39.
336 1d. 40 to 43.
337 1d. 54.
33
1 See 3 FCPA Rep. 699-155.
339See id.
340 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
341 These cases have little precedential value because they are not litigated dispositions.
There are many reasons why a defendant facing potential charges on a variety of grounds
might negotiate a guilty plea to one charge, even if an element of that charge might be le-
gally contestable. See e.g., United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp. 993, 1008 (D. Cal.
1972) (dismissing criminal charges where government's theory of liability rested on
uncontested settlement with the SEC); Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Re-
port of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1141-48 (1992).
Defending SEC & DOJ FCPA Investigations
18:303 (1998)
and Herzberg cases as "precedent" to bolster their views in future civil, ad-
ministrative and criminal FCPA enforcement actions that the "business pur-
pose" test should be construed broadly and liberally in favor of the
government. Defense counsel must be prepared to argue, particularly in a
criminal prosecution, that the "rule of lenity" trumps the precedential value
of a non-litigated consent decree.342
XII. REQUIRED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE343
A. "Materiality" Under the Federal Securities Laws
Apart from the books and records and internal accounting controls
provisions, the FCPA does not contain any public disclosure require-
ments.34 Thus, whether an issuer must publicly disclose an unadjudicated
foreign bribe turns on the same "materiality" determination that would ap-
ply to a domestic bribe or any other unadjudicated misconduct.
Under well-established standards, a public company must disclose an un-
adjudicated FCPA violation if it is financially material - that is, if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the corrupt payment will have a material effect on
earnings, assets, or liabilities. Even if the payment is not itself significant in
amount, disclosure may also be required when there is a material amount of
business dependent on the illegal conduct or when there is a reasonable possi-
bility that discovery of the illegal conduct will result in expropriation of a ma-
terial amount of assets or imposition of material criminal fines or civil
damages. Traditional disclosure standards will also require disclosure of cor-
rupt foreign payments if they somehow involve self-dealing by the U.S. com-
pany's directors or senior management.345
Two commentators posit four different ways that a corrupt payment
may cross the "materiality" threshold:
46
(1) the "sheer size" of the payment itself;
3 4 7
342See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812-13 (1971); Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926).
343 See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 3.04; see also BIALos & HusIsiAN, supra note
8, at 127-29.
3 " BLACK & WrrEN, supra note 13, § 3.04, at 3-13:
The FCPA contains no disclosure requirements. Although the SEC brought to light the
issue of improper or questionable foreign payments through creative and aggressive in-
terpretations of the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws, Congress
made a conscious choice to address the issue substantively rather than altering tradi-
tional disclosure requirements.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 6 (1977); S. REP. No. 94-1031, at 7 (1976)).
345BLACK & WrIrEN, supra note 13, § 3.04, at 3-13 (citing John Fedders [SEC Enforce-
ment Director], Speech on Failure To Disclose Illegal Conduct (Nov. 26, 1982), in 14 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2057, 2058, 2061 (1982)); Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Prac-
tices and the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REV.
781, 797-805 (1982); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclosure of Information Bearing on Man-
agement Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 555, 581, 590 (1981)).
346 BIALOS & HUsIsIAN, supra note 8, at 127-28.
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(2) "the amount of business ... secured by the bribe is itself mate-
rial" ;34
8
(3) "an otherwise nonmaterial bribe could become material if it be-
comes necessary for the corporation to reserve a material amount of funds
against earnings to cover potential contingent claims, potential fines, or
otherwise."
349
(4) [s]everal courts have held that a company must disclose any corrupt
payments made by its employees or officers - even if the payment would not
otherwise be considered material - because such payments reflect a lack of
managerial integrity, which is itself a material fact that should be disclosed.
350
The prevailing judicial view, however, is that undisclosed payments, while
immoral, are not material under U.S. securities laws (although even these
courts generally have concluded that once a firm, or its officers or directors,
have been indicted or convicted of making a payment, then disclosure is re-
quired).
3 5
3471d. at 127 n.44 ("A million-dollar payment like that made by the Lockheed Corpora-
tion to secure the sales of its aircraft to Egypt, for example, is large enough to require disclo-
sure for most, if not all, issuers.")
3481d. at 128.
349Id. (citing Decker v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) aff'd
and rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982) (denying motion to dismiss a
plaintiff's claim under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act where the company failed to disclose an
illicit payment made in a foreign county and disclosure of the payment would render affected
sales and earnings from that country vulnerable to termination); CODIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 54, §
17.13 ( American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988) (stating that an illegal payment
of even an immaterial amount could be material if it could reasonably be construed as lead-
ing to a potentially material liability or loss of income)).
3501d. at 128-129 (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987)
(stating that management is required to disclose allegations that bribery has occurred because
"we do not think it is necessarily true that information about bribery is not material until it
becomes the subject of an indictment" since "[m]anagement's willingness to engage in prac-
tices that probably or obviously are illegal, and its decision to put the corporation at risk by
doing so, may be critically important factors to investors"); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (requiring disclosure of foreign payments by
offeror's management because "[i]n circumstances where actions by some members of cor-
porate management have been challenged as being questionable, if not outright illegal, and
such actions have indeed been acknowledged by the corporation itself, it is certainly neces-
sary that stockholders have knowledge of the individuals involved and the activities which
transpired in order that they may have a full opportunity to appraise those activities and the
participants. Such activities bear the closest relationship to the integrity of management.")).
It should be noted, however, that in the Roeder v. Alpha Indus. Inc. case, even though the
First Circuit found the bribes to be "material" prior to indictment or conviction, the court
dismissed the complaint finding the defendant corporation had "no duty to disclose" the oth-
erwise "material" bribes.
351 Id. (citing Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1145 (1982) (Alleging that Lockheed violated corporate reporting and proxy require-
ments of Sections 13(a) and 14(a) of 1934 Act by failing to disclose questionable foreign
payments. The court acknowledged that foreign bribes can be "unethical" or "immoral."
However, "[a]bsent credible allegations of self-dealing by the directors or dishonesty or de-
ceit which inures to the direct, personal benefit of the directors - a fact that demonstrates a
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There is little remaining judicial support for the early SEC enforcement
position that all bribes, foreign or domestic, no matter what amount, must
be disclosed on an "integrity of management" theory of materiality.352 The
SEC Enforcement Division itself abandoned that broad contention in
131982 .
3
B. The Crop Growers Case
A recent criminal prosecution brought by Independent Counsel Donald
Smaltz in the investigation of former Secretary of Agriculture Michael
Espy, deals squarely xvith the application of the books and records and in-
ternal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA as they relate to undis-
betrayal of trust to the corporation and shareholders and the director's essential unfitness for
corporate stewardship" - information concerning alleged bribes "is simply not material or
othervise within the ambit of the federal securities laws."); United Techs. v. Daniell, 769 F.
Supp. 649, 653 (D. Conn. 1992) (dismissing Rule 14a-9 allegation for failure to disclose
bribes in proxy materials because "[i]t would be unreasonable to require board members to
tell the world they are thieves, unless, of course, they have been charged and/or convicted.").
Cf Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979) (distinguishing situations in which the
officer personally benefits, and hence is required to disclose his interests, with those, in-
cluding "illegal foreign payments," in which the transaction is for the benefit of the corpora-
tion); United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that even though
Southland General Counsel Clark Matthews, up for election as a director, knew that he might
be named as a participant in a conspiracy to cover-up Southland's payments of domestic
bribes, "we find no merit in the Government's argument that Matthews violated Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by not confessing that he was guilty of conspiracy three years before
he was indicted on that charge.")). See also Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 731
(8th Cir. 1979) ("Illegal foreign payment cases.., should not be dealt with under the general
disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws. . . ."); In re Par Phar., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
733 F. Supp. 668, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[A] company [is] not obligated to speculate as to
the myriad of consequences.., that might have befallen the company if the bribery scheme
was discovered, disclosed or terminated.... Defendants cannot be held liable for failing to
'disclose' what would have been pure speculation.").352 Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d at 776 ("We draw a sharp distinction ... between alle-
gations of director misconduct involving breach of trust or self-dealing - the nondisclosure
of which is presumptively material - and allegations of simple breach of fiduciary
duty/waste of corporate assets - the nondisclosure of which is never material."); see also
Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure Requirement of the Federal
Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAxi L. REV. 781, 797-805 (1982); Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Disclo-
sure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv.
at 581, 590 (1981).
353 John Fedders, Speech on Failure to Disclose Illegal Conduct (Nov. 11, 1982), in 14
See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2057, 2061 (Nov. 26, 1982): "Absent quantitatively material in-
formation, self-dealing or failure to comply with other mandated disclosure requirements,
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws generally should not be utilized where there is
a failure to disclose qualitative information." For an article arguing that the SEC should
adopt a specific line item disclosure item under the 1934 Act proxy rules requiring disclosure
of unadjudicated domestic or foreign bribes by nominees for the board of directors of a
public company, see James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy
Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships
Passing in the Night, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 315 (1992).
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closed illegal domestic campaign contributions, and with the question of
whether a corporation has a duty to disclose publicly unadjudicated charges
of such illegal payments.3 54 Defendant Crop Growers Corporation was in-
dicted for conspiring to make illegal campaign contributions of approxi-
mately $46,000 to Secretary Espy's brother, Henry, when Henry was
running for Congress, and for concealing such contributions from the Fed-
eral Election Commission, the SEC, and the public. In companion substan-
tive counts, Crop Growers was charged with:
(i) making and keeping false records and accounts;
(ii) failing to disclose material facts in various SEC filings;
(iii) failing to disclose to potential investors the false information; and
(iv) individual defendants were charged with failing to disclose to Crop
Grower's outside independent auditors the potentially illegal conduct in-
volving the making and false booking of the campaign contributions.
Many of the counts in the indictment charged false statements to the
SEC as 18 U.S.C. § 1001 false statement felonies.
The Indictment specifically alleges ten different SEC filings from which
material facts were allegedly omitted. These material facts are: (a) that Crop
growers violated FECA by making illegal campaign contributions; (b) that a
material contingent liability existed for potential criminal and civil fines be-
cause of said violations; (c) that Crop Growers' financial statements were
misleading; (d) that Crop Growers maintained false books and records; and, (e)
that Crop Growers, its subsidiaries, and their key officers faced criminal and
civil sanctions under provisions other than FECA and that their ability to oper-
ate could be severely affected as a result.355
To the extent that the 18 U.S.C. § 1001 false statement counts were
based on a "concealment" theory, the court dismissed the counts because it
found that Crop Growers and the individual defendants did not have a legal
duty to disclose the alleged facts at the time of the alleged concealment.
The court found that Crop Growers and its officers had no duty to disclose
that the company had made illegal campaign contributions or had illegally
maintained false books and records, relying on United States v. Mat-
thews.357 The court also found that 17 C. F. R. §§ 229.103, which mandates
354 See United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1997).
355Id. at 344.356 See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 1994) (violation of Section
1001 predicated on concealment requires that the defendant must have had a legal duty to
disclose the facts at the time of the alleged concealment); United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d
1047, 1055 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 958 (1987) (same);
United States v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Her-
nando Ospina, 798 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Larson, 796 F.2d
244, 246 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 683 (1st Cir.
1985) (same); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 678-79 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); see also
United States v. Dale, 782 F. Supp. 615, 626 (D.D.C. 1991).
357 United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (no duty to disclose uncharged
criminal conduct). The Crop Growers court observed:
[T]he SEC itself has, in conjunction with the proxy statement provisions of the securi-
390
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disclosure in SEC filings of any "material pending legal proceedings" or
"any such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authori-
ties," did not require disclosure of the facts alleged in the indictment.358
The court also rejected two further disclosure theories proffered by the In-
dependent Counsel: First, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303, which requires an issuer to
disclose "any known trend or uncertainty" likely to influence the regis-
trant's liquidity or operational results. Second, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503, which
requires a registrant to disclose in Form S-1 "the principal factors that make
the offering speculative or one of high risk."
To the extent the Independent Counsel argued that the 18 U.S.C. §
1001 charges should proceed on a "false representation" as opposed to a
"concealment" theory, the court dismissed the counts finding "[tihe Indict-
ment does not assert that there are any affirmatively false statements in the
SEC filings. 359
One count in the indictment (Count Sixteen) charged the defendants
with a fraud felony pursuant to the anti-fraud provision of the 1933 Act,
360
on the theory that the defendants wilfully failed to disclose the allegedly
ties law, failed to adopt such a broad disclosure requirement. The provisions of Item 6
of Schedule 14A, which require only disclosure of criminal convictions or pending
criminal proceedings, were proposed in 1976, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
5758, 1976-77 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,783, and adopted in
1978. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5949, 1978 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,649. The Commission found that information about directors' and of-
ficers' involvement in litigation was material to investors. Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 5949, supra, at p. 80,618. The Commission considered requiring disclo-
sure of questionable or illegal payments, see Securities Exchange Act Release No.
13185, 1976-77 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,897 at 87,382-84, but
failed to adopt such a requirement. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15570,
1979 Transfer Binder, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,959 at 81,392. Thus, the SEC
clearly knows how to write specific disclosure requirements into its regulations, and has
chosen not to do so for uncharged criminal conduct.
954 F. Supp. at 346 (emphasis added).
Applying the Matthews holding, the court specifically held that 17 C.F.R. § 229.401, the
general SEC disclosure provisions relating to directors and executive officers on Form S-1
and proxy statements, did not require disclosure of the uncharged misconduct here. Id. at
347.
358954 F. Supp. at 347:
The regulations governing corporate disclosures are set forth in 17 C.F.R. §
229.103. See Form S-1, Item 11(c). By its plain language, the regulation requires
only disclosure of proceedings "known to be contemplated by governmental
authorities" and does not require the disclosure of uncharged criminal conduct. One
court has even held that the receipt of a target letter is insufficient to trigger an obli-
gation to disclose under this section. In re Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. Shareholder
Derivative Litig., 830 F. Supp. 361, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1993), affd mem., 20 F.3d 465
(5th Cir. 1994). The government does not contend that Defendants, at the time of
the filings at issue, had any knowledge that the government was contemplating for-
mal criminal proceedings or even an investigation. The Court cannot find that the
regulation unambiguously requires disclosure of the conduct alleged.
3 91d. at 349.360Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a) and 77x (1997).
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material facts to the investing public. Relying upon analogous Rule lOb-5
cases, the court found no duty to disclose and dismissed the charge. 361
Four of the charges in the indictment relating to keeping false books
and records and falsifying related accounting records, 362 making false
statements and failing to disclose material facts to auditors,363 were dis-
missed on venue grounds;364 the indictment did not allege a basis for crimi-
nal venue in the District of Columbia.365 The court did engage in some
interesting dicta, however, regarding an issuer's exposure under the books
and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA.366 The
court stated that even though these provisions apply only to SEC registered
or reporting issuers, the provisions may be violated if a company maintains
false books and records during the two-year period prior to first becoming
registered with the SEC. Thus, a "private" company that later (within two
years) becomes a public company, can, by falsifying its "private" books and
records, trigger a subsequent criminal prosecution of the "public" company
for false books and records.367 The court also stated that an issuer's "finan-
cial statements" constitute "books and records" for the purposes of Sections
13(b)(2) and (5). The defendants, relying upon World-Wide Coin Invest-
ments, Ltd.,368 argued that the statute requires that "books, records, and ac-
counts" be accurately kept so that financial statements can be prepared, and
that the difference between "books and records" and "financial statements"
is clear and well-defined.369 The Independent Counsel argued that the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Statement on
Accounting Standards No. 62,370 establishes no clear separation between
"books and records," on the one hand, and "financial statements" on the
other (a financial statement is "[a] presentation of financial data, including
361 United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 350 (citing Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) ("[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclo-
sure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak."); Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (A duty to disclose attaches
"only when a party has legal obligations other than a mere duty to comply with the general
antifraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws.")).
36215 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(5) (1997).
36317 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (1997).
364United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 351-53.
365 Venue is jurisdictional in a federal criminal case. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 3; U.S. CONST. Amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 18; Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231, 1234 (D.
C. Cir. 1967); Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961). Cf. United States v. Anderson,
328 U.S. 699 (1946); United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1188 (2d
Cir. 1989).366Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(5) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(b)(2)(A) and
m(b)(5), and Rule 13b2-1 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1.
367 United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 354-55.
368SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 748 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
369United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 354-55.
37 
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 62, § 5 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1994).
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accompanying notes, derived from accounting records and intended to
communicate an entity's economic resources or obligations at a point in
time." 371). The court sided with the Independent Counsel:
No case law squarely addresses this issue. However, a common sense
reading of the statute suggests that financial statements and records are not suf-
ficiently distinct to warrant differential treatment. When Congress has pro-
vided no definition for a particular term, the ordinary meaning associated with
that term applies.... The Court concludes that financial statements are books
and records under the securities laws.372
C. Other Related Governmental Disclosure Obligations
Even if an issuer determines that a foreign bribe is not "material" and
therefore need not be publicly disclosed in SEC filings, that doesn't mean
that the issuer may not have other related governmental disclosure obliga-
tions.
Disclosure may be required under other laws, however, to cure false,
misleading, or inaccurate statements made to federal departments and agencies.
For example, where a party has submitted statements to the Department of
Commerce in connection with export licensing, such representations, state-
ments, and certifications are deemed to be continuing in effect and the submit-
ting party is under a duty to report new material information or changes in
previously reported facts.
Banks and other financial institutions have strict reporting obligations
regarding potential criminal conduct to the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency.3 74 Government bond dealers must report potential criminal conduct
371 United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 356.3721d. at 356-57.
373BIALOS & HUsIsIAN, supra note 8, at 127 n.42; see 15 C.F.R. § 787.5(a)(3) (1997).
374 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 208.20 (Federal Reserve System requirements of reporting of
possible criminal misconduct by member banks, Edge Act corporations, foreign banks oper-
ating in the United States, and bank holding companies); 12 C.F.R. § 563.180 (Office of
Thrift Supervision requirements of reporting possible criminal misconduct by savings asso-
ciations and service corporations); 12 C.F.R. § 353 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) requirements of reporting of possible criminal misconduct by insured nonmember
banks); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (Office of Controller of the Currency requirements of reporting of
possible criminal misconduct by national banks). For a synopsis of these requirements, see
Gary G. Lynch & Douglas M. Fuchs, Conducting Internal Investigations of Possible Corpo-
rate Wrongdoing,,in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: How TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION
THROUGH SELF-POLICING at 615, 63740 (1996). The importance of these provisions was
highlighted by the recent Daiwa Bank prosecution in the S.D.N.Y. Daiwa Bank was charged
with, among other crimes, misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4, for failing to timely
file with the Federal Reserve System a criminal referral form as required by 12 C.F.R. §§
208.20 and 211.24 with regard to the misconduct by its "rogue trader" Toshide Iguchi. The
draconian nature of criminal exposure in this regard is highlighted by the fact that Daiwa
Bank did inform the Federal Reserve of the misconduct approximately one-month after the
manager of Daiwa's New York office was informed by two Daiwa employees that it was
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to the Department of the Treasury.375 Broker-dealers have reporting obli-
gations to such self-regulating organizations (SROs) as the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) that may require the disclosure of bribes.376 Defense contractors
and other companies making foreign military sales have onerous reporting
and certification requirements that may require disclosure of corrupt foreign
payments.377 U.S. suppliers of goods sold to foreign purchasers with U.S.
Export-Import Bank financing must also file a Supplier's Certification that
378affirms disclosure of all payments.
necessary to file the criminal referral form. See id. at 640. And in the interim, Daiwa had
informed its Japanese governmental bank regulators who apparently encouraged the Bank to
delay disclosure. See Audrey Strauss, Corporate Liability For Misprison of Felony,
N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1996, at 5; see also United States v. LBS Bank-New York, Inc., 757 F.
Supp. 496 (E.D. Penn. 1990) (defendant bank convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 371 conspiracy to
defraud United States, by virtue of filing false CTRs and failing to file criminal referral re-
ports pursuant to FDIC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 353).
375 See, e.g., United States v. Salomon, Inc., Civ. No. 92-3691 (S.D.N.Y., May 20, 1992);
SEC v. Salomon, Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 13246 (S.D.N.Y., May 20, 1992); In the Matter
of Salomon Brothers, Inc., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 30722 (May 20, 1992); United States
v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. Mozer and Murphy, SEC Lit. Release
No. 13453 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1992); In the Matter of John H. Gutfreund et al. (Donald M.
Feuerstein), SEC 1934 Act Release No. 31554 (Dec. 3, 1992).376See NYSE Rules 351(a)(1) (Form RE-3 must be filed when employee "has violated
any provision of any securities law or regulation, or any agreement with or rule or standards
of conduct of any governmental agency, self-regulatory organization, or business or profes-
sional organization. . . ."); Rule 351(a)(10) (requires disclosure of any disciplinary action
taken against an employee "involving suspension, termination, the withholding of commis-
sions or imposition of fines in excess of $2,500, or any other significant limitation on activi-
ties."); NASD Conduct Rule 3070 (reporting of disciplinary actions); NASD Forms U-4 and
U-5 (requires reporting if any employee is the "subject of any complaint, investigation or
proceeding" that could result in a finding of violation or a reportable event.).377See BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13, § 8.01[2] & [3]; The Arms Export Control Act,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796d; International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), 22 C.F.R. §§
120.1-130.17, 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(c)(6) (export license applications when articles or services
are valued at $500,000 or more, must include disclosure of payment of political contribu-
tions, fees, and commissions); 22 C.F.R. § 130.9(a)(1) (statement must disclose "whether the
applicant or its vendors have paid, or offered or agreed to pay, in respect of any sale for
which a license or approval is requested... [p]olitical contributions in an aggregate amount
of $5,000 or more, or ... [flees or commissions in an aggregate amount of $100,000 or
more."). Defense Security Assistance Agency financing through Foreign Military Financ-
ing, pursuant to DOD Manual, 5105.38-M, at 902-60 (Jan. 1996), requires certification by
suppliers that "no bribes, rebates, gifts, kickbacks or gratuities, which are intended to secure
the Purchase Agreement or favorable treatment under the Purchase Agreement or for any
other purpose relating to the Purchase Agreement, have been or will be directly or indirectly
offered or given contrary to United States law, or have been or will be arranged contrary to
United States law with, officers, officials, or employees of the purchaser by the Contractor,
its employees or agents."378The U.S. Export-Import Bank requires certification "that, in connection with the sale,
the supplier has not 'directly or indirectly granted or paid, agreed or offered to grant or pay,
or arranged for, any discount, allowance, rebate, commission, fee or other payment' other
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XIII. DEFENDING AN SEC INVESTIGATION OR A DOJ/GRAND JURY
INQUIRY AND CONDUCTING A RELATED CORPORATE INTERNAL
INVESTIGATION
A public corporation, like Triton Energy, which becomes involved
with a "questionable" foreign payments problem that may implicate the cor-
rupt foreign payments provisions of the FCPA, is likely to need outside le-
gal counsel to represent and assist the company in conducting or defending
three simultaneous or parallel investigations or inquiries, namely (i) the de-
fense of an SEC investigation, (ii) the defense of a DOJ/federal grand jury
inquiry, and (iii) the conduct of an internal corporate investigation. Any or
all of these inquiries may be followed by major governmental criminal,
civil or administrative enforcement litigation against the company and its
officers, employees or agents, or by major private damages litigation by
shareholders or other victims, and companion derivative litigation. The role
of counsel, and pertinent strategic considerations, may differ significantly in
each of these three contexts. The following discussion is intended to illu-
minate some key issues that arise in the development of most cases, even
though the public corporation ordinarily cannot affect the temporal order in
which specific government investigations or inquiries arise or are pursued.
A. Defense of the SEC Investigation
79
1. Strategies in Defending an SEC Investigation May Differ From Defend-
ing a DOJIGrand Jury Inquiry Into the Same Activities
The defense of an SEC investigation, while sharing many similarities
to the defense of a DOJ/grand jury inquiry, is different in several crucial re-
spects. Counsel cannot appear with the client before a federal grand jury
when the client is questioned under oath by the prosecutor. Thus, defense
counsel has little ability to shape the development of the investigative rec-
ord being compiled by the prosecutor with the grand jury's assistance. On
the other hand, in an SEC investigation involving the same facts, counsel
can appear with his client during the SEC investigative testimony, and has
significant opportunities to influence the development of the underlying
SEC investigative record. 380 This is one of the principal reasons why a per-
than those it has disclosed in the certification." BLACK & WrrrEN, supra note 13, § 8.01[1],
at 8-1.
379 See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the
Foundation for Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal
Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567 (1975) [hereinafter Effective Defense]; William R. McLu-
cas et al., A Practitioner's Guide To The SEC's Investigative And Enforcement Process, 70
TEMp. L. REv. 53 (1997) [hereinafter A Practitioner's Guide].
380See Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 588. Rule 7(b) of the SEC's Rules Relating
to Investigations grants all witnesses in formal SEC investigations the right to be "accompa-
nied, represented and advised by counsel." 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1997). Rule 7(c) circum-
scribes the role of counsel:
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son may determine to testify in an SEC investigation, but may decline to
appear before and give testimony to the grand jury, even though the areas of
inquiry are identical in both investigations. Another reason is that a Fifth
Amendment plea to avoid grand jury testimony cannot be used against a de-
fendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution; however, a Fifth Amendment
plea to avoid SEC investigative testimony can be used as a basis to draw
adverse inferences against a nontestifying defendant or respondent in sub-
sequent SEC civil or administrative enforcement proceedings.
381
Multiple representation occurs much more frequently in the defense of
SEC investigations than it does in parallel DOJ/grandjury inquiries.3 82 The
SEC does not name "targets" in its investigations, and does not have
authority to grant immunity; the SEC must request the DOJ to seek court-
approved immunity to accommodate an immunity request in an SEC inves-
[The witness has the right] to have an attorney present with him during any formal in-
vestigative proceeding and to have this attorney (1) advise such person before, during
and after the conclusion of such examination, (2) question such person briefly at the
conclusion of the examination to clarify any of the answers such person has given, and
(3) make summary notes during such examination solely for the use of such person.
Id.
381 See, e.g., 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2 (1311) ("While no ad-
verse inferences may be drawn from a Fifth Amendment plea in a subsequent criminal case,
adverse inferences might be drawn from such a plea in subsequent civil or administrative
proceedings."); Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 594; Seymour Glanzer & Mark Pack-
man, The Use of the Fifth Amendment in SEC Investigations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 895
(1984); Richard J. Morvillo & Andrew D. Koblenz, Testimonial Waiver of the Fifth Amend-
ment in SEC Investigations, 22 REv. SEC. & COM. REG. 115 (1989); Peter H. Morrison, The
Fifth Amendment: Disciplinary Sanctions in the Securities Industry Undercut the Constitu-
tional Right to Remain Silent 3 REv. SEC. REG. 949-52 (1970). See also SEC v. Stewart, 476
F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1973); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1969); N. Sims Organ & Co.,
Inc. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961); Strathmore Sec, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
8207 (Dec. 13, 1967), affd, 407 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Mannos, Exchange Act
Release No. 8090 (June 2, 1967); In re J.A. Winston & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 7337
(June 8, 1964).
382 See Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 572-84.383See A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 94 ("Unlike the grand jury process
where 'targets' of an investigation are often identified, the Commission investigative process
does not have 'targets.' Thus, the Commission is not required to provide any type of 'target'
notification when it issues subpoenas to 'third parties' for testimony or documents."). But
see Richard M. Phillips et al., SEC Investigations: The Heart of SEC Enforcement Practice,
in KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 43, 27. The SEC avoids the use of the term 'tar-
get' in connection with its investigations. It has long maintained that its investigations are
merely fact finding exercises in which no conclusions are reached until after completion of
the investigation. See, e.g., White Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574, 575 (1936) (contending that an
investigation "is not a hearing. It is not in any sense an adversary proceeding. There are no
parties. There are no issues."). In fact, investigations by necessity quickly become focused,
and a primary issue facing defense counsel is to assess the likelihood of his or her client be-
coming a 'target.' Richard M. Phillips et al., SEC Investigations: The Heart of SEC En-
forcement Practice, in KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 43, 29 n.3.
396
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tigation.384 Supposedly, everyone subpoenaed for SEC testimony is at that
time merely a "witness" or a "subject."
That subpoenaed person is entitled to counsel, who may be present at
the investigative deposition, but other counsel representing someone else
may not be present. Thus, the corporation's counsel may not be present
when any corporate officer, director, employee or agent testifies, unless the
corporation's counsel also represents as counsel or co-counsel the individ-
ual giving testimony.385 If the corporation's counsel strategically wants the
continuing opportunity to influence and shape the development of the SEC
investigative record, counsel must become involved in representing multi-
ple clients. Such multiple representation, absent a conflict of interest, is not
unusual in the defense of SEC investigations, including FCPA investiga-
tions. 86
On the other hand, such multiple representation seldom occurs in the
defense of DOJ/grand jury inquiries. 38 7 The DOJ identifies "targets," and
has the authority to grant immunity. Therefore, it is much more likely that
representing multiple clients in a DO/federal grand jury inquiry may trig-
ger insoluble conflicts of interest. Consequently, although possible and
even desirable in unique circumstances, it is fairly unusual for corporate
counsel to represent any client other than the corporation itself in the
DO/federal grand jury inquiry.
Following is an updated version of the author's Rules of Thumb in De-
fending SEC Investigations.3 88 They all merit consideration in the defense
3 See A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 74; Lionel E. Pashkoff, Obtaining Im-
munity in Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 165, 168
(1977). Unlike the DOJ, the SEC generally does not use paid informants, undercover tech-
niques, or wire-tapping or electronic surveillance in the conduct of its investigations. In one
class of cases, however - insider-trading enforcement actions - the SEC is authorized to
pay monetary bounties to informants. See, e.g., Authority to Award Bounties to Informants,
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (1994); Applications for Bounty Awards on Civil Penalties Imposed in
Insider Trading Litigation, Exchange Act Release No. 26,994, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,423 (June 30, 1989); Julie R. Shaw, The SEC as Lady Bountiful:
Awards to Informers Under the 1988 Insider Trading Act, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1989, at 20.
385 Rule 7(b) of the SEC's Rules Relating to Investigations states:
'A]ll witnesses shall be sequestered, and unless permitted in the discretion of the officer
conducting the investigation no witness or counsel accompanying any such witness
shall be permitted to be present during the examination of any other witness called in
such proceeding.
17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (1997).386 For example, in the underlying SEC investigation in the Triton Energy/Indonesia case,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering represented Triton Energy, Triton Indonesia, Phillip W. Keever,
David Gore, Robert Puetz, William McClure, Robert P. Murphy, and several other offi-




7See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & William Zeena, Jr., Representing a Corporation and
Its Employees, 25 REv. SEC. & COM. REG. 13 (1992).388 See Arthur F. Mathews, Defensive Corporate Tactics For Dealing With SEC Investi-
gations: The Role of Outside Counsel, 61 N.C. L. REv. 483, 501-504 (1983); Outline ofAr-
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of a public corporation that is being investigated by the SEC in an FCPA
"questionable" foreign payments matter:
2. AFM Rules of Thumb in Defending SEC Investigations
Rule One: Read the appropriate literature and case law precedent to
assure proper consideration of all the legal pitfalls as well as available stra-
tegic options.
* Review the statutes, rules and particularly the SEC Rules Relating
To Investigations.3 89
* The literature and case law precedent relating to civil injunc-
tive/penalty actions,390 administrative disciplinary and cease-and-
desist proceedings, 3 9' criminal prosecutions3 92 and grand jury in-
thur F. Mathews on Defense of SEC Investigations, in HANDLING AN SEC INVESTIGATION
1980, 539 (Richard R. Rowe ed., 1980).
.. 17 C.F.R. § 203.1 et seq. (1996); see also Rule 102(e) of the SEC Rules of Practice,
17 C.F.R. §201.102(e) (1997), which authorizes the SEC to impose administrative discipli-
nary sanctions against attorneys who engage in contumacious or other misconduct in an SEC
investigation. Rule 7(e) of the SEC Rules Relating to Investigations states:
The officer conducting the investigation may report to the Commission any instances
where any witness or counsel has been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist or contuma-
cious conduct during the course of an investigation or any other instance of violation of
these rules. The Commission will thereupon take such further action as the circum-
stances may warrant, including suspension or disbarment of counsel from further ap-
pearance or practice before it, in accordance with [Rule 102(e)] of the Commission's
rules of practice or exclusion from further participation in the particular investigation.
SEC Rules Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(e) (1997); see also Procedures Re-
lating to the Commencement of Enforcement Proceedings and Termination of Staff Investi-
gations; Exchange Act Release No. 9796 (Sept. 27, 1972); Amendment of Part 202 of Title
17 of The Code of Federal Regulations Relating to Informal Enforcement Procedures, Ex-
change Act Release No. 9818, (Oct. 12, 1972); The Commission's Practice Relating to the
Commencement of Investigations and Statements Submitted to the Commission Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 15664, 18
(Mar. 21, 1979).
390 See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, S.E.C. Civil Injunctive Actions - II, 5 REV. SEC. REG.
949, 969 (1972); 1 & 2 ARTHUR F. MATHEWS, NEGOTIATING SEC CONSENT DECREES:
TARGETS AND TACTICS FOR SETTLING CIVIL INjuNCTiVE ACTIONS (1979); Marc I. Steinberg,
SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions - Standards For Their Imposition, Modification, and
Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1980); Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Collateral Conse-
quences of SEC Injunctive Relief. Mild Prophylactic or Perpetual Hazard? 1981 U. ILL. L.
REv. 625 (1981); Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under
the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5 (1994).391See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative En-
forcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 215 (1980); Theodore A. Levine et al., Admin-
istrative Proceedings Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 25 MERCER L. REV. 671
(1974); William R. McLucas, Stop Order Proceedings Under the Securities Act of 1933: A
Current Assessment, 40 Bus. LAW. 515 (1985); William R. McLucas & Laurie Roma-
nowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,41 Bus. LAw. 145 (1985).
392See, e.g., MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ, SECURITIES CRIMES (1997); Arthur F. Mathews,
Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Law and Related Statutes: The Nature
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quiries, 393 parallel proceedings problems,3 94 and Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act issues,395 may be just as important as materials that
relate solely to SEC investigations.
Although SEC investigatory powers resemble the powers of a federal
grand jury, the strategies in defending an SEC investigation may be quite
different from the strategies in defending a grand jury inquiry embracing
the same activities. The fact that defense counsel cannot be present in the
grand jury room when witnesses testify, but may be present at the SEC in-
terrogation of the witnesses into the same activities, means that defense
counsel has a substantially greater opportunity to influence and control the
content of the SEC investigative record, as opposed to the grand jury rec-
ord.
Rule Two: Take as much control over the investigation as possible -
get the SEC out as quickly as possible.
Obviously, neither defense counsel nor his or her clients should engage
in sharp tactics that smack of contumacious conduct or obstruction of jus-
tice, but within acceptable legal, ethical and professional bounds, counsel
should influence as much as possible the speed and scope of the investiga-
tion.
and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1971); Arthur F.
Mathews, Defense of Federal Securities Laws Criminal Prosecutions, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIES 105 (Gary P. Naftalis ed., 1980) [hereinafter Naftalis, WHITE COLLAR CRIMES]; Se-
curities Fraud: Twelfth Survey of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRlm. L. REV. 983 (1997).
a
93
DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, chs. 1, 2, 12-16 (1997);
Stanley S. Arkin & Jeffrey M. Kaplan, A Primer on Grand Jury Representation, 24 REV.
SEC. & COMM. REG. 69 (1991); Donald C. Smaltz, Outline on The Application of the Gov-
ernment's Principal Weapons - Obstruction of Justice, Perjury and False Statements, Mail
and Wire Fraud, and Conspiracy - to Corporations and Their Officers, in DEFENDING
CORPORATIONS AND THEIR OFFICERS IN PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS 110 (A.B.A. National Insti-
tute 1980); Donald C. Smaltz, Tactical Considerations for Effective Representation During
Government hzvestigation, 16 AM. CPIM. L. REv. 383 (1979); Thomas P. Sullivan &. Daniel
R. Warren, The Initial Stages of Representing Targets of Federal Investigations (pt. 1),
NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1983, at 26; Thomas P. Sullivan &. Daniel R. Warren, Cooperating
With an hIvestigation: Strategies for Getting Immunity (pt. 2), NAT'L L.J., June 20 1983, at
22; Thomas P. Sullivan &. Daniel R. Warren, Defense Tactics When Your Client Stonewalls
a Federal Investigation (pt. 3), NAT'L L.J., June 27, 1983, at 24; Thomas P. Sullivan &.
Daniel R. Warren, The Role of Independent Counsel in Internal Corporate Inquiries (pt. 4),
NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1983, at 37; Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert A. Spanner, Representation of
Persons in Connection with the Federal Investigation of White Collar Crimes, in Naftalis,
WHITE COLLAR CRIMES, supra note 392; Stephen V. Wilson & Howard Matz, Obtaining
Evidence for Federal Economic Crimes Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investi-
gative Methods, 14 AM. CIuM. L. REv. 651 (1977); J. Wing & H. Yale, Grand Jury Practice,
in OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 67.
394 Arthur F. Mathews, Parallel Proceedings Problems in Securities Enforcement Mat-
ters, in 1 SEC ENFORCEMENT AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES 527 (Arthur F. Mathews ed.,
1979) [hereinafter Parallel Proceedings]; PICKHOLZ, supra note 392.
39 5
BLACK & WITTEN, supra note 13; A.B. LEVENSON ET AL., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
AND THE FCPA (1977); THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, supra note 13;
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, supra note 3.
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If necessary, have the client offer to investigate itself, i.e., an internal
corporate investigation, perhaps conducted by uninvolved outside coun-
sel. 96 The goal is to have a non-prosecutorial person, rather than a gov-
ernment enforcement agency, conduct as much of the investigation as
possible.397
Rule Three: Consistent with an attorney's duty to avoid conflicts of
interests, when representing the corporate entity, also represent as many in-
dividuals (officers, directors, and employees) as is tactically and practically
possible and ethically appropriate. Otherwise, the record may not ade-
quately contain all mitigation evidence on behalf of the entity or particular
individuals.
Principal wrongdoers will virtually always require separate counsel.
Be careful to assure that the representation of any one individual will not
raise a significant risk of a future conflict of interest that will require you to
withdraw from representing the corporation or other particular individuals
in the SEC investigation or in related governmental investigations or litiga-
tion.39 8 Finally, explain potential conflicts of interest to each prospective
396
BROWN & KUNDEL, THE LEGAL AUDIT: CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
(1991); CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE: LEGAL AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS (William A.
Hancock ed., 1995); Stephen F. Black & Robert M. Pozin, Internal Corporate Investiga-
tions, in 5 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES, ch. 119 (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 1995); Arthur F.
Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OIo ST. L.J. 655 (1984); Jean D. Reed,
Comment, Corporate Self-Investigations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 803 (1980).397See McLucas Says Proper Corporate Culture Must Underlie Codes of Conduct, SEC
TODAY, Nov. 17, 1977, at 1 (referring to SEC Enforcement Director William R. McLucas ):
The Enforcement Division is more inclined to wait for a company to conduct its own
investigation if it hires outside counsel to handle the inquiries. More importantly, the
SEC must get full and adequate disclosure at the end of the investigation. McLucas ad-
vised that the SC is more likely to postpone its inquiries if it will be allowed to see all
notes and are records compiled during the internal investigation. "The more we get to
see, the more we are willing to wait," he said.3 98 E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969); In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10233, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,416 at 83,191 (June 22, 1973); David M. Brodsky & William
Zeena, Jr., Representing a Corporation and Its Employees, 25 REv. SEC. & COM. REG. 13
(1992); David Ferber & Paul Gonson, Disqualification ofLaw Firms, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 875
(1980); Jeffrey B. Maletta, Common Ethical Issues in Securities Enforcement Practice, in
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 43, at 459, 469-75; Effective Defense, supra note
379, at 572-84; Samuel R. Miller & Irwin H. Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Is-
sues for the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 631 (1985); Theodore Sonde, The
Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws - Some Observations, 68
Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1973).
One issue that merits consideration is whether the SEC Staff ex parte can contact corpo-
rate employees in an informal or formal investigation, when corporate counsel has advised
the Staff that corporate counsel also intends to represent any employees the Staff wishes to
interview. Compare Kenneth B. Winer & Samuel J. Winer, Ex Parte Contacts with Officers
and Employees of Corporations in SEC Investigations, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1994, at 13 with Wil-
liam R. McLucas, Contacts with Corporate Officers and Employees in SEC Investigations,
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client in advance, and have a written retention letter dealing with potential
conflicts.
Rule Four: Give appropriate consideration to existing and potential
parallel proceedings" problems,3 99 and to "joint defense" issues.0 0
Rule Five: Avoid subpoenas by voluntarily offering to produce docu-
ments or witnesses for testimony. Grant access and inspection, rather than
produce originals or copies whenever possible.
INSIGHTS, Mar. 1995, at 2. Obviously, the SEC Staff will seek to preserve exparte opportu-
nities to interview corporate "whistle-blowers" outside the presence of corporate counsel.
399A leading case dealing with "parallel proceedings" problems in an SEC investigation
is SEC v. Dresser Industries, 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993
(1980). In addition to SEC investigations, grand jury inquiries, civil injunctive or penalty
actions, administrative disciplinary or cease and desist proceedings and criminal prosecu-
tions, "parallel proceedings" problems may embrace bankruptcy or corporate reorganization
proceedings, SIPC actions, private damage actions (including class or derivative actions), as
well as NASD, NYSE, American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and other SRO proceedings, and
various types of state proceedings. See, e.g. PicKHoLz, supra note 392, ch. 3; Parallel Pro-
ceedings, supra note 394, at 527; Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1967); F. Lee Ruck & Eric Youngquist, Comment, Commingled Civil
and Criminal Proceedings: A Peek at Constitutional Limitations and a Poke at the SEC, 34
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527 (1966).
400 Counsel to a corporation must carefully weigh the pros and cons of entering into "joint
defense" agreements with officers, directors, employees, agents or third parties involved in
the investigation. While such agreements will allow various counsel and their clients to
share privileged information in pursuit of a common defense without waiving the applicable
attorney-client privileges or work-product protections, there are a host of problems that may
arise in connection with joint defense agreements. The most common problem is the in-
stance when one member of a joint defense group withdraws from the arrangement, and
makes a deal with the government to assist in building a case against the other members of
the joint defense arrangement. See, e.g. FDIC v. Cheng, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,211 (N.D. Tex. 1992). In addition, counsel to a public company
should assure that provisions of a particular joint defense agreement do not preclude the cor-
poration from making public disclosure of any material facts required to be disclosed by fed-
eral securities laws or other statutes or regulations, or to make required reports to a
govemmental regulatory agency, even though the corporation has gained access to the in-
formation in a privileged communication from another member of the joint defense group.
See generally Deborah Bartel, Reconceptualizing The Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 871 (1996); COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Ethical Implications of Joint Defense/Common Interest Agree-
ments, in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1996); William F.
Pendergast & Mark S. Gold, Surviving Self-Governance: Common Interests Approach to
Protecting Privileges Under the DOD Voluntary Disclosure Program, 22 PuB. CONT. L.J.
195 (1993); Marc I. Steinberg & Daniel R. Rogers, The Joint Defense in Federal Securities
Litigation, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1991); Patricia Welles, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 321 (1981); Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The
Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys
Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1994); Susan K. Rushing, Com-
ment, Separating the Joint Defense Doctrine from the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEX. L.
REv. 1273 (1990); Michael W. Tankersley, Comment, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 TEX. L.
REv. 804 (1980).
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* Ask for return of all documents when the government inquiry is
completed.
* Be particularly careful in responding to an SEC Staff request for
the "creation" of evidence, i.e., the preparation of a detailed "chro-
nology" of past events from the corporation's perspective and rec-
ords. The SEC Staff cannot legally compel the creation of
evidence. It may be appropriate to decline to produce a formal
detailed chronology, and instead to informally apprise the Staff of
the flow of relevant events including granting access to relevant
corporate records. While any chronology created and provided to
the Staff must be meticulously accurate, it will usually be appro-
priate to adopt a presentation that will avoid documenting damag-
ing admissions against interest.
40'
Rule Six: Conduct as detailed a preparatory investigation as time and
circumstances permit, to assure that counsel and investigatees or witnesses
will be prepared for all significant issues that may arise.
* Study the SEC "formal order of investigation" in advance.403
* Review all documents before authorizing inspection or copying by
the SEC Staff.
* Interview as many persons as possible in advance, and obtain ac-
cess to, and review as many investigative transcripts of testimony
of other witnesses in the investigation as is allowed by other wit-
nesses and their counsel.
* Spend adequate time preparing the witness for testimony. 4  05
Rule Seven: Conduct as much testimony as possible off-the-record.40 5
40' For example, in SEC v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C.
1988), affd, 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the voluntary chronology submitted on behalf
of the broker-dealer Bear, Steams in the underlying investigation was received into evidence
at the subsequent trial, containing damaging admissions against the interests of Bear,
Steams' clients, First City Financial Corp. and Marc Belzberg, that led the Court to conclude
that defendants First City Financial Corp. and Belzberg had an illegal "parking" arrangement
with Bear, Steams to accumulate a large position in the securities of Ashland Oil Corp.
402 See 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2(1100); Effective Defense, su-
pra note 379, at 584-88.
403 Rule 7(a) of the SEC Rules Relating To Investigations grants an investigatee (and
thereby his counsel) the right to inspect a copy of the formal order of investigation. SEC
Rules Relating To Investigations, 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1997). Much intelligence can be
gleaned therefrom. See 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, §13.2(800-850); Effec-
tive Defense, supra note 379, 584-85.4
04See, e.g, 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, §13.2(1210); 1 MARC I.
STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
§ 3:16 (1988); Lewis B. Merrifield III, Investigations by the SEC, 32 Bus. LAw. 1583, 1606
(1977).405At some point in the future, it is inevitable that either under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) or pursuant to civil discovery, a corporation's litigation adversaries will
obtain copies of the transcripts of sworn on-the-record SEC testimony of the corporation's
officers, directors, employees and agents. See, e.g., Lamorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d
402
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Rule Eight: Protect applicable privileges.4 °6
If it is determined to give the SEC Staff access to any privileged in-
formation (i.e., attorney-client privilege or work-product protection), at-
tempt to structure a Diversified Industries "limited waiver" so that
privileges can still be asserted against third parties in private litigation.4 7
Cir. 1971); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 54 F.R.D. 527 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Hebst v.
Able, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,479, at 92,331 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). But see Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Amendment to Rules
Relating to Requests for Transcripts of Private Investigations, Securities Act Release No.
5331, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,091, at 82,362 (Nov. 16,
1972); John F.X. Peloso, Discovery of SEC Transcripts, 10 REv. SEC. REG. 829 (1977).406 In general, any constitutional, common law or statutory privilege recognized in federal
grand jury practice or in federal civil or criminal litigation in federal district courts will be
applicable also in an SEC investigation. See Wooley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.
1938); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied sub nom. McMann v.
Engle, 301 U.S. 684 (1937). The most common privilege issues in SEC investigations arise
concerning attorney-client privilege, work-product protection, Fourth and Fifth Amendment
privileges, and governmental "executive" or "deliberative process" privileges. 4 BROMBERG
& LO\VENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2(1300), (1310), (1320), (1330), (1340), (1341), (1350),
(1360) and (1370); STEIERG & FERRARA, supra note 404, §§ 3:21, 3:22; John M. Fedders,
Speech on the Attorney-Client Privilege in SEC Investigations, in [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,242, at 85, 249 (Aug. 8, 1982); Effective Defense, supra note
379, at 592-605; A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 70-78.
4 07 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (implied underpinning of opinion is
that selective disclosure of privileged information to the SEC was not broad waiver of privi-
lege); United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1995) (disclosure to government
of internal corporate information received from corporation's outside counsel held to be
broad, general waiver of attomey-client privilege); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d
230, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1993) (court rejects Diversified Industries holding and finds broad
waiver of privilege upon disclosure of information to government investigatory agencies);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines Nat'l Power Corp., 951 F.2d 1414,
1425-26 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding broad waiver of privilege upon voluntary disclosure of in-
formation to the SEC); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988)
(disclosure to government agency during settlement negotiations held to be broad, general
waiver of attorney-client privilege); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (Tesoro Petro-
leum/Fulbright & Jaworski), 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (by voluntarily disclosing ma-
terials to the SEC, company waived work-product protection for materials in subsequent
private damage action); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (disclosure
of internal company reports to underwriters and auditors effects general waiver of attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection); In re Sealed Case (No. 81-1717), 676 F.2d
793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (after disclosure to the SEC, limited waiver doctrine rejected); Permian
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court finds waiver of privilege by
virtue of disclosure to the SEC despite existence of agreement with the SEC purporting to
limit waiver implications of such disclosure); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596
(8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (court holds limited disclosure to the SEC is not a broad waiver of
privilege); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (notes and
memoranda created in connection with published report of internal investigation protected
by attorney work-product privilege to the extent that they reflected "attorney mental proc-
esses," but not to the extent they contained "purely factual summaries of witness state-
ments"); In re Woolworth Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94 Civ. 2217 (RO), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7773 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) (internal notes and memoranda created in connection with
public Audit Committee report protected by both attorney-client privilege and work-product
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* Consider attempting to establish a "self-evaluative" privilege,4 °8 or
some other type of possibly applicable privilege such as an "om-
budsman" privilege. 0 9
immunity); In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. See. Litig., 152 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 147 F.R.D. 208, 212 (N.D.Cal. 1992) (corporation waived
work-product protection by voluntarily producing documents to the SEC in informal investi-
gation); In re Atlantic Fin. Management Sec. Litig., 121 F.R.D. 141 (D. Mass. 1988); In re
LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (court accepts "hybrid" privilege
where the SEC and corporation shared common interest in analyzing facts and legal theories
upon appointment of an independent special investigatory officer by consent decree); Teach-
ers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (suggesting application of limited waiver with respect to disclosures to SEC
Staff in SEC investigation if producing party expressly preserves privilege prior to releasing
documents to agency); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (limited
waiver doctrine accepted); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (dated July 13, 1979), 478 F. Supp.
368, 372-73 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (voluntary cooperation with the SEC or other government
agency held not to be broad, general waiver of attorney-client privilege).
The Second Circuit, in In re Steinhardt Partners L.P., 9 F.3d at 236, clearly left the door
open for negotiation in a particular case with the SEC for a limited or selective waiver of at-
torney-client privilege and work-product protection:
Establishing a rigid [waiver] rule would fail to anticipate situations in which the dis-
closing party and the government share a common interest in developing legal theo-
ries and analyzing information, or situations in which the SEC and the disclosing
party have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain the confi-
dentiality of the disclosed materials.
See also Dennis Block & Nancy E. Barton, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by
Disclosure to the SEC, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 170 (1982); Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F.
Mathews, Limited Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Inter-
nal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corporate "Self-Evaluative" Privilege, 21 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 123 (1983); Daniel L. Goelzer & Clifford E. Kirsch, The Doctrine of Selective
Waiver: Self-Policing or Self-Destruction?, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1992, at 11; Breckenridge L.
Wilcox, Martin Marietta and the Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work
Product Protection, 49 MD. L. REV. 917 (1990); Beth S. Doris, Note, The Limited Waiver
Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1984); Raymond
E. Watts, Jr., Comment, Reconciling Voluntary Disclosure with the Attorney-Corporate Cli-
ent Privilege: A Move Toward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine, 39 MERCER L.
REV. 1341 (1988); Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1198 (1982).
401 See, e.g., BROWN & KANDEL, supra note 396; Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazel-
wood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L.
355 (1987); Corporate Counsel's Guide to the Self-Evaluative Privilege, in CORPORATE
COUNSEL'S GUIDE: ATTORNEY-CLIENT, WORK-PRODUCT & SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGES
(William A. Hancock ed., 1996); Crisman & Mathews, supra note 407; David P. Leonard,
Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 113 (1988); Sam
Scott Miller, Self-Regulatory Organizations and the Securities Industry: Does Membership
Have Its Privileges?, 19 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1991); Joseph E. Murphy, The Self-Evaluative
Privilege, 7 J. CORP. L. 489 (1982); Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, The Self-
Evaluative Privilege and Beyond, INSIGHTS Mar. 1993, at 11; John F. X. Peloso, The Privi-
lege for Self-Critical Analysis: Protecting the Public by Protecting the Confidentiality of
Internal Investigations in the Securities Industry, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 229 (1990); Harvey L.
Pitt & Matt T. Morley, Corporate Introspection In the Nineties: "To Thine Own Self Be
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Rule Nine: Protect the record.
410
At the opening of the record, put a statement in the record that the wit-
ness and his counsel will not deem the investigative transcript to be com-
plete and accurate until after the witness and counsel are provided access to
a copy of the transcript, to be reviewed, corrected and supplemented if ap-
propriate.
Put into the investigative record mitigation evidence (both documen-
tary and by oral testimony) and defenses, subject by subject as the SEC in-
terrogator completes each separate line of inquiry. If tactically appropriate,
do not allow the SEC interrogator to explore on the record areas that are be-
yond the scope of the formal order of investigation. Make sure all docu-
ments are stamped and numbered both for identification and confidentiality
purposes. Have in the record an itemization - as general as may be appro-
priate - of all withheld privileged documents (i.e., a cover letter containing
a "privilege list").
Rule Ten: Preserve confidentiality.
411
True," 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 148 (1993); Robert J. Bush, Comment, Stimulating Corporate Self-
Regulation - The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or
Pragmatic Panacea, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 597 (1993); John C. Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative
Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 621 (1995); Comment, The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1983); Reed, supra note 396;
Compare In re Continental I11. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1989) and In re Crazy
Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (court credits "self-evaluative"
or "self-critical analysis" privilege), New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court credits a "qualified" privilege in nature of
"self-evaluative" privilege) with In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 152 F.R.D. 42, at 45-
46 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (company waived self-evaluative privilege when it voluntarily provided
the SEC with copy of internal audit report), In re Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig. [1992-1993 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,254, at 95,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (internal broker-
dealer reports not protected by self-evaluative privilege) and SEC v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., SEC Lit. Release No. 12,047, 1989 WL 256616 (S.E.C.) at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
1989) (broker-dealer fails to keep information from the SEC based on claim of "self-
evaluative" privilege).409Courts are split as to whether, and, if so, when an "ombudsman" privilege will be rec-
ognized. Compare Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(recognizes ombudsman privilege in corporate context), and Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp.
90 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (recognizes ombudsman privilege in Iowa prison litigation), with Car-
man v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1997) (court refuses to recognize
"ombudsman" privilege). See also Roy v. United Techs. Corp., Civil No. H-89-680 (D.
Conn. May 29, 1990).410See 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2 (1220), (1230); STEINBERG &
FERRARA, supra note 404, § 3:19; Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 588-91, 608-11.
4 1 1 See Amendment to Proxy Rules Regarding Confidential Treatment For Preliminary
Proxy and Information Statements, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13030, 1976 SEC
LEXIS 234 (Dec. 2, 1976); Confidential Treatment of Information Filed with the Commis-
sion and with Any Exchange, Securities Act Release No. 5700 [1 975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,481, at 86, 252 (Apr. 28, 1976); Amendment to Commission
Rules Relating to Requests For Information and Documents, Securities Act Release No.
5571 [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,114, at 85,119 (Feb. 21,
1975); Amendment to Rules Concerning Commission Records and Information: Public
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AFM "laundry list": Set out up front in the record your detailed list of
confidentiality and related requests. Of particular note, as applicable, are:
* FOIA issues.413
* Privacy Act4'14 and Right to Financial Privacy Act issues415 - i.e.,
object to such SEC "routine uses" as providing investigative in-
formation to Congress and to the press.
* Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) issues.4 17
Availability of Staff Letters of Comment and Most Correspondence with the Commission:
Requests for Confidential Treatment of Sensitive Information Revealed in Correspondence,
Securities Act Release No. 5561, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,068, at 84,995 (Jan. 24, 1975); M. Frankhauser & P. D. Belman, The Right to Information
in the Administrative Process: A Look At the Securities and Exchange Commission, 18
ADMiN. L. REV. 101 (1966); Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 611-18.
4 12 See 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2(1220); STEINBERG &
FERRARA, supra note 404, § 3:26; Handling an SEC Investigation: Defense Strategies,
Problems and Consequences Considered at PLI Program, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) A-5,
A-10 (Sept. 26, 1979); see also SEC v. Dresser Indus.; Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1388 (D.C. Cir.
1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980) (court refused to enforce alleged confidentiality
agreement between the SEC and Dresser Industries when the agreement was not memorial-
ized in writing).
4 13 See generally A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 78; 4 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2(1420); Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 611; Sym-
posium, Freedom of Information, Sunshine and Privacy Laws: Impact on Business, 34 Bus.
LAw. 977 (1979); see also 17 C.F.R. § 200.80 (1997) (describing FOIA and SEC) and Secu-
rities Act Release No. 33-5647 (1975) (Amendment of Certain Procedural Rules Relating to
Requests Made Under the Freedom of Information Act); 17 C. F. R. § 200.83 (1998) (Confi-
dential Treatment Procedures Under the Freedom of Information Act); Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 34-13350 (1977) (SEC Adoption of Rules and Regulations to implement the
"Sunshine Act"); cf Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13350 (1977) (SEC rules and
regulations adopted to implement the "Sunshine Act").414See generally A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 81; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 33-5618 (1975) ("Adoption of Rules to implement provisions of the Privacy Act
of 1974") and Release No. 33-5619 (1975) ("Privacy Act of 1974: Promulgation of Exemp-
tions").415 See A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379 at 84; see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78u(h)(1997). See generally Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex.
1981); Patricia A. Calore, Note, The Right to Financial Privacy Act and the SEC, 39 WASH.
& LEEL. REv. 1073 (1982).
41 6The "routine uses" of information the SEC assembles in its private informal and for-
mal investigations, are set forth in SEC Form 1662 (Feb. 1966) (Supplemental Information
for Persons Requested to Supply Information Voluntarily or Directed to Supply Information
Pursuant to a Commission Subpoena), and SEC Form 1661 (Feb. 1996) (Supplemental In-
formation for Regulated Entities Directed to Supply Information Other than Pursuant to a
Commission Subpoena). See also 54 FR 24454 (SEC 1989); 59 FR 27626 (SEC 1994).417See generallyA Practioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 92. The ECPA, codified in the
Federal Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2703-2711 (1994), protects e-mail and
other computerized communications. The ECPA restricts the SEC's ability to subpoena
contents of electronic communications from third-party providers, and sets up procedural
hurdles applicable to the SEC's requests for, or subpoena of telephone records.
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* Trade Secrets Act issues. 418 There may be entitlement to confi-
dential treatment for many classes of internal business, commercial
and financial information.
41 9
* The related issue of whether, and, if so, when, a public company is
required to disclose publicly the existence of a private formal SEC
investigation.420
Rule Eleven: Correct and supplement the record. After you and your
witness or client review the investigative transcript of testimony, make
whatever corrections, additions or supplementations (by letter, affidavit or
further sworn testimony) required to ensure complete accuracy of the in-
vestigative record and to best protect your client's interests.4 21
Rule Twelve: Make appropriate strategy decisions designed to keep the
case civil or administrative rather than letting it develop into a subsequent
criminal prosecution. The strategic goals are to avoid criminal prosecution,
keep the prospective defendant or defendants out of jail, maintain licenses
to do business, and save as much of the prospective defendant's money and
assets as possible.
* Avoid any prospect of a perjury, false statements or obstruction of
justice charge.4
4118 U.S.C. §1905 (1994).
419See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 291 (1979); V. Gerard Comizio,
Keeping Corporate Information Secret: Confidential Treatment Under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 787 (1983); Stephen S.
Madsen, Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information From Federal Agency Disclo-
sure After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 109 (1980).420A formal private SEC investigation is not per se material as soon as the SEC enters
the "formal order of investigation." Therefore, absent peculiar circumstances, the investiga-
tion ordinarily is not required to be disclosed publicly. However, when the investigation is
developed to the point where the SEC Staff has tentatively determined to recommend the
SEC institute formal enforcement action, and has requested a "Wells Submission" from the
investigatee, the materiality threshhold may be crossed, and public disclosure may be re-
quired in a particular case. See infra Part A.3; see also A Practioner's Guide, supra note
379, at 105; Phillips et al., supra note 383, at 94; Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels,
Securities Disclosure: Disclosure of Government Investigations, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 17.
421 See Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 590; 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note
292, § 13.2(1230); STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 404, § 3:26; Rule 6 of the SEC Rules
Relating To Investigations, 17 C.F.R. § 203.6, grants the witness (and thereby his counsel)
an absolute right to inspect a copy of the transcript of investigative testimony, and a right to
request purchase of a copy for the witness' retention. The SEC has discretion to deny "for
good cause" the request to purchase, but in most cases the request is routinely granted. Once
purchased, the transcript in the hands of the witness, is discoverable by adversaries in civil
litigation. See, e.g., John F.X. Peloso, Discovery of SEC Transcripts, 10 REv. SEC. REG. 829
(Nov. 30, 1977); BROMBERG & LOWVENFELS, supra note 292, §13.2 (1400), (1410), (1420),
(1430).422See Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 590 n.63; Stephen W. Grafman et al., Crimi-
nal Enforcement of the Securities Laws: A Primer for the Securities Practitioner, in
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, supra note 43, at 305, 324. See generally United States v. Bat-
ten, 226 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1964), reh'g denied, 381
U.S. 936; United States v. Ale, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Mahler, 363
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
0 A Fifth Amendment plea, despite the adverse inferences that can
be drawn from it in an administrative or civil litigation, is much
more protective of a client than is "creative" testimony that may
form the basis for a criminal prosecution for perjury or obstruction
of justice.
Rule Thirteen: If making a "Wells Committee" Submission,42 3 make
sure all statements therein are completely accurate. At the same time, avoid
making admissions that will bind the client if and when the Submission is
produced in subsequent litigation, or will be used for cross-examination or
impeachment purposes when the client testifies in any future proceeding.
Avoid losing credibility with the Commission and its Staff by making un-
supported or erroneous statements in a Submission.4 24
Rule Fourteen: If your client chooses to negotiate a settlement, as op-
posed to litigating - which is typical when public corporations are the
subject of investigation - negotiate a consent settlement that will accom-
plish, if possible, the following objectives:
* Make sure the consent settlement does not include any findings of
fact or conclusions of law that adjudicate violations of law or guilt
on behalf of your client, and make sure the formal settlement
documents include "without admitting or denying" language, and
point out that there has been no evidentiary or adjudicatory hearing
or record adduced in connection with the settlement. This will
avoid the collateral estoppel effects of the Parklane Hosiery42 s Su-
preme Court opinion.
* If findings of statutory violations are necessary (e.g., in an admin-
istrative proceeding), if possible, agree only to non-fraud, or negli-
gence-based "fraud" violations; i.e., statutory provisions that do
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Steel, 359 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v.
Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929 (D. Colo. 1963); United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) affd, 988 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 1994 WL 115998
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), affTd, 50 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919
(3d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 456 (1982); United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75
(2d Cir. 1990), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 199 1)
(en bane); United States v. Swink, 21 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 1994), reh 'gdenied (June 28, 1994);
United States v. Gremillion, 464 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085
(1972); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (two accountants had pled
guilty to obstruction of justice for burning important records and ledgers relevant to the fi-
nancial condition of a company being investigated by the SEC).
423For a discussion of the requirements and risks of a Wells Submission, see infra Part
XIII.4.424See SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5310 (1972); see also McLucas, A Practione's Guide,
supra note 379, at 111; Effective Defense, supra note 379, at 618; Phillips et al., supra note
383, at 97; Gary G. Lynch & Katherine M. Choo, Wells Submissions: Effective Representa-
tion Following the Completion of the Staffis Investigation, in SECURrIES REGULATION ch.
8.1 (1992).
425 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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not require proof of "scienter" (such as Sections 17(a)(2) and
l(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, which require only mere proof of negli-
gence).
426
" Absent conflicts of interest, in cases in which the corporate entity
will be named a defendant in any event, let the entity "take the rap"
and avoid the circumstances of having individuals personally
named as defendants. Individuals will be subject to the injunc-
tion's prohibitions, even if they are not named as defendants, if
they are put on proper notice of its proscriptions, and are acting on
behalf of the corporate defendant. For example, an injunction
against a corporate defendant pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure also binds the defendant corporation's
"officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and.., those
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
' 427
" Rather than naming individual defendants, attempt to resolve the
matter as to individuals by having them file an "undertaking" to
comply with the consent decree against the corporation. Or, even
if an individual is named as a defendant, attempt to settle with a
421court-ordered "undertaking" as opposed to a consent injunction.
* Make sure any injunctive order limits "attorneys" to "attorneys-in-
fact." There is no need to enjoin defense counsel who has negoti-
ated the settlement.
* When both a civil monetary penalty and disgorgement are required
as part of the sanctions imposed, negotiate the penalty downward
and the disgorgement upward. The civil monetary penalty likely
will not be tax deductible, but the disgorgement likely will be tax
deductible. Also get double credit for any money paid in disgor-
gement: Make sure 100% of any disgorgement fund can be used to
settle parallel private damage actions or arbitration claims.
426See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); see also Richard M. Phillips, Settlements:
Minimizing the Adverse Effects of an SEC Enforcement, in KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, su-
pra note 43, at 179, 181.
427
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
428 See Arthur F. Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions - II, reprinted at 1 MATHEWS,
supra note 282, at 372:
In some instances, the Commission will accept a defendant's 'undertaking' not to
violate the law in the future. While the undertaking may be filed in court and em-
bodied in a formal court order, it does not constitute a formal injunction and does not
carry with it the mandatory or discretionary disqualifications that result from the en-
try of an injunction or an ordinary consent decree. Complete settlement by 'under-
taking' has been accepted by the Commission in at least two recent cases. (citations
omitted.)
The two cases settled by "undertaking" are: SEC v. Frank, SEC Lit. Release No. 3957
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) and SEC v. First National City Bank, Release No. 4534 [1969-1970 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,592 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970).
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* Agree to ancillary relief that embraces prophylactic policies, pro-
cedures and practices (e.g., independent audit committee, compli-
ance review) that constitute good business practice the client
would consider implementing in any event, even without the exis-
tence of an SEC enforcement proceeding.
* Resolve as many direct or indirect statutory disqualifications as
possible as part of the formal settlement. 429
* Negotiate the specific language in the charging document (injunc-
tive complaint or SEC order for proceedings) as well as the settle-
ment order (injunctive decree or SEC order imposing remedial
sanctions or SEC cease and desist order). The "cosmetics" of the
settlement may be the most important aspect of how much damage
the settled enforcement proceeding does to the client's ongoing
business interests.
" Have the settlement filed in the jurisdiction of the most inoffensive
venue.
* Influence the publicity when the settlement is filed. Try to negoti-
ate a bland SEC press release, and have your client issue a press
release putting the client in the best fair light. But do not "deny"
the allegations when the consent is specifically conditioned on
"without admitting or denying" language.
430
3. When, If Ever, Must a Private Formal SEC Investigation Be Publicly
Disclosed?
It is not clear whether, and, if so, when, a public company must dis-
close publicly the existence of a private SEC investigation or grand Pry in-
quiries. Courts have not given clear guidance on this question.43 As a
429 See generally RALPH C. FERRARA & GREGORY S. CRESPI, REDEEMING FALLEN
BROKERS: MANAGING THE AFTERMATH OF BROKER-DEALER ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
(1988) (describing in detail the direct and indirect collateral consequences and disqualifica-
tions arising under state and federal law as a result of SEC enforcement actions).43
)See generally COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, in 47 Bus. LAw. 1083 (1992).431See, e.g., In re Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 361, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1993),
aff'd, 20 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 1994) (receipt of "target" letter in pending grand jury inquiry is
not required to be publicly disclosed); United States v. Yeaman, Crim. Action No. 96-51-03,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2678, at * 27 (E.D. Pa. March 10, 1997) (defendant required to dis-
close existence of SEC investigation, even though the "precise outcome" of the pending in-
vestigation was unknown, in order to correct assertions in SEC filings that defendant was not
involved in "contemplated or threatened" litigation); In re Teledyne Defense Contracting
Deriv. Litig., 849 F. Supp. 1369 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (until conduct is charged as being criminal,
neither any investigation nor the underlying conduct needs to be publicly disclosed); cf., Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-6791 (1988) ("Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclo-
sure Obligations of Companies Affected by the Government's Defense Contract
Procurement Inquiry and Related Issues"); United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1986); Bolger v. First State Fin. Serv. 759 F. Supp. 182 (D.N.J. 1991). For criticism of the
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general rule, absent special facts and circumstances, the author believes
there is no obligation to disclose the existence of the private investigation,
unless and until the SEC commences some type of enforcement proceeding
against the company or the SEC Staff apprises the company that it has or is
recommending that the Commission institute an enforcement proceeding.
Section 21(a)(1) of the 1934 Act gives the SEC discretion to conduct its in-
vestigations either publicly or privately. Rule 5 of the SEC's Rules Relat-
ing to Investigations 43 2 provides that "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the
Commission, all formal investigative proceedings shall be non-public."
The SEC chooses to conduct virtually all of its formal investigations on a
non-public basis. The author believes it to be very unsound for any com-
mentator to argue that a corporate issuer has a statutory obligation to pub-
licly disclose the existence of an SEC investigation on the heels of the
Commission formally exercising its statutory discretion under the 1934 Act
in determining that the investigation should be private, not public. Never-
theless, some attorneys from time to time suggest (erroneously in the view
of the author) that Rule lOb-5, or other 1933 Act or 1934 Act disclosure
provisions, mandate that the corporate issuer publicly disclose the private
investigation; i.e., that the mere existence of a private formal investigation
is per se "material." Not even the SEC's Enforcement Director takes such
an extreme, unfounded position:
The disclosure obligations of an issuer, registrant or an individual in-
volved in an SEC enforcement investigation or action depend upon a number
of factors. These factors include: the nature of the disclosure document; the
status of the company or the individual; and the context in which the investi-
gation or action arises.... [R]egistrants and issuers must disclose information
responsive to particular line item disclosure requirements and must otherwise
evaluate the materiality of the matter under inquiry for purposes of registration
statement and periodic reporting.
Applying a general materiality analysis, disclosure of the existence of a
Commission investigation may or may not be required in a particular situation;
disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the investigation, how-
ever, very well may be required.... Outside counsel often advises registrants
that disclosure of the matters under investigation and/or the existence of an in-
vestigation is prudent even if such disclosure is not specifically responsive to
required disclosure items.
Clearly, management must evaluate disclosure requirements and weigh
the materiality of the facts and their possible impact on both operations and in-
vestment decisions to determine if disclosure of the matters underlying the in-
vestigation, and/or if disclosure of the investigation, is required. Similarly,
management will have to assess the status of the investigation as it proceeds
publicity effects of an SEC investigation, see Robinson B. Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC
Enforcement Procedure, 46 FORDHAM L. RaV. 435, 438 (1977).
43217 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1997).
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because changes in the evolution of the facts will affect the disclosure analy-
sis.433
While not necessarily legally required in any particular case, the author
often advises clients that the point in time when it may be prudent for an is-
suer to disclose publicly the existence of a private formal SEC investigation
is when the SEC Enforcement Staff requests the issuer to file a "Wells
Submission." At that point in time, the Staff has made a preliminary deci-
sion to recommend that the Commission authorize the institution of en-
forcement proceedings against the issuer. That may be the point in time
when the "materiality" threshold is crossed. This is not necessarily so,
however, because the arguments in the Wells Submission may persuade the
SEC Staff to drop their enforcement recommendation, or may persuade the
Commission to reject the Staff s recommendation. In any event, it is rele-
vant to note that Item 103 of Regulation SK,434 requires disclosure of both
material pending legal proceedings and "proceedings known to be contem-
plated by governmental authorities.' 35
4. "Wells Submission" Considerations
436
At the end of a formal SEC investigation, the SEC Staff typically noti-
fies a subject of the investigation whether the Staff will recommend to the
Commission the institution of a formal enforcement action against the sub-
ject, and provides the subject an opportunity to submit a so-called "Wells
Submission" to the Staff and the Commission arguing why the proposed en-
forcement action should not be authorized.437 In any investigation, includ-
433A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 105-06 (citations omitted).
43417 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1997).
435See generally Richard M. Phillips et al., supra note 383, at 94; Richard H. Rowe,
HandlingAn SEC Investigation at 106-08 (P.L.I. 1979) (Gerald E. Boltz, "Handling An SEC
Investigation": "Public companies today commonly believe that disclosure of the existence
of a known SEC investigation is prudent and consistent with their disclosure obligations
generally." Richard H. Rowe, "Some Collateral Effects Under The Securities Act of 1933
and the Disclosure Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of an SEC Investiga-
tion or Related Enforcement Action").436See, e.g., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 5310 [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,010, at 82,184 (Sept. 27, 1972) (Procedures Relating to the Commencement of En-
forcement Proceedings and Termination of Staff Investigations); see generally Effective De-
fense, supra note 379, at 618; A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379, at 111; Richard M.
Phillips et al., supra note 383, at 97; 1 STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 404, § 3:55;
Lynch & Choo, supra note 424, ch. 8.1; Werner Kronstein, A Practitioner's Guidelines For
the Wells Submission Part 1, 7 SEc. REG. L.J. 89 (1979); Werner Kronstein, A Practitioner's
Guidelines For the Wells Submission Part 2, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 166 (1979); 4 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 292, § 13.2(1800). For the original "Wells Committee" Report, see
SEC Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforcement Policies and Practices (June 1,
1972), reprinted in 1 MATHEWS, supra note 282, at 237.437See SEC 1934 Act Release No. 5310 (1972); A Practitioner's Guide, supra note 379,
at 618. There is no absolute right to such notice. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); cf. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C.
1975).
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ing FCPA investigations, company counsel faces the tactical decision of
whether to file a Wells Submission, and, if so, what points to address
therein. Typically, a Wells Submission would contain a pertinent discus-
sion, in the context of the particular investigation, of: (i) the facts, (ii) the
alleged statutory violations, (iii) applicable legal questions, (iv) pertinent
enforcement policy questions, (v) the equities, and (vi) exploration of pos-
sible settlement.
On the one hand, a Wells Submission may highlight factual and legal
deficiencies in a proposed enforcement action that may lead the Commis-
sion to reject institution of the recommended enforcement proceeding, or
may persuade the Staff to abandon its enforcement recommendation. On
the other hand, by flagging deficiencies in the Staff's proposed case, the
Wells Submission may cause the Staff to conduct further investigation or
additional research in an attempt "to fill the holes" in its proposed case.
[A] Wells Submission requires extensive disclosure of the defense's case and
is costly to prepare. Such an effort is worthwhile only if there is a reasonable
possibility that it can be effective in preventing an enforcement action, reduc-
ing the potential charges or sanctions, or facilitating a satisfactory settlement.
Otherwise, it only depletes the client's resources and may diminish the client's
ability to litigate.438
In addition, a brief that flags the weaknesses in a proposed defendant's
case, or contains patently incredible rationalizations or explanations, will
both damage counsel's credibility with the Staff, and diminish the client's
opportunity to negotiate a satisfactory resolution of the proposed enforce-
ment matter.
439
Some of the risks involved in filing a Wells Submission are: (i) state-
ments in the Submission may be used against the client in a subsequent
civil, administrative or criminal enforcement action, or related private liti-
gation, as admissions, or for cross-examination or impeachment purposes;
(ii) The Submission likely will be turned over to the DOJ in any parallel or
subsequent grand jury inquiry or criminal prosecution, and will be provided
to other government investigators or regulators in other cases; (iii) the
Submission may at some future time be discoverable by the subject com-
pany's adversaries either under the Freedom of Information Act, or under
civil discovery rules;440 and (iv) false statements in a Submission presuma-
bly could be prosecuted criminally under the felony provisions of 18 U.S.
C. § 1001 (1996).
Wells Submissions are particularly appropriate to persuade the Com-
mission or its Staff not to proceed against peripheral proposed defendants.
438Richard M. Phillips et al., supra note 383, at 101.
439 See, e.g., Lynch & Choo, supra note 424.
44"See, e.g., In re Jung Ja Malandris, SEC FOIA Release No. 8 (May 9, 1975); In re Re-
quest of Dow Jones & Co., SEC FOIA Release No. 12 (June 19, 1975); In re Request of
First National City Bank, SEC FOIA Release No. 36 (Nov. 4, 1975); Goldberg v. Touche
Ross & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,759 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Both the Commission and its Staff attempt to fashion enforcement cases to
formally name as defendants principally central actors in violative activi-
ties. Further, since the Commission and its Staff appear to give closer scru-
tiny, and perhaps apply a more stringent standard, in determining whether
to name attorneys or accountants as defendants in enforcement actions, it
will usually be strategic to file a Wells Submission on behalf of any client
who is a practicing attorney or accountant.
In the Triton Energy/Indonesia case, Wells Submissions were filed on
behalf of the company, and a number of individuals. While the Commis-
sion determined to pursue enforcement actions against the company and
several individuals, more peripheral proposed defendants were eliminated
from the case. And the Wells Submissions did affect the nature of the
charges, and facilitated the negotiated settlement of the cases.
5. International Aspects of SEC Investigations441
In the 1980s and 1990s, the globalization of business and the world-
wide expansion of securities markets has led to the internationalization of
SEC enforcement efforts.
With this growth in 'cross border' investment, the instances of interna-
tionally focused investigations and enforcement actions by the SEC have rap-
idly increased. Since 1988 the SEC has made nearly 1400 requests for
enforcement assistance to foreign regulators and received nearly 1900 requests
for assistance from abroad.442
The two typical types of SEC enforcement actions that involve investi-
gative efforts abroad are insider trading cases and FCPA cases.
The SEC Enforcement Staff gathers evidence abroad in its investiga-
tions principally by use of two types of international law enforcement vehi-
cles: Formal Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties in Criminal Matters
(MLAT), and more informal Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). The
United States is a party to MLATs with seventeen countries443 and is cur-
rently finalizing MLATs with eleven additional countries, or foreign politi-
441 See generally Michael D. Mann et al., Developments in International Securities Law
Enforcement and Regulation: Oversight by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of
U.S. Securities Markets and Issues of Internationalization and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
29 INT'L LAW. 729, 731; Michael D. Mann et al., International Agreements and Under-
standings for the Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 INT'L LAW. at
780 [hereinafter Mann et al., International Agreements]; Charles R. Mills et al., Interna-
tional Enforcement: Enforcement Actions in the Global Market, in KRKPATRICK &
LOCKHART, supra note 43, 489; H. Pitt et al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational
Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 378 (1987); Greene et al., Problems of Enforce-
ment in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 371 (1987).
442Mills et al., supra note 441, at 491 [Footnote omitted].
443 Mann et al., International Agreements, supra note 441, at 781 and n.3 (Argentina, the
Bahamas, Canada, the Cayman Islands - extended by diplomatic note to Anguilla, the
British Virgin Islands and the Turk and Caicos Islands, and to Montserrat; Italy, Mexico,
Morocco, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay).
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cal organizations. 444 The SEC is a party to MOUs with twenty-five foreign
states, provinces or countries.445 When an MLAT is used, the SEC's re-
quest for evidence from abroad must be processed through the DOJ; when
an MOU is used the SEC Staff deals directly with foreign authorities.
MOUs feature several advantages for the SEC that are not available from
MLATs. A treaty represents a formal and, absent amendment, an inflexible
agreement and process not easily adaptable to changing circumstances. It does
not usually involve or form a mechanism for informal conversation on topics
of mutual interest among regulators or prosecutors. On the other hand, MOUs
are agreements among regulators. The very existence of the document signi-
fies the regulators' mutual interests in assisting each other and in addressing
matters of concern to their foreign counterparts. The agreement does not re-
quire formal process, including Senate ratification. It can be tailored to the
parties' needs and, frequently, is couched in broad language which allows
flexibility for addressing new situations. These agreements usually pledge
each party to assist the other, to use all available processes to obtain and for-
ward information, to keep shared information secret, and to undertake, not just
enforcement related activities, but regulatory activities, such as inspections of
entities doing business in the requested party's nation. To date, the SEC has
negotiated four generations of MOUs.
446
The use of MLATs and MOUs has been particularly effective in inter-
national SEC investigations to assist the SEC in circumventing foreign se-
crecy and "blocking" statutes to trace the flow of funds through foreign
banks and trusts." 7 Thus, bribes paid through secret foreign bank accounts
in FCPA cases may be uncovered by the SEC Staff through MLAT and
MOU requests to foreign governmental authorities.
The 1934 Act was amended in both 1988 and 1990 to specifically grant
the SEC powers to assist foreign securities regulators and enforcement
authorities to gather evidence in international investigations. In the Insider
444Id. at 781 n.4 (Austria; Organization of American States (OAS) MLAT and Protocol
on Assistance in Tax Cases; Hungary; the Philippines; United Kingdom; South Korea; Pan-
ama; Nigeria; Jamaica; Belgium; and Columbia).445Id. at 795; see also PicKuoLz, supra note 392, § 4.04[8] (Switzerland; Japan; Canada
- Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia; Brazil; the Netherlands; France, Mexico; Nor-
way; United Kingdom; Argentina; Spain; Italy; Chile; Australia; Sweden; South Africa; the
Commission of European Communities; Hungary; the Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB) and the united Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(UNECLAC); Costa Rica; Indonesia; China; Luxembourg; Israel; Hong Kong).
In addition, pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes, the SEC is qualified to obtain
assistance in gathering evidence in Germany through the German Ministry of Justice under
the German Law on International Legal Assistance in Law Enforcement Matters (IRG). The
IRG authorized the German Justice Ministry to coordinate with German states requests for
documents and testimony on behalf of foreign law enforcement authorities in aid of their in-
vestigations. See, e.g., Mann et al., InternationalAgreements, supra note 441, at 821.
4
6 PICKHOLZ, supra note 392, § 4.04[8] (citations omitted). Pickholz describes the dif-
fering provisions of the "four generations" of SEC MOUs. Id. §§ 4.04[8][a], [b], [c] and [d].
447Mills et al., supra note 441, at 513; Pitt et al., supra note 441 at 411.
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Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), 48 sec-
tion 21(a)(2) was added to the 1934 Act to allow the SEC to assist foreign
securities regulators in gathering investigative information relevant to vio-
lations of foreign securities laws and rules even though the activities being
investigated do not violate U.S. laws. The International Securities En-
forcement Cooperation Act of 1990 (ISECA)449 amended the 1934 Act
(Section 24(c)) to authorize the SEC to provide nonpublic documents and
records to foreign law enforcement officers upon an appropriate showing of
need and assurances of confidentiality.
Counsel defending an FCPA investigation must input into all strategic
decisions the recognition that the SEC now has extensive international in-
vestigatory tools that make it unlikely that evidence of foreign activity will
be insulated from discovery in an SEC investigation.
B. Defending A DOJ/Grand Jury Inquiry
4s °
1. Informal and Formal Stages of the Inquiry
Like other federal white collar criminal investigations conducted by the
DOJ, an FCPA inquiry usually commences at an informal level. An Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney or other DOJ prosecutor with the assistance of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigations (FBI) or Customs agents requests voluntary
production of corporate documents, and informal interviews of company
employees. Often the interviews are accomplished by a single FBI agent, at
the direction of the DOJ prosecutor, at the employee's home or otherwise
off the company's premises without prior notice to the company or its
counsel. Not infrequently, when outside counsel to the company gets in-
volved in the inquiry, some company employees have already been inter-
viewed by the FBI, and often have not been represented by counsel at the
interview. These "informal" interviews inevitably lead to a more gradual
formalization of the DOJ investigative process - a grand jury subpoena for
the company's documents relating to the questionable foreign payments un-
der inquiry.
448Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988).
4491ntemational Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550,
104 Stat. 2714 (1990).450 See generally Howard A. Matz & Stephen V. Wilson, Obtaining Evidence for Federal
Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 651 (1977); Donald C. Smaltz, Tactical Considerations for Effective Repre-
sentation During Government Investigation, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 383 (1979); Thomas P.
Sullivan & Robert A. Spanner, Representation of Persons in Connection with the Federal
Investigation of White Collar Crimes, in Naftalis, WHITE COLLAR CRIMES, supra note 392;
DAN K. WEBB ET AL., supra note 393, §§1.01-1.13, 2.01-2.06, 12.01-12.07, 13.01-13.09,
14.01-14.13, 15.01-15.11, 16.01-16.13; J. Wing & H. Yale, Grand Jury Practice, supra note
393.
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Despite use of the grand jury subpoena to gather company documents,
the DOJ prosecutor at this early stage seldom produces documents or wit-
nesses directly before the grand jury. Rather, the prosecutor pursues a
rather semi-formal "office inquiry" reviewing the documents and perhaps
interviewing witnesses without a formal stenographic transcript of testi-
mony. It is at this stage of the inquiry that defense counsel has the most di-
rect opportunities to influence the direction of the criminal inquiry. This is
so principally because the investigating prosecutor will allow defense coun-
sel to be present, and to participate, in such "office" interviews of employ-
ees whether at that time they be targets, subjects or merely witnesses. At
the federal level, when such persons are formally subpoenaed to give
sworn, transcribed testimony before the actual grand jury, counsel cannot be
present in the grand jury room. Thus, from the defense perspective, the
more the inquiry can be conducted in the prosecutor's office rather than in
the grand jury's presence, the more the defense counsel may be able to pre-
sent mitigation evidence in an attempt to forestall any formal criminal
prosecution.
2. The Changing Climate: "Cooperating" rather than "Defending" the
Company
Prior to the 1970s, apart from major anti-trust prosecutions, few major
corporations were the subjects of white-collar criminal prosecutions. When
corporate guilty pleas were entered, it was usually in cases where the corpo-
ration "took the rap" in instances where the federal prosecutor wanted to
exercise favorable prosecutorial discretion regarding the corporate indi-
viduals involved in the matter. At least since the E.F. Hutton prosecution in
the 1970s, national federal prosecutorial policy has changed. Witness the
Drexel prosecution in the 1980s and the Daiwa Bank prosecution in the
1990s. As one prominent New York City defense lawyer, Larry Pedowitz,
recently stated:
Twenty years ago when I began at the [SDNY] United States Attorney's
Office - it's actually 24 years ago - we did not convict corporations very
often. There was not much of an effort by prosecutors to go after corporations.
If you did, it was generally because you did not want to convict the individu-
als, you would take a corporate plea instead. Today a sea change has occurred.
Prosecutors are using the threat of criminal prosecution of corporations to get
them to help prosecutors with their cases - to be cooperative. Prosecutors
here in the Southern District and throughout the country have learned in cases
like the Kidder [Peabody] case in 1987, and the Salomon [Brothers] case in
1991, and the Prudential [Securities] case this last year, that the prosecutor has
extraordinary leverage in getting corporations to do what the prosecutor wants
them to do in an investigatory context.45 '
451 FEDERAL BAR FOUND., REPRESENTING THE CORPORATION AND ITS OFFICERS IN GRAND
JURY PROCEEDINGS 15 (1997). Indictments of major public companies came to the forefront
in the 1980s and early 1990s in the area of defense procurement fraud, where at least 28
large corporations were charged with federal felonies: Avco, Boeing, Emerson Electric, E-
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Whether it be an FCPA DOJ/grand jury inquiry or any other type of
corporate white-collar criminal investigation by the DOJ, the corporate is-
suer at the start of defending the inquiry, must make a strategic decision
whether it is more likely than not that the company will end up cooperating
with the prosecutors rather than taking a more adversarial litigating posture.
This early strategic decision will influence multiple representation choices,
joint defense agreements, privilege assertions or waivers, advancement of
legal fees to involved individuals, and a host of other defense considera-
tions that arise in almost every case.
There are tremendous pressures that cause public corporations to opt to
cooperate with prosecutors in the course of a grand jury investigation of
possible corporate criminal misconduct. First, consider the federal Organi-
zation Sentencing Guidelines.452 If a corporation is convicted (whether by
guilty plea or after trial) of a federal felony, e.g., an FCPA bribery charge,
the size of the corporate fime to be imposed as a sentence is increased if the
corporation has impeded the criminal investigation,453 but is decreased if the
corporation has cooperated in the investigation.4 4 Second, it is much more
likely that a prosecutor will exercise prosecutorial discretion and choose not
to criminally charge a public company, as opposed to its miscreant individ-
ual officers, directors, employees and agents, if the company diligently co-
operates in the government investigation of the corporate wrongdoing.
Compare, for example, the favorable treatment of the corporations in the
Salomon Brothers, Kidder Peabody and Prudential Securities cases, with
the unfavorable treatment of the corporations in the E.F. Hutton, Drexel
Burnham, Consolidated Edison, Cooper Companies and Daiwa Bank cases.
When Salomon Brothers came under criminal investigation for unau-
thorized bidding at U.S. treasury auctions, its miscreant trader Paul Mozer,
was criminally convicted,455 but favorable prosecutorial discretion was ex-
ercised in not criminally charging the broker-dealer firm 45 6 Instead, the
broker-dealer and its responsible supervising managers were able to negoti-
Systems, Fairchild Industries, GTE Government Systems, General Electric, Gould Defense
Systems, Grumman, Harris Corp., Hazeltine Corp., Hughes Aircraft, ITT, Litton Systems,
Loral Corp., LTV Aerospace & Defense, Magnavox and Industrial Electronics, Martin Mari-
etta, Motorola, Northrup, Raytheon, RCA, Rockwell International, Sperry, Sundstrand,
TRW, Teledyne and Unisys. See Otto Obermaier, Do the Right Thing: But If a Company
Doesn't, It Can Limit the Damage, BARRoN's, Dec. 14, 1992, at 18.4 2U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C (1995).
453 See id. § 8C2.5(e).
414 See id. § 8C2.5(g).
455See United States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting defen-
dant Mozer specific performance of plea agreement, including limited immunity, over gov-
ernment's objection).
456 See F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Spe-
cialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. CoRP. L. 121, 124 (1997).
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ate civil and administrative settlements.457 Then S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney
Otto Obermaier stated that Salomon Brothers' cooperation in the grand jury
investigation played a significant role in the decision not to criminally
prosecute the broker-dealer firm; indeed, the S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice press release stated: "Salomon's cooperation has been exemplary.
',s 8
Among the factors considered important by the government in Salomon's
cooperation were the facts that Salomon Brothers (i) opened up its books
and records to the government, (ii) encouraged its employees to cooperate
and speak with the prosecutors, and (iii) waived its attorney-client privilege
to enable it to share with the government the results of its internal investi-
gation of the unauthorized treasury bidding activities.4 59 Obermaier high-
lighted the importance that Salomon's cooperation played in his decision
not to prosecute the broker-dealer corporation:
The [sentencing] guidelines . . . reward an organization for detecting
crime before the Government investigation, bringing it to the authorities' at-
tention and unequivocally accepting responsibility. Those that refuse to coop-
erate will face heavier fines. Good corporate citizenship is now defined by
expanded obligations; the traditional prevention and detection of crime, and
now the reporting of crime when detected.
The resolution of the Salomon case... especially [the U.S. Attorney's
Office's] decision not to seek criminal penalties reflects the advantages of ap-
plying these principles. Salomon's cooperation [was] exemplary. It replaced
top management, discharged the principal wrongdoers, fully cooperated in the
Government investigation and took substantial steps to prevent recurrence of
its misconduct.
460
Kidder Peabody's cooperation with the prosecutors kept it out of two
criminal prosecutions in the past decade. In the celebrated insider-trading
criminal prosecutions in the late 1980s, the Kidder Peabody broker-dealer
firm was not charged criminally, even though one of its high level officials,
4
17See In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, 51 SEC 93 (Dec. 3, 1992);
SEC v. Salomon, Inc., Litig. Release No. 13,246, 51 SEC Docket 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
United States v. Salomon, Inc., Civ. No. 92-3691 (S.D.N.Y., May 20, 1992). See also Sam
Scott Miller & George E. Scargle, The Feuerstein Report: Legal and Compliance Officers
on the Line, INSIGHTs, Feb. 1993, at 5.458 See Otto Obermaier, Drafting Companies to Fight Crime, N.Y. TwES, May 24, 1992,
§3, at Cll; DOJ, SEC Enter $290 Million Settlements with Salomon Brothers, U.S.
NE\VSWiRE, May 20, 1992.459 See Sara E. Moss & Ira Lee Sorkin, You Can Protect Your Company From the Rogue
Criminal, 6 CoRp. LEGAL TIMES 10 (1996); see also [S.D.N.Y. United States Attorney] Otto
Obermaier, Department of Justice And SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement With Salomon
Brothers In Treasury Securities Case, Press Release (May 20, 1992):
With regard to the decision not to seek criminal charges against Salomon, Obermaier
noted that Salomon had cooperated extensively in the investigation and had taken deci-
sive and extraordinary actions to restructure its management to avoid future miscon-
duct. The cooperation included providing detailed information concerning the firm's
own internal investigation, turning over documents and making employees available for
interviews and testimony.
460Obermaier, supra note 458, at C-I 1.
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Marty Siegel, had conspired with Ivan Boesky and others in extensive, in-
sider-trading and related "parking" crimes.461 The broker-dealer firm was
allowed to resolve the matter by settling SEC civil or administrative en-
forcement actions. The principal reason for nonprosecution of the broker-
dealer corporation was the willingness of the firm, and its then new corpo-
rate parent, General Electric Company, to cooperate in the government in-
vestigation and to overhaul its management and compliance procedures.462
In 1995-1997, Kidder Peabody again escaped criminal prosecution
when it disclosed to government regulators that Joseph Jett, one of its gov-
ernment bond traders, incurred and covered up $85 million in trading
losses, and had caused the firm to book hundreds of millions of fictitious
profits, by engaging in sham government bond stripping and reconstitution
transactions for future delivery with the Federal Reserve Bank. Conduct of
a comprehensive internal corporate investigation,46 3 complete cooperation
with DOJ prosecutors and in the parallel SEC investigation, and quick dis-
missal of the miscreant bond trader by Kidder Peabody and its parent Gen-
eral Electric - as well as eventual sale of assets and liquidation of the
broker-dealer firm - led the U.S. Attorney's Office in the S.D.N.Y. not to
criminally charge the firm.464 Indeed, ostensibly due to the complexity of
461See FEDERAL BAR FOUND., supra note 451, at 15 n.15 (citing Gregory M. Patrick &
Sheryl A. Odems, The Lesson of the Daiwa Bank Scandal, INT. COMM. LrIG., U.S. LITIG.
SUPPLEMENT 5, 5-7 (1996)). See also [S.D.N.Y. United States Attorney] Rudolph W. Giu-
liani, Press Release (June 4, 1987):
The decision by the United States Attorney [not to prosecute Kidder, Peabody] was
based on four principal factors: Kidder's full cooperation with the government's inves-
tigation; Kidder's entry into a consent judgment with the SEC in the SEC's related in-
vestigation, which provides mechanisms to avoid the commission of securities
violations in the future; structural, management and policy changes instituted at Kidder
by Kidder's new owner, the General Electric Company; and the negative effect that
charges against the firm would have on Kidder's thousands of innocent employees and
the firm's legitimate activities.
Marty Siegel was criminally prosecuted and subjected to SEC civil injunctive and adminis-
trative disciplinary proceedings. See United States v. Siegel, No. 87 Cr. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (criminal plea); SEC v. Siegel, SEC Lit. Release No. 11,354, 37 SEC Docket 916
(Feb. 13, 1987); In re Siegel, Exchange Act Release No. 24,098, 37 SEC Docket 841 (Feb.
13, 1987). The Kidder, Peabody firm consented to SEC civil injunctive and administrative
disciplinary orders. See SEC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 11452, 38
SEC Docket No. 9 at 647 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1987); In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC 1933
Act Release No. 24543, 38 SEC Docket No. 9 at 602 (June 4, 1987); SEC 1940 Act Release
Nos. 15765 and 15766, 38 SEC Docket No. 9 at 633, 637 (June 4, 1987).
462 See Giuliani Press Release, supra note 461, at 3:
The United States Attorney [Rudolph W. Giuliani] explained that because G. E. decided
at an early stage to cooperate fully with the Government, began institution of vigorous
structural, management policy and trading reforms, and reached an appropriate agree-
ment with the SEC, the public interest has been well served; at this point a prosecution
of Kidder is unnecessary.
463 See Gary Lynch, Report of Inquiry Into False Trading Profits at Kidder, Peabody &
Co. (Aug. 4, 1994).464See [S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Mary Jo White, Remarks at 25th Anniversary Securities
Regulation Institute, Coronado, California (Jan. 14, 1998).
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the underlying trading activities, the S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney's Office did
not criminally charge the trader, Joseph Jett, leaving to the SEC the en-
forcement task of litigating administrative disciplinary proceedings against
Jett and his supervisors.4 65
The Prudential Securities "direct investments" case involved an alleged
eleven-year selling practices fraud scheme involving the sale of approxi-
mately $8 billion of limited partnership interests in over 700 oil and gas,
real estate and aircraft rental ventures. In a global civil and administrative
settlement with the SEC, the NASD, and the States, and in related class ac-
tions and arbitrations, Prudential Securities repaid investors over a billion
dollars.466 By cooperating with the S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney's Office con-
465See In re Jett, Exchange Act Release No.37226, 61 SEC Docket 2440 (May 20, 1996);
Administrative Proceedings and Cease and Desist Proceedings Instituted Against Orlando
Joseph Jett; Administrative Proceedings Instituted Against Melvin Mullin, Securities Act
Release No. 7252, Exchange Act Release No. 36696, 61 SEC Docket 3 (Jan. 9, 1996); In re
Cerullo, Exchange Act Release No. 36695, 61 SEC Docket 48 (Jan. 9, 1996).466See SEC v. Prudential Sec., Inc., Litig. Release No. 13840, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,238 at 84,601 (Oct. 21, 1993); The Prudential Solution and
National Securities Regulatory Settlements, 51 Bus. LAw. 256 (1995); see also Lomax v.
SEC, No. 97-5109, 1998 WL 66728 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In 1996, the "Big Six" accounting firm, Coopers & Lybrand entered into a pre-trial diver-
sion agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California in Los
Angeles. Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456, at 126. A federal grand jury was investigating
the role of Coopers & Lybrand in the business activities of former Arizona Governor J. Fife
Symington, III. Id. at 126-27. The allegations being investigated focused upon whether a
Coopers & Lybrand partner (since deceased) "received inside information concerning a state
contract, concealed material errors and omissions in [Governor Symington's] personal finan-
cial statements, knowingly made false statements to a federal grand jury, and withheld
documents subpoenaed by the grand jury. Id. at 126-27. Governor Symington was con-
victed at jury trial in D. Arizona on several federal felony fraud and false statement charges.
Id. at 126. The Coopers & Lybrand investigation was transferred to the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice for the Central District of California when the United States Attorney's Office for the
District of Arizona recused itself from the grand jury inquiry into the activities of the ac-
counting/auditing firm. On the Symington Indictments, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 16, 1996, at
A-I, available in 1996 WL 7715214. The Coopers & Lybrand pre-trial diversion agreement
was not filed in court; it is strictly a contractual obligation between Coopers & Lybrand and
the United States. Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456, at 127. The pre-trial diversion
agreement contains the following, among other, provisions:
(i) It runs for 24 months commencing Sept. 20, 1996.
(ii) It provides nonprosecution only to the limited liability partnership, Coopers & Ly-
brand, not to any individuals.
(iii) The firm committed to provide restitution payments of $3,000,000 ($725,000 pre-
viously paid to the State of Arizona and $2,275,000 paid to the United States).
(iv) The firm accepted responsibility for its wrongdoing.
(v) The firm agreed to the retention of independent counsel to monitor compliance,
and to the implementation of a formal ethics and integrity program.
(vi) The firm agreed not to violate any local, state or federal laws during the 24 month
supervision period, and agreed to perform 3,000 hours of community service.
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duct of a grand jury investigation and settling related SEC civil and admin-
istrative proceedings, Prudential Securities avoided criminal prosecution -
and the concomitant direct and indirect collateral consequences - through
(vii) The firm waived its right to indictment, any claim of double jeopardy, and the ap-
plicable statutes of limitations should the government choose to prosecute it for any breach
of the diversion agreement.
(viii) The government reserved the right to fine Coopers & Lybrand $100,000 for each
breach of the diversion agreement for which it chooses not to prosecute the firm.
See [Central District of California U.S. Attorney] Nora M. Manella, Coopers & Lybrand
Agrees to Settlement in Government Investigation of Arizona Governor and Bid-Rigging of
State Contract, News Release (Sept. 19, 1996); see also Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456,
at 127. U.S. Attorney Nora M. Manella explained that the basis for the prosecution deferral
agreement were: "Coopers' exemplary conduct following notification of possible wrongdo-
ing; its public acceptance of responsibility, its ongoing cooperation with investigators, its
restitution payments, its agreement to perform community service, and its agreement to in-
stitute nationwide ethics training for its professionals," Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456,
at 127; Manella News Release, supra at 2.
In 1993, two affiliates of Aetna Life Insurance Company and Aetna Life and Casualty
Company avoided criminal indictment as a result of corporate cooperation with the U.S. At-
torney's Office for the District of Massachusetts, and with the SEC. See Aetna Bought Itself
Out of Criminal Indictment, Defense Lawyer Claims, 7 CORP. CRIME REP., Sept. 13, 1993, at
35(1). Aetna Capital Management, Inc., an SEC registered investment adviser, and Aetna
Financial Services, Inc., an SEC registered broker-dealer, were investigated by the SEC and
a federal grand jury in Boston for matters involving nondisclosure of secret payments and
compensation arrangements with a securities broker, Carmen Elio, and a broker-dealer with
whom Elio was associated, Faneuil Hall Securities, Inc. The SEC and grand jury inquiries
were focused upon whether the undisclosed payments to Elio were a quid pro quo for Elio to
engage in "influence-peddling" to persuade various local and state government officials or
politicians to cause various pension and related funds and programs to use the services of
Aetna's subsidiaries/affiliates. Elio was criminally prosecuted for multiple federal felony
charges, and eventually pled guilty. See United States v. Carmen W. Elio, Litig. Release No.
13859, Criminal No. 93-12401 DPW (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 1993); Elio Indicted For Crimes In-
volving Aetna Life Insurance Co., 7 CoRP. CRiME REP., Nov. 15, 1993, at 3. Elio pled guilty
on Dec. 13, 1994 to two felony mail fraud counts. The two Aetna subsidiaries/affiliates con-
sented to the filing of a DOJ civil complaint for injunctive relief alleging 18 U.S.C. § 1341
mail fraud violations, which injunctive complaint was simultaneously dismissed with preju-
dice upon the filing thereof based upon a settlement in which the Aetna entities paid $5.2
million in civil penalties and disgorgement to the SEC and the State of Massachusetts. Both
Aetna subsidiaries/affiliates consented to SEC administrative disciplinary sanctions, see In
re Aetna Capital Management, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7011, Advisers Act Release
No. 1379, 54 SEC Docket 1726 (Aug. 19, 1993), and to Massachusetts State administrative
sanctions and the filing and dismissal of a Massachusetts State civil injunctive complaint.
See In re Aetna Capital Management, Inc., The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Office of
the Secretary of State, Securities Division, Docket No. E-91-145 (Aug. 1993) (Mass. state
administrative consent order); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Aetna Capital Manage-
ment, Inc. and Aetna Financial Services, Inc., Mass. Commonwealth Superior Court De-
partment (Suffolk, S. S.) (Aug. 1993) (filing and dismissal of Mass. state civil complaint).
Both Elio and Faneuil Hall consented to SEC civil injunctive orders and administrative dis-
ciplinary sanctions. See In re Elio, Exchange Act Release No. 36039, Advisers Act Release
No. 1513, 59 SEC Docket 2380 (July 31, 1995) (concerning SEC administrative disciplinary
orders); SEC v. Elio, Litig. Release No. 14579, 59 SEC Docket 2442, (July 20, 1995) (re-
garding SEC consent injunctive orders).
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a unique three-year deferral of prosecution agreement.467 In the global S
civil and administrative settlement, Prudential Securities consented to (i) an
SEC administrative cease and desist order, (ii) payment of a $10 million
civil penalty to the U.S. Treasury, (iii) payment of a $5 million civil fine to
the NASD, (iv) payment of $26 million in fines to the States ($500,000
each to 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), (v) pay-
ment of $330 million into an "uncapped" court-ordered arbitration fund for
the benefit of defrauded investors, (vi) appointment of former SEC Com-
missioner Irving M. Pollack as Claims Administrator to adopt a claims
resolution process and to supervise distribution of the arbitration fund to de-
frauded investors, (vii) payment of all claims authorized by the Claims
Administrator even if total claims ultimately exceeded the initial $330 mil-
lion deposit, (viii) adoption of various remedial measures to improve the
firm's securities law compliance, and (ix) a court order mandating the
firm's compliance with a prior 1986 SEC order against the firm relating to
branch office supervision.
In achieving the deferral of prosecution agreement with the S.D.N.Y.
U.S. Attorney's Office, Prudential Securities was required (i) to accept the
government's filing of a criminal complaint alleging securities fraud, (ii) to
acknowledge extensive wrongdoing, (iii) to pay an additional $330 million
into the SEC claims resolution fund, (iv) to install an independent "om-
budsman" to receive allegations of misconduct by any PSI employee and to
file quarterly reports with the U.S. Attorney of any such allegations, (v) to
retain an independent law firm to review PSI's regulatory and compliance
policies and procedures, and (vi) to provide full and truthful cooperation in
any criminal investigations, including voluntarily providing any requested
records and unlimited access to governmental authorities to PSI's facilities,
documents and employees. 468 The prosecution deferral agreement ran for
three years; on October 24, 1997, finding that PSI had complied with all the
terms of the agreement, the criminal complaint was dismissed, and Pruden-
tial Securities thus avoided all criminal exposure for the underlying activity.
S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White listed the following factors as
the reasons why the government was willing to enter into the deferred
prosecution agreement with Prudential Securities:
0 "PSI's payment of an additional $330 million to compensate inno-
cent investors and its prior settlement with the SEC in October
1993, which included its paying an initial $330 million into a fund
established to compensate victims and its agreeing to enhanced
compliance procedures;"
467 See Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456, at 125-26.
468See Mary Jo White, Press Release (Oct. 24, 1997) (concerning Prudential Securities).
Prudential Securities Group and The Prudential Insurance Company, as parent companies of
PSI, also had to agree to take appropriate steps to ensure PSI's compliance with the prosecu-
tion deferral agreement.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
* PSI's cooperation with the United States Attorney's Office during
the investigation, including its acknowledgment of its own wrong-
doing;"
" "the concern that an indictment would cause crippling collateral
consequences to thousands of innocent employees and investors;"
and
* "the fact that the core of the criminal conduct occurred in the
1980s and the departure from PSI of the individuals believed to be
responsible for the wrongful acts. 'A69
Thus, the Salomon Brothers, Kidder, Peabody, and Prudential Securi-
ties cases demonstrate that corporate cooperation with prosecutors may well
best serve the interests of public corporations and their shareholders.4 70 On
469 1d. at 4. Ms. White added:
The public interest is well served by this agreement. Upon conviction, a corporation
cannot be sentenced to jail but only to pay restitution, fines and adopt measures aimed
at enhancing internal controls to prevent and detect future wrongdoing. This agreement
imposes such sanctions. It will ensure restitution of over $650 million to defrauded in-
vestors and cause PSI, through the appointment of an independent ombudsman and
other measures to adhere to the highest ethical and legal standards in its dealings with
customers and regulatory authorities. If PSI fulfills all of its obligations under the
agreement, further prosecution will be unnecessary.
4"Another example where corporate cooperation with the prosecutors led to a decision
not to pursue corporate criminal charges is the Sequa Corp./Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp.
matter. The S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney's Office in 1993 determined not to criminally prosecute
Sequa Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corporation,
for alleged fraud in the manufacture and repair of airplane engine parts at Chromalloy's Re-
search and Technology Division in Orangeburg, New York. See Mary Jo White, Press Re-
lease (June 24, 1993) (concerning Sequa/Chromalloy). The corporate nonprosecution
decision by the U.S. Attorney was based upon four principal factors:
(i) Sequa's cooperation with the Government's investigation.
(ii) Sequa's entry into a civilladministrative consent order with the Federal Aviation
Administration. (The FAA Consent Order required Sequa to make a $5 million reme-
dial payment, and to agree to cease repair of airplane engine parts at Chromalloy's Or-
angeburg Plant until the FAA approved enhanced plant compliance and inspection
systems, policies and procedures.)
iii) Structural, management, and policy changes instituted at Chromalloy by Sequa.
Sequa had conducted a timely internal corporate investigation, and thereafter made
extensive structural, management, and policy changes to correct the perceived viola-
tions and to prevent their recurrence.)
(iv) The negative effect including severe and unintended economic impact that criminal
charges against Chromalloy or Sequa would have on Sequa's thousands of innocent
employees, customers, and suppliers and on the firm's legitimate activities.
See White Press Release, supra at 1-2.
As part of the nonprosecution agreement, Sequa and Chromalloy were required to "fund
such scientific testing and expert analysis of airplane engine parts and such expert testimony
regarding that testing and analysis as the United States Attorney's Office deems appropriate
in an amount not to exceed $5 million." Id. at 2-3; see generally Jed S. Rakoff, Corporate
Indictment and the Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13, 1994, at 3 (discussing Sequa's cooperation
with the government's investigation); Jed S. Rakoff, Four Postulates of White Collar Prac-
tice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1993, at 3; Warin & Schwartz, supra note 456, at 125; Moss &
Sorkin, supra note 459, at 10-11; You Can Protect Your Company From the Rogue Crimi-
nal, CoRp. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1996, at 10-I1; David M. Zomow, Should Companies Turn
Themselves In? Programs to Address Corporate Criminal Liability, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 1994,
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the other hand, failures to choose the cooperative route led to corporate dis-
asters in the E.F. Hutton, Drexel Burnham, Consolidated Edison, Cooper
Companies, and Daiwa Bank cases.
In 1985, E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., then one of the largest, most
prestigious full-service, publicly-held broker-dealer firms in the world pled
guilty to 2,000 felony counts of federal mail and wire fraud violations as a
result of a massive fraud in which E.F. Hutton allegedly defrauded a host of
banks.471 The DOJ charged that E.F. Hutton's nationwide cash manage-
ment program encompassed a massive "check-kiting" scheme and other
fraudulent artifices designed to allow the broker-dealer firm to profit ille-
gally on "float" in its checking accounts, thereby creating millions of dol-
lars of illegal income. E.F. Hutton chose "to defend" vigorously the
extensive underlying grand jury investigation, rather than "to cooperate" at
the start in the prosecution's attempt to build a federal criminal case. Many
high-level E.F. Hutton executives pled the Fifth Amendment to avoid testi-
fying before the federal grand jury. The DOJ granted formal immunity to a
number of mid-level E.F. Hutton branch managers, and accumulated suffi-
cient evidence before the grand jury to support a major criminal prosecu-
tion.4 72 Eventually E.F. Hutton agreed to plead guilty to 2,000 felony mail
and wire fraud counts, and to extensive civil and administrative penalties,
fines, and related sanctions, in return for the DOJ's agreement not to prose-
cute criminally any E.F. Hutton executives or employees. As a part of the
plea bargain, the broker-dealer firm paid a $2 million fine, agreed to a civil
"ank fraud" injunction, and consented to pay restitution to victims of the
fraud .473
at S-3; Sequa Won't Face Criminal Charges, Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules (June
25, 1993), available in 1993 WL 2902967 (discussing Sequa's cooperation with the govern-
ment's investigation).471 See Information in United States v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Crim. No. 85-00083, re-
printed in SUBCO,M%1. ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON E.F.
HrrrON MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD, 99th CONG. 325 (Comm. Print 1986) (hereinafter HUTrON
HOUSE HEARINGS); Plea Agreement in United States v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Crim. No.
85-00083 (Apr. 30, 1985), reprinted in HUTrON HOUSE HEARINGS, supra, at 329.472 See HUTTON HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 471.
473In the criminal plea, E.F. Hutton paid a $2 million fine plus an additional $750,000
payment for the costs of the investigation and prosecution. See Plea Agreement in United
States v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., supra note 471, at 329. The firm also agreed to pay full
restitution to any bank or financial institution injured by its illegal course of conduct. See
Model Restitution Letter, reprinted in HuTrON HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 471, at 334;
Consent And Undertaking Of The E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. and E.F. Hutton & Company,
Inc., in United States v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., and E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Civil Action
No. 85-0601, reprinted in HUTrON HousE HEARINGS, supra note 471, at 344. Both the bro-
ker-dealer firm and its corporate parent also consented to a civil mail, wire and bank fraud
injunction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1345 and to related undertakings to make full restitution
to banks and financial institutions, and to adopt and implement enhanced compliance and
auditing policies and procedures to deter future violative conduct. See Complaint for Per-
manent Injunction and Ancillary Relief in United States v. E.F. Hutton Group Inc. & E.F.
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The E.F. Hutton firm teetered on the brink of bankruptcy as a result of
the criminal check-kiting guilty pleas and the implications of a potpourri of
parallel proceedings, and extensive adverse publicity, generated thereby.
The broker-dealer firm eventually expired when it was acquired by Shear-
son Lehman/American Express in 1987.474 The E.F. Hutton case epito-
Hutton & Co., Inc., Civil Action No. 85-0601, reprinted in HUTroN HOUSE HEARINGS, supra
note 471, at 349; Consent and Undertaking, supra.
E.F. Hutton also consented to an SEC civil injunction and to a related SEC administrative
disciplinary order pursuant to § 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act. See SEC v. The E.F. Hutton
Group Inc., SEC Litig. Release No. 10915, 34 SEC Docket 588 (Oct. 29, 1985); In re E.F.
Hutton & Company Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22579, 34 SEC Docket 538 (Oct. 29,
1985). See also 40 Act Release No.15287; E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc. and The E.F. Hut-
ton Group, Inc., Application and Temporary Order, Investment Company Act Release No.
14499, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,766, at 87,423 (May 2,
1985). The SEC settlement required E.F. Hutton to retain an independent consultant to ex-
amine the firm's policies and procedures regarding the handling of customer securities and
monies, and to make recommendations to strengthen such policies and procedures, which
recommendations the firm agreed to adopt and implement.
E.F. Hutton hired former U.S. Attorney General Griffin Bell to conduct a massive inter-
nal investigation of its cash management activities, and to prepare a report recommending
appropriate disciplinary action against involved or responsible individuals. The "Bell Re-
port" was issued, and made public, on Sept. 4, 1985. See Honorable Griffin B. Bell, The
Hutton Report: A Special Investigation into the Conduct of E.F. Hutton Company Inc., that
gave Rise to the Plea of Guilty entered on May 2, 1985 (Sept. 4, 1985) in HurroN HOUSE
HEARINGS, supra note 471, at 156, 165. For a libel case litigated against Judge Bell after
publication of the Report, see generally Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 810
(D.D.C. 1987) (refusing to stay libel action against Judge Bell after publication of his re-
port), rev'd, 828 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) set up a special
NASAA Task Force to investigate E.F. Hutton and to facilitate state disciplinary actions
against the firm. A number of states, including New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Georgia, Virginia and Arizona brought disciplinary actions and imposed civil monetary pen-
alties and fines against the firm. See generally New York v. E.F. Hutton Co., Index No. 85-
43, 176 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. City, Oct. 28, 1985); see also FERRARA & CRESPI, supra note 429, at
25 n.30 (noting 21 states instituted proceedings against E.F. Hutton firm).
Several congressional committees (both House and Senate) held public hearings in the
E.F. Hutton case. Indeed, documents produced in the House hearings that were not previ-
ously produced to the DOJ pursuant to grand jury subpoena led to a further DOJ inquiry to
determine whether the firm or any of its executives or employees (or outside counsel) should
be prosecuted for obstruction of justice or perjury. No such prosecution was ever pursued.
See HUTrroN HOUSE HEARINGS, supra note 471; Oversight of the Problems of White Collar
Crime: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
(Part I); Id. (Part 2: Money-Laundering); and Id. (Part 3: E.F. Hutton).
The New York Stock Exchange litigated SRO administrative disciplinary proceedings
against E.F. Hutton and several of its former principal executives, including George Ball,
Tom Lynch and Norman Epstein. The firm settled and paid a large fine. Lynch and Ball
settled on failure to supervise charges and were censured. Epstein was vindicated at trial.
474For years as the firm prospered, E.F. Hutton's motto was: "When E.F. Hutton talks,
people listen!" During the litigation of the various E.F. Hutton fraud cases, the Wall Street
Journal reported that, at the SEC, E.F. Hutton's motto had been bastardized into: "When
E.F. Hutton speaks, investors lose interest!"
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mizes the dangers to a corporation involved in "parallel proceedings" at the
federal, state and SRO levels.
In September 1989, Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated pled guilty
to six felony counts charging securities and mail fraud arising out of crimi-
nal arrangements between Michael R. Milken, the head of Drexel's High
Yield and Convertible Bond Department, and others.475 Drexel paid in ex-
cess of $300 million in criminal fines and penalties, in addition to $350
million in disgorgement and civil penalties that the firm paid in settlement
of a related SEC civil injunctive and penalty action.476 Both the Drexel firm
Even after E.F. Hutton was acquired by Shearson Lehman/American Express, the result-
ing firm, had to deal with other criminal problems arising from E.F. Hutton's prior activities.
For example, there was a money-laundering case centered in E.F. Hutton's Providence,
Rhode Island office that led to a criminal plea by the firm and former employees, and an
SEC administrative disciplinary consent order against the firm and several employees. See
United States v. E.F. Hutton Co., Cr. No. 88-036 (D. R. I., April 15, 1988); In the Matter of
E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. & John A. Pliakas, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 25054 (Oct. 22,
1987).
For books and reports related to the demise of the E.F. Hutton firm, see JAMES
STERNGOLD, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: How GREED, DECEIT AND BITTER REVENGE
DESTROYED E.F. HUTTON (1990); MARK STEVENS, SUDDEN DEATH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
E.F. HUTTON (1989); Nelson S. Kibler, Policies and Practices of E.F. Hutton Company Inc.
for Handling Customers' Securities and Monies: Report of the Independent Consultant Pur-
suant to the Order Contained in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release Number 22579
Dated October 29, 1985 (SEC 1986); Frederick M. Werblow, Report of the Independent
Consultant: Re: Securities and Exchange Commission in the Matter of E.F. Hutton & Com-
pany, Inc. (SEC 1986).
475 See [S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Benito Romano, Outline Of Guilty Plea And Sentence:
United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Press Release (Sept. 11, 1989). The Drexel firm
had been charged in January 1989 in a six count felony information with mail fraud and se-
curities fraud arising out of fraudulent arrangements with Ivan Boesky and Prince-
ton/Newport partners. Drexel was charged with manipulating securities prices, engaging in
illegal insider trading, and unlawfully facilitating merger and acquisition activities. See
[S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Rudolph W. Giuliani, Outline Of Charges: United States v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated, Press Release (Jan. 24, 1989). The Drexel firm was
charged specifically with (i) failing to file and causing others fraudulently to file false
Schedule 13Ds in connection with securities of Fischback Corporation, (ii) manipulating the
price of MCA common stock in connection with Golden Nugget's sale of its MCA holdings,
(iii) unlawfully aiding Ivan F. Boesky to defraud regulators and his creditors and investors
by allowing Boesky to park Phillips Petroleum common stock with Drexel and certain
Drexel clients, (iv) failing to file and causing others fraudulently to file false Schedule 13Ds
in connection with securities of Harris Graphics Corporation, (v) manipulating the price of
Stone Container Corporation common stock in connection with an offering of convertible
securities underwritten by Drexel, and (vi) manipulating the price of C.O.M.B. Corporation
common stock in connection with an offering of convertible securities underwritten by
Drexel. See United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., No. 89-Cr. 41 (KBW) (Criminal
Information, S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1989); United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., No.
89-Cr. 41 (KBW) (criminal guilty plea, S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1989).476See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,999 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1988); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
Litig. Release No. 12,247, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1793 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1989); see also In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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and its superstar "junk bond king," Michael Milken, resisted the DOJ's
grand jury probe for almost two years before they finally succumbed to plea
bargain dispositions of the criminal cases.47 7 Like the E.F. Hutton case, the
94,198 (2d Cir. Feb. 21, 1989); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1989 Transfer.
Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 94,474 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989). The firm also con-
sented to related SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings. See In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 27,236, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1754 (Sept. 11, 1989).
See also SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,051 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 1988) (Judge Pollack refuses to disqualify himself
from Drexel cases), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988), petition for reh 'g en banc denied,
869 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1989). Michael Milken and his brother eventually consented to SEC
civil injunctive orders and to related SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings. See Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,200 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990). Cary J. Maultasch also consented to
an SEC civil injunctive order, see SEC v. Drexel Burnham lambert, Inc., Litig. Release No.
12,171, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1418 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1989). Pamela Monzert also consented
to an SEC civil injunctive order, see SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Litig. Release
No. 13588, 1993 SEC LEXIS 779 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1993), and to a related SEC administra-
tive disciplinary sanction. Victor Posner and his son, Steven Posner, litigated the SEC civil
injunctive action through trial and appeal. They lost the trial and appeal, were enjoined,
were ordered to pay extensive disgorgement, and were barred from serving in the future as
an officer or director of any public company. See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837
F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d. Cir. 1994).
See also SEC v. Fischback Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,101 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30,
1977), and SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
47Michael Milken, his brother Lowell Milken, and Brce L. Newberg, a Drexel trader,
were indicted in a 98-count indictment that tracked and expanded upon the charges against
the Drexel firm contained in the SEC civil injunctive complaint. See United States v.
Milken, No. 89 Cr.41 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1989) (criminal indictment). The original indict-
ment, and an eventual superseding indictment, included counts of (i) RICO conspiracy, (ii)
substantive RICO violations, (iii) mail fraud, (iv) wire fraud, (v) securities fraud, (vi) 18
U.S.C. 1001 false statements, and (vii) false tax returns. Michael Milken eventually pled
guilty to certain felonies, consented to parallel SEC civil injunctive relief, and paid criminal
fines and civil disgorgement and civil monetary penalties totaling $600 million. See United
States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (guilty plea and Fatico hearing opinion);
United States v. Milken, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,497
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1991) (court seals portions of the sentencing affidavits); SEC v. Milken,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,200 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990)
(SEC consent injunction and disgorgement). Michael Milken also consented to SEC admin-
istrative disciplinary sanctions. Lowell Milken, as part of his brother's guilty plea, had all
criminal charges against him dismissed. However, Lowell Milken consented to an SEC civil
injunctive order, and to related SEC administrative disciplinary sanctions. See SEC Lit. Re-
lease No. 12454, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,200 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 1990); see also In re
Boesky Sec. Litig., 128 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1989) (Michael and Lowell Milken,
defendants in parallel SEC civil and DOJ criminal cases, may not compel production in the
SEC civil injunctive action of documents in possession of SEC and attorneys for Ivan Boe-
sky due to possible prejudice to parallel DOJ criminal prosecution).
Michael Milken's SEC problems continued long after his criminal, civil and administra-
tive DOJ and SEC settlements in 1991. For example, in February 1998, Milken consented to
an SEC injunction in a case where the SEC alleged he violated the March 11, 1991 SEC ad-
ministrative "bar order" that precluded him from associating with a broker-dealer. Milken,
allegedly acting through McGroup, a company he owns and controlled, performed securities
brokerage activities for compensation in connection with two corporate transactions includ-
ing a 1995 transaction between MCI Communications Corporation and The News Corpora-
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adverse publicity and direct and indirect collateral consequences of the
criminal plea and related SEC civil settlements, as well as a potpourri of
private damages actions, forced the Drexel firm out of business.47 But un-
like E.F. Hutton, the Drexel firm did not merge with another large broker-I. 479 "e
dealer; rather it was liquidated in bankruptcy proceedings. The
Drexel/Milken prosecutions, coupled with a host of related criminal prose-
cutions of individuals and entities that took part in various illegal activities
of Drexel and Milken, will historically be labeled "Wall Street's Scandals
of the 1980s." 410 Many observers believe that if the Drexel firm had cho-
tion Limited. As part of this 1998 consent injunctive settlement, Milken agreed to a disgor-
gement order of $42 million (the allegedly illegal fees he received) plus $5 million in pre-
judgment interest. See SEC v. Milken, Litig. Release No. 15,654, 1998 SEC LEXIS 323
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998). An open, lingering question - whether being charged with vio-
lating the SEC bar order would lead the SDNY U.S. Attorney to move the court to revoke
Milken's criminal probation which barred him from all securities brokerage activities during
the probation term - was also put to rest with the recent SEC settlement. The U.S. Attorney
determined not to seek probation revocation because of "the problems of seeking criminal
penalties in the absence of controlling regulatory authority and judicial precedent construing
the term 'securities broker' in this context," and evidence that Milken relied on his lawyers'
advice that "his consulting activities did not violate" the lifetime ban. See U.S. Attorney
hite Finds That Milken Did Not Violate Probation, But He Will Pay $47 Million To Settle
SEC Charges, 12 CoRP. CRME REP., Mar. 2, 1998, at 3.478For interesting contrasting accounts of the demise of the Drexel firm, see DAN G.
STONE, APRIL FOOLS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND COLLAPSE OF DREXEL
BURNHAm (1991); DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL
MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995); JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDENT:
THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN (1992); DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & Co.:
WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCANDAL (1987); MARK STEVENS, THE INSIDERS: THE
TRUTH BEHIND THE SCANDAL ROCKING WALL STREET (1987); DENNIS B. LEVINE, INSIDE
OuT: AN INSIDER's ACCOUNT OF WALL STREET (1991); JAMES STEWART, DEN OF TIEVES
(1992); DAVID A. VISE, EAGLE ON THE STREET: BASED ON THE PULITZER PRIZE WINNING
ACCOUNT OF THE SEC'S BATTLE WITH WALL STREET (199 1).479See, e.g., In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 130 B.R. 910 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991).
480 Ivan Boesky, who was the principal government witness in the Drexel/Milken cases,
cooperated with the government prosecutors from the start. He consented to an SEC civil
injunctive order, related SEC administrative disciplinary sanctions, and pled guilty to a tech-
nical criminal "parking" conspiracy charge. The criminal charge related to filing a false
Schedule 13D in connection with securities of Fischback Corporation. See United States v.
Ivan F. Boesky, No. 87 Cr. - 378 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 1987); SEC v. Boesky, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); Ivan F. Boe-
sky, SEC 1934 Act Release No. 23802, 37 SEC Docket No. 2, at 2 (Nov. 14, 1986) (SEC
administrative disciplinary bar order); In re Seemala Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
24,089, 1987 SEC LEXIS 2598 (Feb. 12, 1987) (withdrawal of SEC broker-dealer registra-
tion of Boesky's firm, Seemala Corp.); see also United States v. Boesky, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,417 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1989) (denial of Boesky's
Rule 35 sentence reduction motion).
Five principals of the Princeton/Newport Partners hedge fund and a related broker-dealer
firm, and a Drexel Burnham bond trader (Bruce Newman) were indicted for (i) conspiracy to
file false tax returns, to commit securities, mail and wire fraud, and to create false broker-
dealer books and records, (ii) RICO conspiracy, and (iii) 32 substantive counts of mail and
429
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
sen to cooperate with government prosecutors at the start, the firm would
still be alive and prospering.
In October 1994, in mid-trial, Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Inc. pled guilty to federal environmental reporting and false statement
offenses arising from the corporation's deliberate concealment of the re-
lease of approximately 200 pounds of asbestos in the wake of a steam man-
hole explosion in the Gramercy Park section of Manhattan on Aug. 19,
1989.481 Consolidated Edison and two of its executives, Constantine J. Pa-
pakrasas and Philip B. McGivney, had been indicted in the S.D.N.Y. in De-
cember 1993 on charges that the company did not truthfully and promptly
report to appropriate federal, state and city governmental agencies the
amount of asbestos released into the environment as a result of the acci-
dent.482 The indictment alleged that federal law required Consolidated Edi-
son "to report the release of more than a pound of asbestos into the
environment to an appropriate agency of the U.S. Government immediately
upon knowledge of the release," but that the defendants "concealed the as-
bestos release in order to save the company the significant expense of le-
wire fraud, involving allegations that Princeton/Newport entered into sham transactions with
Drexel Burnham and Merrill Lynch for the purpose of creating "false, fictitious and bogus
long-term capital gains and short-term capital losses, through rigged and prearranged securi-
ties trading .. . [which] were then to be reported on the partnership returns of "Prince-
ton/Newport entities." The indictment further alleged that "to protect the aid of Drexel in
accomplishing these illicit goals" Princeton/Newport carried on its books securities positions
secretly held for Drexel's benefit and executed transactions "in the manipulation and at-
tempted manipulation of the price of certain securities" that "hid and concealed Drexel's role
in such manipulative acts." The indictment sought criminal RICO forfeiture of all of
Princeton/Newport's assets. The prosecution obtained a RICO pretrial asset freeze, the first
time such draconian action has been taken in a securities/tax prosecution. At jury trial, all
the defendants were convicted, and RICO forfeitures - albeit in much lower amounts than
the prosecution sought - were ordered. However, the trial judge imposed minimal jail
terms, and, indeed, rebuked the government for utilizing RICO charges in the prosecution.
See Asides - RICO Gets Mauled, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1989, at A30; Laurie P. Cohen,
Princeton Judge Imposes Terms Up to 6 Months - Light Sentences Are Blow To Use of
RICO Statute Against Securities Aide, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1989, at A3. Eventually most of
the convictions in the Princeton/Newport case were reversed on appeal. Indeed, on the few
convictions sustained on appeal, a Rule 35 motion was granted, eliminating the jail terms
imposed. See United States v. Regan, 713 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v.
Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court denies motion to dismiss indictment, but
does strike "intangible rights" mail fraud allegations); United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp.
36 (S.D.N.Y. 198); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d. Cir. 1988) (court sustaining
RICO pretrial asset freeze); United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Regan, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991). In a related case, Lisa Jones, a former assis-
tant bond trader under Newberg and Milken at the Drexel firm, was convicted for perjury in
her grand jury testimony in the Princeton/Newport case. See United States v. Jones, 900
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming perjury conviction).481 See [S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Mary Jo White, Press Release (Apr. 21, 1995).482 See [S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Mary Jo White, U.S. v. Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Constantine J. Papakrasas, and Philip B. McGivney, Press Release (Dec. 16,
1993).
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gaily-mandated asbestos cleanup procedures, and that Consolidated Edison
reported the release only after it became public that the residents of one
building spewed with contaminated debris had conducted tests and found
asbestos in the building.4 83 The indictment further charged "that the de-
fendants made a false statement to the Environmental Protection Agency
... and that they failed immediately to notify, and then filed an untimely
and misleading notification with the National Response Center of the Coast
Guard, the agency responsible for receiving notifications of hazardous sub-
stance releases and relaying those notifications to appropriate government
agencies.4'84
In addition to imposition against the company of a maximum
$2,000,000 criminal fine and corporate probation for three years, S.D.N.Y.
Judge John S. Martin, as part of the sentence against the company, ap-
pointed a court-supervised monitor to surveil Consolidated Edison to insure
that the company will "comply with environmental rules, regulations and
laws of the United States." In imposing sentence, Judge Martin stated that
probation and appointment of a monitor were necessary because of "many
disturbing things" including that company employees knew about the as-
bestos release but the "corporate culture" at Consolidated Edison encour-
aged the attitude among company employees that they "better not tell the
bad news." Judge Martin added, "I want to make sure that attitude has
changed.485
U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White stated: "The sentence in this case, in-
cluding the appointment of a monitor to make certain that Consolidated
Edison observes all environmental laws, sends a clear message to the regu-
lated community that corporations like Consolidated Edison, which commit
environmental crimes and fail to take appropriate action after those crimes
are discovered, will be held accountable.
'4 86
The detriments to a public company for failing to cooperate with a
DOJ/grand jury inquiry and a parallel SEC enforcement investigation can
be no better illustrated than by the Cooper Companies case in the early
1990s. In November 1992, a S.D.N.Y. grand jury indicted the Cooper
Companies, Inc. and its co-chairman Gary Singer on conspiracy, Travel
Act, mail and wire fraud and related federal felony charges (including
RICO and money-laundering crimes against Gary Singer),487 and the SEC
4 31Id. at 2.
4841d. at 3-4.
48 White Press Release, supra note 481, at 1-2. The monitor's corporate surveillance ac-
tivities have apparently turned up a host of additional problems for the company including
incidents involving "pollution spills, cover-ups and internal backbiting," including "a PCB
leak at a transformer shop in Queens, a fire at a generating station in Manhattan, and a park-
ing lot full of defective hydraulic trucks in nearby Westchester County." See Dean Stark-
man, Law: Corporate Monitors Form a New Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1977.486 Id. at 2. Defendant Papakrasas, who pled guilty, was fined $5,000.
487 See United States v. Gary Singer & The Cooper Cos., 92 Cr. 964, SEC Lit. Release
No. 13432 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992).
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simultaneously filed a civil injunctive complaint charging the Cooper Com-
panies, Gary Singer, and other senior officers of the company with securi-
ties fraud .4 1 The DOJ criminal prosecution and the companion SEC civil
enforcement action encompassed three distinct frauds. In the first scheme,
Gary Singer allegedly bribed a mutual fund analyst, G. Albert Griggs, Jr.
who advised, and managed the portfolio of several mutual funds, in order to
obtain inside information about the funds' junk bond purchases, and then
engaged in "front-running" trading ahead of the funds in personal family
and company accounts. A friend of Griggs, John Collins, served as an in-
termediary, and assisted in furthering the scheme. Singer thereafter caused
the high-yield bonds to be sold at inflated prices to the mutual funds and di-
verted Cooper Companies' corporate funds representing a porion of the
trading profits to Griggs and Collins.48 9 The second fraud involved a ma-
nipulation by Gary Singer and the Cooper Companies of the trading price of
an issue of Cooper Companies' 10-%% Convertible Subordinated Reset
Debentures to avoid a June 1991 interest rate Reset. The manipulation was
accomplished through massive purchases of the Debentures in accounts of
the Cooper Companies. The third fraud encompassed a scheme whereby
Gary Singer caused high-yield bonds to be traded between Cooper Compa-
nies' account and accounts controlled by his wife and aunt in a manner
whereby Singer sold bonds that had increased in value from the company's
portfolio to Singer family accounts at below market prices, thereby fraudu-
lently transferring profits of over $560,000 from the company to Singer and
his family.
The company was indicted, and charged with, among others, mail and
wire fraud crimes, because prosecutors believed that company officials did
not cooperate with the government's grand jury investigation. The com-
pany and Gary Singer continued to resist the government through a criminal
jury trial in January 1994 at which both the company and Gary Singer were
convicted on multiple felony counts.490 Gary Singer appealed his criminal
conviction and continued to litigate the parallel SEC civil injunctive and en-
forcement action. In July 1994, Cooper Companies was sentenced to pay a
$1.8 million corporate criminal fine and to pay $1.3 million in restitution.
In imposing the fine, the District Court denied the Company's motion for a
downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that the
Company had failed to take prompt action against the corporate officers re-
488See SEC v. Cooper Cos., Inc., Litig. Release No. 13,432, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2933
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1992).489Early in the government investigations, Griggs and Collins entered into plea bargains,
became cooperative government witnesses against Gary Singer, pled guilty to criminal
charges, and agreed to consent injunctive orders in the parallel SEC civil enforcement action.
See SEC v. Griggs, Litig. Release No. 13,247, 1992 SEC LEXIS 1193 (D.D.C. May 21,
1992).490Gary Singer was convicted on 21 felony counts, including RICO, money-laundering,
and mail and wire fraud. The Company was convicted on seven mail and wire fraud counts,
and acquitted on the remaining charges against it.
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sponsible for the criminal schemes - even while they were refusing to co-
operate with either the government's investigation or with the company's
own internal corporate inquiry. At the corporate sentencing, S.D.N.Y. U.S.
Attorney Mary Jo White warned: "The firm sentence in this case sends a
clear message that corporations like the Cooper Companies, Inc., who do
little, if anything, to rectify the wrongdoings of their employees, and who
fail to take appropriate action after those crimes are discovered, will be held
accountable.' 91
In December 1994, the company negotiated a global settlement with
the DOJ and the SEC, resolving all the governmental civil and criminal
charges outstanding against it.492 The SEC in December 1995 issued a Sec-
tion 21 (a) Public Report of Investigation criticizing the directors of Cooper
Companies for failing to adequately deal with the fraudulent conduct of
management of the company.49 The SEC found the following facts:
1. The board of directors began to learn about the fraudulent schemes di-
rected by Gary Singer in January through March 1992 when the Company was
informed (in January) that the SEC and (in March) that the S.D.N.Y. U.S. At-
torney's Office had commenced parallel investigations of the Company and its
co-chairman. In late January 1992 the Company filed a Form 10K with the
SEC stating that Cooper Companies was "cooperating fully with the Commis-
sion's investigation."
2. Both CEO Gary Singer, and his brother Steven Singer who was COO, in
February 1992 pled the Fifth Amendment to avoid giving testimony in the SEC
investigation. In March 1992, after learning of the DOJ/grandjury inquiry, the
Company's board of directors authorized an internal corporate investigation by
independent outside counsel. The directors were led to believe that both
Singer brothers would consent to interviews by outside counsel in the internal
inquiry. But both Singer brothers, on Fifth Amendment grounds, thereafter re-
fused to be interviewed in the internal inquiry. In early April 1992, in a pre-
liminary report generated in the internal inquiry the directors were informed of
trading in high-yield bonds between Company accounts and Singer family ac-
491See REPRESENTING THE CORPORATION AND ITS OFFICERS IN GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS, 16 n.21 (1997); see also Richard Thomburgh & Roger M. Adelman, The
Saga of Cooper Companies: How Not to Avoid Indictment, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1994, at 22.492 See SEC v. Cooper Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release No, 14,351, 1994 SEC LEXIS
3936 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1994). Cooper Companies consented to an anti-fraud injunction,
agreed further to be permanently enjoined from further employing or otherwise engaging the
services of Gary Singer, Steven Singer, or any person related to either of them, paid disgor-
gement of $1,360,830 plus prejudgment interest of $260,644, and paid an additional civil
penalty of $1,150,000. The final judgment permitted Cooper Companies to offset the
amount of any criminal fine and restitution ordered and paid by the Company in the com-
panion criminal case against the civil penalty and disgorgement ordered in the SEC civil
case. See United States v. Gary Singer & The Cooper Cos., 92 Cr. 964 (RJW) (S.D.N.Y.
July 15, 1994) (Cooper Companies ordered to pay criminal fine of $1,831,568 and restitution
and interest of $1,310,166).
493 See Report of Investigation in the Matter of Cooper Cos., Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 34-35,082, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,472 (Dec. 12,
1994).
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counts, which generated over $560,000 profits to the Singer brothers manage-
ment team. However, the Board of Directors failed to take any action to re-
claim the more than $560,000 diverted from the Company by Gary Singer.
3. On May 21, 1992, the SEC and S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney's Office publicly
filed civil and criminal charges against Griggs and Collins, two co-conspirators
with Gary Singer, based on the fraudulent high-yield bond front-running
scheme with Cooper Companies. Both Griggs and Collins pled guilty, and
were cooperating in the continuing DOJ/grandjury and SEC investigations. At
the criminal plea hearing, Griggs publicly identified Gary Singer as the person
at the Company with whom he had engaged in the illegal frontrunning scheme.
In late May 1992 the Company issued a press release, drafted by Steven
Singer, stating:
"The Company, including its Board of Directors and legal counsel, is re-
viewing the allegations of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York and the SEC as regards G. Albert Griggs and John Collins. The Com-
pany denies any wrongdoing and is unaware of any wrongdoing on the part of
its officers or employees."
The SEC found this press release to be false and misleading, because be-
fore it was issued the directors had already been informed of at least one in-
stance of wrongdoing and the assertions of their Fifth Amendment privileges
by both the CEO and the COO. Nonetheless, the directors let the press release
stand and took no other action until three months later, when the Board placed
CEO Gary Singer on temporary leave of absence. Even then, Gary Singer
continued to be paid and to have an office on Company premises (although a
Board resolution specified that the CEO relocate his office). Gary Singer con-
tinued to serve as a director, and COO Steven Singer was promoted to CEO.
4. At a July 28, 1992 Board meeting, the directors were advised that outside
counsel conducting the internal corporate investigation was "not expected to
progress further" with the internal inquiry in view of his inability to interview
Gary and Steven Singer, Griggs and Collins.
The SEC's conclusion in the Cooper Companies Section 21(a) Report,
must be reflected upon by any public company's directors, and legal counsel to
the company, in determining what approach to take vis-a-vis DOJ and/or SEC
in a serious investigation of corporate wrongdoing involving high-level man-
agement:
"The Commission considers it essential for board members to more ag-
gressively to fulfill their responsibilities to oversee the conduct and perform-
ance of management and to ensure that the company's public statements are
candid and complete. The Commission has long viewed the issue of corporate
governance and the fiduciary obligations of members of management and the
boards of directors of public companies to their investors as an issue of para-
mount importance to the integrity and soundness of our capital markets. These
obligations are particularly acute where potential violations of the federal secu-
rities laws involving self-dealing and fraud by management are called to the
attention of the board of directors." [Footnote omitted.]
In this case, Cooper's Board failed to satisfy its obligations when con-
fronted with serious indications of management fraud. After the Board learned
that a member of senior management had concealed fraudulent self-dealing
transactions and thereby caused the company's outstanding reports to be inac-
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curate, the Board failed to take immediate and effective action to protect the
interests of the company's investors. The Board's inaction allowed a second
corporate officer, who himself was allegedly involved in the fraudulent front-
running scheme, to direct the issuance of a press release on behalf of the com-
pany falsely denying any knowledge of wrongdoing. By failing to take
immediate and decisive corrective action on these matters, the Coopers Board
appeared to prefer management's interest in keeping the facts secret over the
investors' interest in full, fair and accurate disclosure under the federal securi-
ties laws.494
The draconian punishment that can be foisted upon a corporation that
fails to self-report corporate crime and fails to cooperate in a government
investigation of corporate misconduct is also highlighted by the Daiwa
Bank prosecution in 1995-96. In November 1995, Daiwa Bank was indi-
cated in S.D.N.Y. in a twenty-four-count federal indictment alleging con-
spiracy, mail and wire fraud, obstructing an examination of a financial
institution, falsification of bank records, and misprision of felonies by fail-
ing to disclose federal crimes.495 The prosecution of Daiwa Bank centered
upon fraudulent trading activity by Toshihide Iguchi, an Executive Vice
President and trader in the Bank's New York Branch. The fraudulent trad-
ing generated approximately $1.1 billion in losses. The concealment of
such losses through falsification of the bank's books and records, and the
concealment by the Bank's senior management of Iguchi's crimes, once
discovered, brought investigations from U.S. bank regulators and other state
and federal governmental departments and agencies.
Although Daiwa senior management learned of Iguchi's crimes in mid-
July 1995, the Bank concealed the crimes and did not report them to U.S.
authorities until almost two months later in September 1995.497 The
494Id. at 86,065. For other enforcement actions that the SEC pursued in the Cooper
Companies case, see SEC v. Russo, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 709 (S.D.N.Y. May 11,
1993); In re Russo, SEC Ad. Pro. File No. 3-8573 (Dec. 12, 1993).495United States v. The Daiwa Bank, Ltd., 95 Cr. 947 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see
[S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Mary Jo White, Press Release (Nov. 2, 1995).
496Id.; see also id. at 1-2:
The charges arise out of the unauthorized sale of securities from Daiwa's custody
account, including the sale of more than $375 million in customer securities, by Toshi-
hide Iguchi, a former Executive Vice President at the New York Branch, which were
used to cover trading losses incurred by Iguchi; Iguchi's attempts to cover-up those
losses and unauthorized sales, which by 1995 had grown to more than $1.1 billion; and
Daiwa's attempts to continue the cover-up after learning of Iguchi's illegal conduct; and
Daiwa's alleged repeated attempts, dating back to at least 1988, to obstruct the Board of
Governors of the federal Reserve System and the New York State Banking Department.
497Id. at 2:
According to the Indictment, Daiwa learned in mid-July 1995 that Iguchi had lost more
than $1.1 billion through unauthorized trading in United States government securities,
and the sale of securities belonging to Daiwa's customers to conceal those losses.
Rather than disclose Iguchi's crimes to law enforcement authorities, as Daiwa was re-
quired by law to do, Daiwa allegedly attempted to conceal the losses and missing secu-
rities by, among other things: making extensive false entries in its books and records to
hide the losses and preclude law enforcement action in the United States; removing the
records of these crimes from Daiwa's New York offices and secreting them in the
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charges in the indictment relating to the Bank's cover-up after senior man-
agement learned of Iguchi's crimes included: (i) a charge that Daiwa, act-
ing through senior Bank officials, both in New York and Japan, conspired
to defraud the Federal Reserve Board, to make false statements to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, and to falsify the Bank's books and records to prevent
discovery of the $1.1 billion trading loss; (ii) misprision of felonies based
on Daiwa's failure to report and affirmative concealment of federal crimes;
and (iii) several counts of falsifying bank books and records.4 98 The in-
dictment contained other charges relating to (i) Iguchi's defrauding the
Bank's customers in the unauthorized sales of $377 million of customers'
securities; and (ii) the Bank's conspiring to defraud the Federal Reserve
Board during the period 1988 through 1995 byproviding false information
about the location and supervision of its traders.'"
A draconian collateral consequence of the indictment of Daiwa Bank
was a parallel joint administrative order by several state and federal bank
regulatory agencies ordering the Bank and one of its affiliates to cease do-
ing business in the United States, thus forcing the Bank and its affiliates to
sell all their U.S. assets, and to close down all their U.S. branches and other
operations. The state/federal administrative order was issued jointly by the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
New York State Banking Department, and bank regulators in five additional
states - California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida and Georgia.500 Daiwa
was also penalized by Japan's Ministry of Finance, and was subjected to an
onerous monthly inspection program by the Bank of Japan. 01
When the indictment was returned, S.D.N.Y: U.S. Attorney Mary Jo
White emphasized:
Daiwa was indicted today, not only because its former officer, Toshihide
Iguchi, committed serious crimes, but because, as charged in the Indictment,
Daiwa and a number of its highest senior officials themselves committed
crimes as they attempted to cover-up other crimes. The message to the finan-
cial community from today's indictment should be clear and unambiguous: law
enforcement will not tolerate financial institutions who unlawfully attempt to
mislead regulatory authorities and coverup criminal misconduct by their em-
ployees. The law requires, and law enforcement expects, that all companies
apartment of the manager of Daiwa's New York Branch; sending false account infor-
mation to its customers; filing a false report with the Federal Reserve Board; and oth-
erwise attempting to prevent law enforcement officials from discovering these crimes.
498 Id.
499 1d. at 3. The indictment alleged that Daiwa temporarily relocated traders from one lo-
cation to another and disguised a trading room as a storage room prior to a bank examination
in order to deceive banking authorities. The Bank was also charged with one count of ob-
structing an examination of a financial institution in connection with that conduct.
50OSee Daiwa Indicted Over Hidden Bond Losses; Regulators Order Shutdown of U.S.
Units, 27 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1767 (1995).50 Id.
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will abide by the law, all regulatory requirements, and the highest standards of
corporate citizenship 0 2
In addition to bringing criminal charges against the rogue trader, To-
shihide Iguchi, °3 a criminal complaint was filed charging Masahiro Tsuda,
a former General Manager of Daiwa's New York Branch, with one count of
conspiracy to deceive the Federal Reserve Board by concealing the $1.1
billion loss, making false statements to the Federal Reserve Board, and
making false entries in the Bank's books and records; and one count of
misprision of a felony.5 4
Daiwa Bank pled guilty in February 1996 to 16 federal felonies, paid a
$340 million fine - believed to be the largest fine ever paid in a federal
criminal case, and made full restitution to all the customer victims of Igu-
chi's fraudulent trading. 05 At sentencing, in a written allocution, Daiwa
S2 White Press Release, supra note 495, at 3.
503In October 1995, Iguchi pled guilty to money-laundering, embezzlement and forfei-
ture charges, as well as to fraud charges alleging that he schemed with other Daiwa traders to
engage in unauthorized trading and conspired to engage in unauthorized trading and con-
spired with Daiwa's senior management to conceal the ensuing losses from federal regula-
tors. See Daiwa V.P. Pleads Guilty to Charges He Conspired to Conceal Massive Losses, 27
Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1770 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1995).
504 White Press Release, supra note 495, at 4. Tsuda pled guilty in April 1996 to the con-
spiracy count. See Frances A. McMorris, Law: Ex-Daiwa Official Pleads Guilty In Failure
to Disclose Trade Losses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1996, at B-6; see also United States v. Tsuda,
95 Cr. 01118 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995).
505United States v. The Daiwa Bank, Ltd., 95 Cr. 947 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1996)
(guilty plea); see also [S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney] Mary Jo White, Press Release at 1-2 (Feb.
28, 1996): "Daiwa pled guilty to two counts of conspiring to defraud the United States and
the Federal Reserve Bank, one count of misprison of felony, ten counts of falsifying bank
books and records, two counts of wire fraud, and one count of obstructing a bank examina-
tion." The Bank's guilty pleas related to four separate incidents, Id. at 2-3:
(i) "First, from 1984 through 1995, acting through Tashihide Iguchi, a former Execu-
tive Vice President of Daiwa's New York Branch, sold without authorization billions of
dollars worth of securities that Daiwa held in custody for its customers. As of July 1995,
when Iguchi disclosed his crimes to Daiwa, approximately $1.1 billion was missing from
Daiwa's custody account, $377 million of which were owned by or held in trust for Daiwa's
customers. Iguchi concealed his theft of customer securities by falsifying Daiwa's books
and records, which in turn caused Daiwa to send false account statements to its customers.
In connection with these crimes, Daiwa has pled guilty to five counts of falsifying bank
books and records and two counts of wire fraud."
(ii) "Second, Daiwa obstructed examinations by the Board of Governors of the federal
Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve") and lied to the Federal Reserve about Iguchi's role
in securities trading at the Branch. During the course of regulatory exams, including a fed-
eral Reserve exam in 1992, Daiwa temporarily relocated its traders from its downtown of-
fice, where they were supervised by Iguchi, to its midtown office and disguised the trading
room downtown to make it look like a storage room.
"In November 1993, Daiwa also falsely stated to the Federal Reserve that Iguchi would
no longer supervise the Branch's securities traders when, in fact, as Daiwa management
knew, Iguchi continued to supervise the trading until September 1995. In connection with
these crimes, Daiwa has pled guilty to one count of conspiring to defraud the federal Reserve
and one count of obstructing an examination of a financial institution."
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admitted that the Bank kept the Iguchi trading losses secret from U.S.
regulatory and governmental authorities from July 24, 1995 to September
18, 1995 by, among other things, creating false internal books and records
relating to Iguchi's trading losses and the securities misappropriated by
Iguchi, in violation of Daiwa's legal duty to keep and maintain accurate
books and records. °6 Daiwa explained that it intended to make full regu-
latory, governmental and public disclosure in due course, but the complex-
ity of Iguchi's schemes coupled with advice from the Japanese Ministry of
Finance caused disclosure to be delayed until September 18, 1995:
Daiwa's failure to make full and prompt disclosure to the Federal Reserve
was due, in part, to the complexity and duration of Iguchi's scheme, the details
of which Daiwa was still trying to unravel at the time of its disclosure to the
authorities, and to grave concerns regarding the impact that reporting of the
losses at the time would have on the Japanese economy, as expressed to Daiwa
on August 8, 1995, by the Japanese Ministry of Finance (the "MOF"). Senior
management of Daiwa also wished to announce the losses at a time when it
could demonstrate its continuing financial stability by writing off the losses at
one time. The MOF has the responsibility for overseeing Japanese financial
policy and for safeguarding the Japanese financial system. Notwithstanding
the fact that the incident had occurred in the U.S., because of a crisis that was
then threatening the international reputation of the Japanese financial system,
the MOF gave priority to the convenience of the Japanese government and im-
plied that it would be the absolutely worst timing if the incident were to come
out in September. MOF's comments reinforced Daiwa's own business deci-
sion to delay disclosure, which was in violation of Daiwa's duty to notify the
authorities of the losses under U.S. banking regulations.
50 7
At the sentencing hearing, S.D.N.Y. Assistant U.S. Attorney Reid M.
Figel stated:
(iii) "Third, Daiwa actively concealed Iguchi's crimes and the attending loss from
United States regulators, from its customers, and from the public. For two months after Igu-
chi confessed to the bank in July 1995, Daiwa committed numerous crimes in its effort to
hide these losses. In particular, Daiwa made extensive false entries in its books and records,
prepared and sent false account statements, filed a false report with the Federal Reserve, ex-
plored plans to hide the loss permanently by moving it off-shore, secretly replaced the miss-
ing $377 million of customer securities, and engaged in a fictitious transfer of $600 million
worth of non-existent securities. In connection with this conduct, Daiwa has pled guilty to
one count of conspiring to defraud the Federal Reserve, one count of misprision of felony,
and five counts of false entries in bank books and records."
(iv) "Fourth, Daiwa has admitted committing similar crimes in connection with trading
losses incurred by its wholly-owned subsidiary, Daiwa Bank Trust Company. Specifically,
Daiwa admitted that from 1984 through 1987 it concealed approximately $97 million in
trading losses at Daiwa Trust by transferring the losses to an off-shore entity, falsifying
Daiwa Trust's books and records, and making false and misleading statements to bank regu-
lators."506Daiwa Allocution, at 3 (Feb. 27, 1996) (Submitted pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
I1 (e)(6)).
507 Daiwa Allocution, at 4; see also Brian Bremner et al., The Daiwa Coverup will Back-
fire on the Banks: MOF's Withholding of the Facts Enrages the US. - and Damages
Credibility Worldwide, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 46.
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[I]f Iguchi's crimes were all that were involved in this case, and had Daiwa re-
ported timely those crimes, it is unlikely Daiwa would have been charged at
all.
A primary factor leading to Daiwa's indictment and to its ultimate plea of
guilty was the conduct of Daiwa's management, not the conduct of its faithless
traders. Daiwa was indicted in this case because of the knowing, intentional,
and fundamentally unacceptable response of Daiwa's management to the
crimes committed by its employees....
We hope that Daiwa's plea to this [misprision] count will serve as a stark re-
minder to the corporate community, and particularly regulated entities that
have an affirmative duty to disclose material events, of their need to comply
scrupulously with their disclosure obligations, and that the failure to make
timely disclosure, coupled with attempts at concealment, constitutes a violation
of federal criminal law.
[T]he fine of this magnitude [$340 million] is justified, in part, because Daiwa
has steadfastly refused to provide any meaningful cooperation in the investiga-
tion of this matter. While providing cooperation is not required by the law, the
government routinely rewards corporations that provide timely and genuine
cooperation to the government in investigating the criminal conduct of its em-
ployees. Thus, although Daiwa insured that none of its customers suffered any
losses as a result of its crimes, and it should be commended for that effort,
Daiwa's serious crimes and its failure at the time of the disclosure of Iguchi's
losses ... to provide any meaningful cooperation to the government in its in-
vestigation of the Iguchi-related matter further supports the imposition of the
fine in this case. It is because of Daiwa's failure to obey the laws of the United
States, that Daiwa merits the harsh punishment that will be imposed today. 
5 08
After Daiwa Bank's guilty plea, S.D.N.Y. U.S. Attorney Mary Jo
White stated
i. that her office made many efforts to obtain the bank's cooperation
in the criminal investigation, "but no meaningful cooperation was ever
given."
50 9
ii. "These corporate crimes represent companies at their highest lev-
els acting at their worst. 51 0
iii. "What we aim for in law enforcement in the corporate context is
good corporate citizenship, cooperation and openness with authorities, and
genuine efforts to improve a corporate culture that has led to the problems
and crimes under investigation. Unfortunately, until today's guilty pleas,
we had the opposite from Daiwa."
'' I
iv. That Daiwa's guilty pleas "should serve as a very clear message to
other corporations - and hopefully stop in its tracks any thought of en-
SS Transcript of Daiwa Plea and Sentencing at 31, 33-34,44 (Feb. 28, 1996).
509Daiwa Pleads Guilty To 16 Felonies, Pays A $340 Million Criminal Fine, CORP.




International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
gaging in Daiwa-like conduct when confronted with crimes committed by
officers and employees or significant problems which require prompt dis-
closure to the authorities and to the public. The integrity of the financial
markets and financial institutions depends upon the prompt and full disclo-
sure that the law and corporate ethics require. 512
Perhaps the most onerous aspect of the Daiwa Bank criminal prosecu-
tion was the inclusion of misprision of felony charges5 13 in the potpourri of
federal crimes to which the Bank had to plead guilty.514 Prior to the guilty
plea, Daiwa had made a motion to dismiss the misprision count, arguing
that its voluntary disclosure to the Federal Reserve on September 15, 1995,
of Iguchi's crimes protected the Bank from a criminal misprision charge.
5 15
The Bank had learned of Iguchi's crimes in a "confession letter" written by
Iguchi in mid-July and received by Daiwa's president in Osaka, Japan on or
before July 21, 1995. The misprision statute requires a person to report a
felony crime to appropriate law enforcement authorities "as soon as possi-
ble."516 Since Daiwa reported the crimes fifty-six days after the Bank was
put on notice, Daiwa argued that if fifty-six days was too tardy, then the
statute should be held unconstitutional as "void for vagueness" because the
phrase "as soon as possible" provided Daiwa with no notice or guidance as
to how quickly it had to report to avoid violating the statute.'
17
Daiwa argued that when applied to an eyewitness to a crime, "as soon as
possible" might be a sufficiently clear requirement; but when applied to corpo-
rate knowledge of a complex financial matter, where a corporation has fiduci-
ary duties to investigate the facts before precipitously reporting, the statute did
not provide sufficient guidance as to the time period available before a delay in
reporting triggered criminal liability.
518
Since Daiwa pled guilty, this important criminal law issue will remain
open until litigated in a future corporate criminal prosecution.5 19
The Southern District of New York is not the only federal prosecutory
office that is stressing corporate self-reporting and cooperation with the
512
1d.
51318 U.S.C. § 4(1994).
514 See Audrey Strauss, Corporate Liability for Misprision of Felon, N.Y.L.J., May 2,
1996, at 5.5151d. at 6, 34 nn.21-22.
516Id. at 6, 34 nn.22-25.
517Id. at 6, 34 n.25.518Id. at 6, 34 n.26.
519S ee discussion of Audrey Strauss, id. at 6. See also FEDERAL BAR FOUND., supra note
451, at 26 nn.44 & 46. Daiwa waited almost two months to report its wrongdoing, and was
prosecuted for misprision. Yet, Salomon Brothers took a much longer period of time to in-
vestigate its criminal wrongdoing before it self-reported to the government, but was not
criminally prosecuted. Id. at 27-28 nn.47-48:
Salomon corporate officials were aware of the wrongdoing in April 1991 and did not
disclose it to authorities until August 1991. This is in contrast to Daiwa officials who
disclosed after approximately two months. The difference is that once Salomon did
disclose, it continued to voluntarily cooperate with the government in its investigation.
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government's investigation of corporate crime. This is a nationwide DOJ
initiative. For example, former Deputy Attorney General Jamie S.
Gorelick, in a May 1996 address to the Conference Board's Business Ethics
Conference, contrasted the wrong approach of Daiwa Bank in dealing with
corporate crime, to the much more constructive approach of the Pepco util-
ity in Maryland and Washington, D. C.
Beginning in the 1980's, a site supervisor at Pepco's 600 acre fly ash stor-
age facility in Maryland began to illegally pump fly ash, which is acidic and
contains metals, into wetlands adjacent to the site.
In 1993, the site manager was removed from his position because of an
unrelated investigation. His replacement discovered the long-term environ-
mental law violations. Pepco, acting on advice of outside counsel, conducted
an internal investigation and then immediately came forward, bringing its envi-
ronmental problems to the attention of the government and assisting it to iden-
tify the culpable employees.
Pepco provided all relevant information concerning the violation, includ-
ing the results of its internal investigation, and made its employees available
for interviews. In addition, Pepco took disciplinary action against the plant
manager's supervisors and worked with environmental regulators to determine
the nature and extent of the environmental violations.
As a result, the company was not criminally charged.... Pepco agreed to
pay a civil penalty ($950,000), which was commensurate with the extent and
duration of the violations.
5 20
I want to underscore that Pepco's ability to mitigate its potential liability
and to avoid criminal liability was not merely the result of good judgment ex-
ercised upon the discovery of the violations. Rather, Pepco had in place, be-
fore and after the occurrence of these violations, an extensive quality assurance
process through which line managers provided oversight and control over envi-
ronmental compliance issues....
Unlike Daiwa, Pepco was well-prepared long before discovering any ille-
gal acts. With the help of counsel, its executives had prepared the company for
the eventuality of wrongdoing, and, when it occurred, made judgments that en-
hanced, rather than detracted from, its reputation. 21
Gorelick also pointed out the DOJ's Antitrust Division's Corporate
Amnesty Policy which provides corporations with the possibility of escap-
ing criminal antitrust liability altogether if their internal corporate compli-
ance policies enable the company to detect violations early, and come
forward in disclosing the illegal conduct to the Antitrust Division. She
contrasted the experience of Miles, Inc., the country's leading maker of
steel wool scouring pads including SOS, to the experience of Dial Corpora-
tion, the manufacturer of Brillo. Miles and Dial had engaged in conspirato-
rial antitrust activities.
520Remarks OfJamie S. Gorelick, 5 Corp. Conduct Q. 1, 3-4 (Rutgers 1996). The plant
manager was convicted of mail fraud and Clean Water Act felonies and sentenced to 15
months imprisonment. Id. at 4. Two subcontractors were convicted for a separate commer-
cial bribery scheme. Id.
52 1id.
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In the end, Miles agreed to plead guilty to the violations and pay a $4.5
million fine. Dial was not prosecuted. What was the difference? Upon dis-
covering the illegal activity, Dial informed the Department of its participation
with the other company, cooperated fully, and took advantage of the Antitrust
Division's amnesty policy.
522
Attorney General Janet Reno recently advocated that effective corpo-
rate compliance programs "can increase the company's chances of obtain-
ing a satisfactory civil resolution as opposed to a criminal case with
possible forfeitures and exclusion," and can provide "perhaps the best way
for a corporation to protect itself from the dire consequences of indictment
and conviction." She stressed, however, that an effective corporate compli-
ance program must not only be aimed at preventing fraud; the program
must also be focused on investigating and reporting fraud.
Making a voluntary disclosure should be part of a business executive's or
corporate counsel's calculus when he discovers that one or more of his em-
ployees are engaged in fraudulent conduct.... When a corporation discloses
wrongdoing, makes full restitution, and takes swift disciplinary action against
the employees engaged in this misconduct, the federal interest in prosecuting
the corporation may be greatly reduced, and the Department will view the cor-
poration more favorably.
On the other hand, the corporation that learns of criminal activity and
fails to report it or fails to cooperate fully with the government cannot expect
to obtain the same benefits. 52
The trend for the DOJ to encourage corporations to become the ally of
the prosecutor, i.e., the government's partner in prosecuting federal white-
collar criminal cases, has led Brian Elmer, a criminal defense lawyer at
Crowell & Moring in Washington, D. C., to comment: "Defending the cor-
poration is now an oxymoron. You cooperate the corporation. You don't
defend it."'524 If the corporation chooses cooperation with the federal prose-
cutors in the conduct of a grand jury inquiry, several legal and strategic
matters will differ dramatically from the case of the corporation, joining
hands with its executives, officers and employees resisting the government
522 1d. "Prior to 1993, only one corporation per year applied for amnesty. Since then, the
Antitrust Division has received applications for corporate amnesty at a rate closer to one per
months." Id.
523 In Speech To American Hospital Association, Reno Uses Carrot And Stock Approach,
12 Cor'. CRIME REP., Feb. 16, 1998, at 1, 3.
See also Obermaier, Do the Right Thing, supra note 451, at 18:
You can see immediately why a prosecutor would deal differently with a corporation on
the one hand that battens down the hatches and tries to ride out the investigation, erecting
every conceivable barrier to the government's investigation and asserting every conceiv-
able defense to the prosecution, and on the other hand, a corporation that comes to the
prosecuting authorities and informs them of its findings voluntarily.
It must be the policy of every prosecutorial agency to encourage and reward organiza-
tional self-policing and voluntary disclosure of criminal violations by corporate citizens.
And it should be the policy of every self-respecting management to stop wrongdoing, to
root it out when it occurs and disclose the discovered wrongdoing to the authorities.524 FEDERAL BAR FOuND., supra note 451, at 17.
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prosecutorial efforts. Larry Pedowitz and other defense counsel provide the
following factors or "ingredients" for the "recipe" by which a corporation
that may have committed serious federal crimes can become the govern-
ment's "partner" and thereby avoid prosecution:
(i) Disclose suspected criminal activity to the government prosecutor at
an early stage.
(ii) Have a corporate internal investigation conducted by outside rather
than inside counsel.
(iii) Preclude the attorney for the corporation from representing any cor-
porate personnel who also come under scrutiny.
(iv) Don't indemnify or advance legal fees for principal wrongdoers.
(v) Waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege and work product
protection, and provide the government with the results, report, and work-
product of the corporate internal investigation.
(vi) Refuse to enter into joint defense agreements. 25
However, sometimes corporate cooperation is not deemed to be strate-
gically appropriate for a corporation and its shareholder constituency, par-
ticularly if the prosecutor insists on an onerous corporate criminal plea, and
extravagant monetary fines, and related penalties including license divesti-
ture or bar from regulated business activities.
3. Defending the Corporation Before the Grand Jury
The grand jury investigation of suspected corporate misconduct often
differs significantly from a parallel SEC investigation of the same activities.
525 See Reports and Proposals, White Collar Crime Meeting Addresses Issues of Privilege,
Corporate 'Good Citizenship', 61 ClM. L. REP., Apr. 2, 1997, at 1020-22; see also FEDERAL
BAR FOUND., supra note 451, at 17. Some commentators point out that while corporate co-
operation with the government prosecutors may be commendable, it is improper for a prose-
cutor to condition a favorable plea bargain or civil/administrative disposition on a
corporation's agreement to fire the suspected employee, to restrict the employee's access to
witnesses and documents or to withhold indemnification and advancement of attorneys' fees
for the employee's criminal defense:
Apart from the fact that a government demand such as this is usually in conflict with
state-law policies and an employee's contractual rights under company bylaws, the practice
is offensive because it undermines the effective functioning of the adversary system....
When the government uses its naked power over the corporation to interdict the lawful flow
of funds to an employee, it alters the balance of forces between government and defense for
a reason unrelated to guilt or innocence.... A basic assumption of the system is that neither
side will take action that interferes with the other party's ability to collect and present evi-
dence. The government's use of corporate cooperation for a purpose other than securing
evidence of the employee's wrongdoing is indistinguishable from prosecutorial directives to
witnesses not to speak with defense counsel. In both cases, the conduct violates due process.
See Roger C. Spaeder, Mens Rea: Corporate Cooperation, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at A-
19, A-20.
For example, in the Drexel/Milken prosecution, the government attempted to condition
Drexel's guilty plea on the broker-dealers agreement to refuse to pay Michael Milken over
$100 million of compensation allegedly due to him. The S.D.N.Y. Court refused to sanction
such a condition in the corporate plea bargain.
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In dealing with the grand jury inquiry, defense counsel must be prepared to
cope with (i) grants of immunity;5 26 (ii) undercover surveillance including
clandestine tape-recording and electronic eavesdropping; (iii) paid infor-
mants; and (iv) "sting" operations. In addition, defense counsel must deal
with search warrants, as well as grand jury subpoenas.
In any grand jury investigation involving FCPA violations, or other
corporate misconduct, if the government is resisted, defense counsel will
inevitably be forced to deal with the "bread and butter' strategic issues that
arise in virtually every case; i.e., (i) preservation of attorney-client privilege
and work-product doctrine; (ii) exploration or maintenance of joint defense
agreements; (iii) advancement of legal fees and costs (or indemnification
thereof) for present and former officers, employees and agents; (iv) disci-
pline of corporate wrongdoers, i.e., termination, suspension, or other sanc-
tions; and (v) enhanced supervisory and compliance procedures. All of
these strategic issues must be resolved in a manner best suited not only to
minimize corporate criminal sanctions, but also to minimize financial and
other business damages occasioned by parallel civil litigation, including
class actions and derivative suits. All of these strategic considerations will
also be influenced to one degree or another by the parallel internal corporate
investigation.
526 For example, in a pending grand jury investigation of foreign business activities of
McDermott International Inc. and J. Ray McDermott S.A., including possible anticompeti-
tive activity of McDermott joint ventures with ETPM S.A. of France and with Heerema Off-
shore Construction Group, Inc., the DOJ has granted immunity to a number of current and
former employees of McDermott entities. In December 1997, Heerema and one of its em-
ployees pleaded guilty to charges that they were part of a conspiracy to rig bids in the lint
venture's heavy-lift business in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and the Far East. See
McDermott Says U.S. Granted Immunity to Some Employees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1998, at
B8. In the current grand jury investigations of Columbia Health Care Corporation, the DOJ
has granted immunity to a potpourri of present and former Columbia officers and employees.
Defending SEC & DOJ FCPA Investigations
18:303 (1998)
C. Conducting An Internal Corporate Investigation
527
Virtually no serious corporate FCPA problem in the 1990s gets re-
solved in the absence of an internal corporate investigation. Sometimes the
internal inquiry is precipitated or accompanied by "whistle-blower" allega-
tions or related litigation such as unjust termination suits528 or qui tam liti-
gation.
Many recurring issues arise in connection with corporate internal in-
vestigations. First, who should conduct the inquiry? Options include: in-
side counsel and/or an internal auditor; regular outside corporate counsel;
and, independent outside counsel. There is no uniform answer and particu-
lar circumstances will always drive procedure. Most commentators do
counsel, however, that if the suspected wrongdoing may be serious, and the
likelihood of eventually negotiating with government prosecutors or en-
forcement officials is high, then outside counsel should be retained to con-
duct the inquiry.
529
527 See, e.g., Stephen F. Black, Internal Corporate Investigations, in 4 SECURITIES LAW.
TECHNIQUES, ch. 119 (1995); Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984); BROWN & KUNDEL, supra note 396; DAN K. WEBB ET AL.,
CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS (1997); INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS:
CONDUCTING THEM, PROTECTING THEM (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 1992);
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE, supra note 396; Jean D. Reed, Corporate Self-Investigations
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. CH. L. REV. 803 (1980); Note, Discovery of
Internal Corporate Investigations, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1980); Alex Koch, Internal Cor-
porate Investigations: The Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege And Work-Product Protec-
tion Through Voluntary Disclosure To the Government, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 347 (1997);
Gary G. Lynch & Robert E. Underhill, Internal Investigations, in Materials, 25th Anniver-
sary Securities Regulation Institute (Coronado, Cal. Jan. 14-16, 1998); Gary G. Lynch &
Robert E. Underhill, Internal Investigations, in 1 WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1997 A-47 [herein-
after WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1997]; Gary G. Lynch & Eric F. Grossman, Defending the Cor-
poration: Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing, in I WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1997, supra, at
A-89; Gary G. Lynch & Douglas M. Fuchs, Conducting Internal Investigations of Possible
Corporate Wrongdoing, in Carole L. Basri et al., Corporate Compliance After Caremark, in
Practicing Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-995
(1997); CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE: HANDLING GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS (1997);
Anton R. Valukas & Robert R. Stauffer, Corporate Internal Investigations, in id. ch. 3.3;
Brian C. Elmer & Ramona R. Romero, Voluntary Disclosure Programs: Confession May be
Good For the Soul, But Is It Good For the Body Corporate? in id. ch. 20; Arthur F.
Mathews, The Role of Outside Counsel. Defensive Corporate Tactics for Dealing with SEC
Investigations, 61 N.C. L. REv. 483 (1983).
528For example, the 1986 Ashland Oil FCPA case (see SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc. & Orin
Atkins, SEC Lit. Release No. 11150, 36 SEC Docket No. 1 at 88 (D.D.C. 1986)), led to a
companion civil RICO private damage action by former Ashland officers Bill McKay and
Harry Williams, in an unlawful employment termination suit against Ashland and some of its
directors, alleging they had been punished for, among other things, whistle-blowing. McKay
and Williams obtained a $65 million verdict against Ashland at jury trial; the case ultimately
settled for $25 million. See Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988); McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Williams v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 853 F.2d
927 (6th Cir. 1988); Howes v. Atkins, 668 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
529 See, e.g., FEDERAL BAR FOUND., supra note 45 1, (remarks of Peter Zimroth); Lynch &
Underhill, supra note 527, at A-52 to A-54:
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Second, who should direct and control the internal investigation?
Again, options include: inside counsel; management; the board of directors;
or a special committee of the board of directors. Once again there is no uni-
form answer, and circumstances will drive procedure. As a matter of
evolving practice, in most major cases either the Audit Committee, or a
Special Committee (usually staffed by outside directors) of the board will
be assigned the task of supervising and directing outside counsel in the in-
530vestigation.
Third, should there be a written report at the conclusion of the investi-
gation? Sometimes there is, and sometimes there isn't. There ordinarily is
no general legal requirement mandating a written report; again, the circum-
stances, particularly the corporation's strategic goals, will govern this deci-
[I]f the wrongdoing is widespread, is serious enough to expose the corporation to sub-
stantial liability, or implicates high-level officers, the investigation generally should be
performed by independent outside counsel, who may be retained by a committee of out-
side directors. Such independence lends the investigation a measure of objectivity and
credibility which may be essential in dealing with the government and third parties.
Anton R. Valukas & Robert R. Stauffer, Corporate Liability: Internal Investigations Of
Corporate Misconduct, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1992, at 17 (citation omitted).
For an analysis of a series of criminal prosecutions which involved an internal corporate
investigation jointly by regular outside counsel and inside corporate general counsel, which
internal inquiry ultimately did more harm than good, see the discussion of the Southland
Corporation cases in Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
655, 680-92 (1984). See also In re John Doe Corp. (Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.
1982); In re Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1986);
530See, e.g., Black & Pozin, supra note 396, § 119.02[2][a], at 119-17 to 119-18:
If the internal investigation is the result of governmental or shareholder pressure, or if
its focus is on the conduct of senior officers or directors, a management supervised in-
quiry is ordinarily not a realistic option because of the increased need for the appear-
ance as well as the fact of independence .... In these circumstances, supervisory
authority over the investigation should probably be vested in the board of directors as a
whole or in a committee of the board.... If members of the board are themselves po-
tential targets of the investigation, the committee option will ordinarily be preferable.
If the investigation is the result of, or is contemplated to deal with, a derivative suit
against the directors, then under applicable state law it is usually necessary to vest control of
the internal inquiry in a "special litigation committee" consisting solely of independent di-
rectors who are not charged with any wrongdoing. Id. at 119-17. See also The Special Liti-
gation Committee in RALPH C. FERRARA, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION ch. 8,
particularly § 8.09 (discussing Statutory Responses to Special Litigation Committees) and §
8.10 (discussing Independence, Good Faith and Due Care: Characteristics of an Adequate
Special Litigation Procedure). Compare General Electric Co. v. Rowe, No. 89-7644, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15,036 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1992) (finding procedures of GE special litiga-
tion committee assisted by independent outside counsel adequate to support dismissal of de-
rivative litigation based on two claims brought against GE under the False Claims Act and a
criminal conviction against a GE subsidiary and two employees for alleged misconduct in-
volving foreign bribery of an Israeli General in connection with securing aircraft engine
business from the Israeli Air Force for the GE subsidiary), with Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that procedures used by special litigation
committee were inadequate to support dismissal of derivative litigation alleging wasting of
corporate assets in connection with repurchase of CleveTrust stock).
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sion.53' Sometimes, however, a written report is either required,532 or useful
to serve the corporation's interests. For example, in the Kidder
Peabody/Joseph Jett trading scandal, the General Electric Company deter-
mined from the start, when it hired former SEC Enforcement Director Gary
Lynch to conduct the internal broker-dealer inquiry, to prepare a written re-
port, and upon completion, to publicize the report in order to serve General
Electric's corporate goals. In addition, in the E.F. Hutton "check-kiting"
scandal, the report of an internal inquiry by former Attorney General Griffin
Bell was immediately publicized upon completion.
One risk of publicizing a written report of an investigation is that libel
claims may be pursued by alleged wrongdoers described in the report.
Therefore care must be taken in fashioning the content and conclusions of a
written report in a manner that best protects the company from liability for
defamation or other tort damages.533
If a written report is prepared, but not publicized, and not provided to
any governmental prosecutors or regulators or private party adversaries,
then both the report and its underlying investigative work-product, includ-
ing memoranda of interviews of witnesses questioned in the inquiry, can
ordinarily be shielded by corporate attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection.534 However, if a copy of the investigative report is
shared with the DOJ or the SEC, or with other third parties like outside
auditors or underwriters, in most federal circuits, attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection will be deemed to be waived for all pur-
poses5 3s The Eighth Circuit, in an en banc decision in the Diversified In-
dustries case has fashioned a "limited waiver" doctrine, sometimes more
appropriately called the "selective waiver" rule, which sanctions the provi-
sion of internal investigative materials to government regulators and prose-
531 See Black, supra note 530, at 119-43 to 119-44:
Since a written report may eventually be discoverable in litigation by a corporation's
third party adversaries, it may be preferable in some cases not to write a report but sim-
ply to present an oral report of the results of the investigation to the board of directors.
The minutes of the meeting would reflect that the presentation was made in confidence
and contained legal advice, but would not repeat the substance of the report.
(citation omitted.)532See Lynch & Underhill, supra note 527, at A-85: "A written report is required in cer-
tain contexts, such as enforcement-agency ordered investigations and where special litigation
committees have been convened."
533See, e.g., Stephen F. Black, supra note 530, § 119.07 ("Guarding Against Liability for
Defamation and Other Torts"). See also (i) the Pearce libel litigation in the E.F. Hutton
scandal, Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987) and Pearce v. E.F.
Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1987); (ii) the Kern libel litigation in the
Grumman/Page FCPA case, Kern v. Grumman Corp., At Law No. 10812-A (Va. Arlington
City Cir. Ct. 1979); and (iii) the Weissman libel litigation in the OPM bankruptcy scandal,
Weissman v. Hassett, 47 B.R. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
534See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
535 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 527; R.H. Porter, Voluntary Disclosures to Federal Agen-
cies - Their Impact on the Ability of Corporations to Protect From Discovery Materials
Developed During the Course of Internal Investigations, 39 CATH. U. L. Rv. 1007 (1990).
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cutors without a concomitant broad, general waiver of attorney-client
privilege or work-product protection as to all third parties.536 However, the
other circuits that have confronted the issue have expressly rejected the
"limited waiver" doctrine,537 although the Second Circuit has left the door
ajar to the possibility that it might in the future accept the "limited waiver"
theory in two narrow circumstances, namely: (i) where the corporation and
the government share a common interest; and (ii) where the government
agency and the corporation enter into a specific confidentiality agree-
ment.
536Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (adopting
"limited waiver" doctrine and holds that disclosure of internal investigative materials to SEC
is not a general waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product protection). In United
States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit acknowledged and applied
the "limited waiver" doctrine. See generally Nancy C. Crisman & Arthur F. Mathews, Lim-
ited Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges: An Emerging Cor-
porate Self-Evaluative Privilege, 21 AM. CriM. L. REv. 123 (1983); Note, The Limited
Waiver Rule: Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REv. 789 (1984);
Note, Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Upon Voluntary Disclosure to the
SEC, 50 FonAum L. REv. 963 (1982); Larry Pedowitz & Carol Miller, Making Your Case
to Government Without Waiving Privilege, 3 Bus. Crimes Bulletin: Compliance & Litigation
No. 1 (Feb. 1996); Comment, Reconciling Voluntay Disclosure With the Attorney-
Corporate Client Privilege: A Move Toward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine, 39
MERCER L. REv. 473 (1987); Allen & Hazelwood, supra note 408; Comment, Stuffing the
Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administra-
tive Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1198 (1982); Daniel L. Goelzer & Clifford E.
Kirsch, The Doctrine of Selective Waiver: Self-Policing or Self-Destruction, INSIGHTS, Aug.
1992, at 11.537See, e.g., United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1995); In re John Doe Corp.
(Southland Corp.), 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th
Cir. 1988); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Tesoro Petroleum), 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Cf In re Perrigo Co., 128
F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D.
Tex. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982); In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 89 F.R.D 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also B. L. Wilcox, Martin Marietta and the
Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection, 49 MD. L. REv. 917
(1990). One District Court in the Seventh Circuit adopted the "limited waiver" doctrine, see
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979 (Phillip Morris & Miller Brewing), 478 F.
Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979), while two other ones rejected the doctrine, see Neal v. Honey-
well, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14488 (N.D. 111. 1995); Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, 875
F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ill. 1994). A District Court in the Ninth Circuit rejected "limited
waiver." See McMorgan Co. v. First Cal. Mortgage Co., 931 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
538See In re Steinhart Partners, 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993). The First Circuit, in dicta in
United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1995), has left open perhaps a crack in the
door leading to "limited waiver" in some narrow future case:
One argument not made by appellants is that, as a matter of policy, private revelations to
the government of possible criminal conduct ought not waiver the privilege as to third par-
ties. The concern, of course, is to encourage such revelations. The general tendency of the
law is to treat waivers as an all or nothing proposition.., but there is a trace of support for
limited waivers in some cases involving confidential disclosures to the government .... If
there was ever an argument for limited waiver, it might well depend importantly on just what
Defending SEC & DOJ FCPA Investigations
18:303 (1998)
In dealing with privilege and confidentiality issues respecting written
reports and underlying memoranda of interview and other investigative
work-product of an internal investigation, counsel would be wise to review
the circumstances of and holdings in five decisions in the Southern District
of New York. In the In re Leslie Fay Companies Securities Litigation
(Leslie Fay 1) case, 3 9 the corporation's disclosure to the SEC of internal in-
vestigative report waived both attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection as to the report itself. In In re Leslie Fay Companies Securities
Litigation (Leslie Fay II),540 the corporation's disclosure of the internal in-
vestigative report to the SEC also waived attorney-client privilege as to the
documents and other investigative work-product underlying the report;
court held that there was no work-product protection because the internal
investigation was conducted for business purposes, not in anticipation of
litigation. In the In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation case,54' the dis-
closure of the Gary Lynch/Kidder Peabody Report to the SEC and to the
public was held to be a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the under-
lying factual summaries of witness interviews; the court held that there was
no work-product protection because the report was prepared primarily for
business purposes, not in anticipation of litigation. In In re Woolworth
Corporation Securities Class Action Litigation,542 the court held that public
disclosure of internal investigation report does not waive attorney-client
had been disclosed to the government and on what understandings. Without intending to
preclude such an argument in a future case, we think that it is enough in this one to say that
no such claim of limited waiver has been argued to us.
See also Scott W. McKay, Protection of Privileged Information in the Context of Corpo-
rate Voluntary Disclosure, in WHrrE COLLAR CRIME 1997, supra note 527, at B-17.
Larry Pedowitz and Carol Miller, in addressing the Second Circuit Steinhart Partners
holding, state: "We are familiar with a number of federal grand jury investigations where
corporations have produced privileged and confidential documents to the government and
the government has entered into stipulated and sealed agreements, so-ordered by a District
Court, expressly providing that attomey-client and work-product protections were not
waived as to third parties." Lawrence B. Pedowitz & Carol Miller, Disclosure of Privileged
Information to the Government Without Causing a Waiver of Privilege; Essential Provisions
in Joint Defense Agreements; And a Recent Ethics Opinion on Multiple Representation in
Criminal Investigations, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME - 1996: Representing Corporations, Finan-
cial Institutions and Their Directors, Officers and Employees, H-5 1, at H-52 (ABA National
Institute 1996) [hereinafter WHITE COLLAR CRIME - 1996]. They offer the following caveats
to counsel attempting to negotiate "limited" or "selective" waiver agreements: (i) The in-
formation must be disclosed pursuant to an explicit written confidentiality agreement or
protective order. (ii) The agreement must adequately set forth the basis for the court's order
(i.e., the mutually beneficial purposes of production and the extent to which the corporation
is relying on the protection of the order). (iii) The agreement should be "so ordered" by the
judge. (iv) The agreement should specifically identify the individuals who are authorized to
have access to the material and the uses to which it may be put. (v) The agreement should
provide for the return and/or destruction of the documents.
"9152 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
540161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
5-' 168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
54294 Civ. 2217 (OR), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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privilege for attorneys' notes and memoranda prepared during the course of
the internal investigation. Finally, in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served
on Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Sensormatics Electronics Corp.), 43 since the
company shared the results of internal investigation with its outside audi-
tors, the court held that the attorney-client privilege and work-product pro-
tection was waived as to all the law firm's otherwise confidential notes and
memoranda underlying the internal investigation report.
Fourth, how does counsel deal with multiple representation issues in
an internal investigation? Counsel conducting the inquiry should certainly
never represent personally any of the officers, directors, employees or
agents interviewed in the investigation.544 However, once the internal in-
quiry is completed, absent any conflicts of interest, it may be perfectly ap-
propriate for investigative counsel to represent both the company and
certain of its officers, directors, employees or agents in litigation arising
from the corporate activities underlying the investigation or in related gov-
ernmental investigations.
A myriad of issues also arise regarding how investigative counsel deals
with employees to be interviewed in the inquiry. 45 May or must the em-
ployee be represented by counsel? Is the company obligated to pay for the
employees counsel? How many different employees can one counsel repre-
sent? What action should be taken by the company if an employee pleads
the Fifth Amendment or otherwise refuses to be interviewed? Can or
should the employee interview be subject to a "joint defense" agreement
among the company, the employee and their respective counsel? What
warnings should or must investigative counsel give to the employee about
to be interviewed?
An employee generally need not be represented by counsel, but if the
employee desires to have personal counsel present at the interview the
company ordinarily should accommodate the employee's wish. A company
generally is not required to pay for an employee's counsel, but in some cir-
cumstances the company appropriately chooses to do so.5 46 General con-
543No. M8-85 (JSM), 1997 W. S. Dist. LEXIS 2927 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 1997).
544See Gary G. Lynch & Robert E. Underhill, Internal Investigations, Materials, 25th
Anniversary Securities Regulation Institute (Coronado, Cal. Jan. 14-16, 1998) at 12-12:
As a general rule, counsel conducting internal investigations should avoid undertaking
joint representation of the corporation and any of its employees until the relevant underlying
facts are known. Otherwise, counsel and its client, the corporation, may be put in the unten-
able position of being unable to disclose relevant facts to governmental authorities which it
may have a legal or practical obligation to disclose.
54- See, e.g., Kathleen G. Gallagher, Legal and Professional Responsibility of Corporate
Counsel to Employees During an Internal Investigation for Corporate Misconduct, 6 CORP.
L. REv. 3 (1983).546 See Lynch & Underhill, supra note 527, at A-63:
[T, he decision should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the
olowing factors: (i) whether the employee will be better able to assist the corporation
if the employee is well prepared for the interview; (ii) whether there is ongoing litiga-
tion or an ongoing government investigation. If so, it is important that the employee be
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flict of interest rules will govern how many different employees one coun-
sel will professionally and ethically be able to represent.:547 There is a gen-
eral trend in criminal law at both the federal and state level to require
separate counsel for each defendant in a criminal prosecution. 4 s It is un
clear whether and when such separate representation would be required in
particular circumstances at the investigatory level, whether in a grand jury
inquiry, a governmental regulatory or enforcement investigation, or, indeed,
a private internal corporate investigation. 49
As an incident of employment, a corporation is entitled to have any
employee provide the company with any knowledge the employee has
about the company's past or present business activities. If an employee
pleads the Fifth Amendment or otherwise refuses to be interviewed in an
internal inquiry, the company may lawfully discipline or sanction the em-
ployee. Whether the appropriate sanction might be termination, suspen-
well prepared and the participation of counsel may facilitate that preparation; (iii)
whether the potential witness is a valued employee whose rights and interests the corpo-
ration is interested in protecting; and (iv) whether the employee's contract or indemnifi-
cation rights entitle him or her to counsel at the corporation's expense.547 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). See also Lawrence B. Pedowitz & Carol
Miller, Disclosure of Privileged Information to the Government Without Causing a Waiver
of Privilege; Essential Provisions in Joint Defense Agreements; And a Recent Ethics Opin-
ion on Multiple Representation in Criminal Investigations, in WHrE COLLAR CRIME - 1996,
supra note 538.
Once a case begins to enter the criminal arena, there is an even more important element
that will usually preclude one attorney from simultaneously representing two or more poten-
tial targets: The possibility that one target/client may be able to obtain total immunity in re-
turn for becoming a government witness against the other targets/clients will raise an
insoluble conflict of interest.
Cf Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases,
67 GEO. L. J. 1075 (1979); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Repre-
sentation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Contro-
versy, 61 TEx. L. REv. 211 (1982); John Stewart Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal
Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attor-
ney, 62 MINN. L. Rv. 119 (1978).
548 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 4-3.5(b); People v. Mroczko, 672 P.2
835, 853 (Cal. 1983); United States v. Cooper, 672 F. Supp. 155 (D. Del. 1987); FED. R.
CRIM. PRO. 44(c).
549In 1997 the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Eth-
ics rendered an Opinion on Question No. 707 that concludes:
In general, the joint representation of multiple clients whose conduct is the target of
a criminal investigation is inadvisable, though not strictly prohibited, even if the clients
consent upon full disclosure .... In the context of a criminal investigation, the legal
interests of individuals whose conduct is the target of inquiry frequently differ, because
even small variances in the situation of each may be material to the outcome. And such
are the stakes that, when the interests of multiple clients diverge in a criminal investi-
gation, it will rarely be obvious that a lawyer can adequately represent the interests of
each....
55 0 ee Stephen F. Black, supra note 530, § 119.04[3][b]; Lynch & Underhill, supra note
527, at A-67; see also In re The Cooper Cos., SEC 1934 Act Release No. 35082 (Dec. 12,
1994) (SEC criticizes board of directors for not taking action when a senior officer pled Fifth
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:303 (1998)
sion with or without pay, placement on administrative leave, denial of ad-
vancement of attorneys' fees, reduction or elimination of bonus, job reas-
signment, demotion, or some other form of discipline or punishment will
vary with the circumstances.55' Company counsel should always examine
any applicable union contract or collective bargaining agreement, state la-
bor or employment statute or regulation, or state case law precedent, that
may bear upon imposing discipline on or terminating an employee. 2
Corporate counsel should never let an employee interview in an inter-
nal inquiry be subject to a joint defense privilege, 553 thereby allowing an
employee and his or her personal counsel to prevent the company from pro-
viding to the government or from publicizing - either generally or in the
company's annual or periodic SEC filings - material factual information
gleaned from the employee in the interview. The attorney-client privilege
and concomitant work-product protection must be the company's - and
the company's alone - not a shared confidentiality blanket controlled as
much by the employee and his or her counsel as it is by the corporation's
board of directors. The company must have unfettered freedom to waive
privilege to meet its legal obligations to publicize all material facts in its
SEC filings, to provide full and accurate factual disclosure in any other re-
quired regulatory filings or in meting any self-reporting obligations, or to
voluntarily provide information to government prosecutors in furtherance of
a corporate decision to fully cooperate with the government in a grand jury
or other enforcement or regulatory inquiry.554
Amendment to avoid testifying in DOJ/grand jury inquiry, parallel SEC investigation, and
related internal corporate investigation).
551 Black, supra note 530, § 119-42:
A] witness may have a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions, but he
as no right to continued employment if he invokes that fight. A corporate employer
also has ights, including the right to require its employees to provide the corporationwith information relevant to its affairs. A refusal to provide such information consti-
tutes a breach of an employee's duty of loyalty to the corporation and is good groundsfor terminating his employment.
[Footnote omitted.]552id"
553 For exploration of some of the unsettled legal issues involving the scope and applica-
tion of "joint defense" or "common interest" agreements, see Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT DEFENSE/COMMON
INTEREST AGREEMENTS, COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, in 51 RECORD OF
THE Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 115 (1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: COMMON INTEREST ARRANGEMENT § 126 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996); Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing The Joint Defense Doctrine,
65 FORDHAM L. REv. 871 (1996); Matthew D. Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Enve-
lope: Disqualification of White Collar Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense
Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1994). See also Steven Alan Reiss & Laraine Pacheco,
The Joint Defense Agreement, in Obermaier & Morvillo, supra note 67, ch. 17.
554 Consider, for example, the respective corporation's governmental/regulatory reporting
obligations in the Daiwa Bank case, and in the Salomon Brothers (Gutfreund/Feuerstein)
case.
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If corporate counsel conducting the internal inquiry is also representing
the company in private or governmental litigation embracing the subject
matter of the investigation, i.e., securities class actions or an SEC civil en-
forcement action, it is appropriate for the corporation and its corporate
counsel to be a party to a joint defense agreement with other officers, di-
rectors or employees (and their personal counsel) who are also defendants
in the ongoing litigation. But when each of those officers, directors or em-
ployees are interviewed in the internal inquiry, despite the existence of the
joint defense agreement applicable to the pending litigation, a written ac-
knowledgment should be obtained from each interviewee that he or she is
aware, and agrees, that the interview in the internal inquiry is wholly out-
side the joint defense arrangement.
It is prudent for investigative counsel to give a fair warning to any em-
ployee or any other person about to be interviewed in an internal corporate
inquiry.555 At a minimum the warning should make it clear that (i) counsel
conducting the inquiry represents solely the corporation, not the individual
employee; (ii) the attorney-client privilege applicable to the interview be-
longs solely to the corporation, not to the employee; therefore, even if the
employee objects, the board of directors can waive the corporate attorney-
client privilege and provide the information obtained in the interview to the
government or any third party, or may publicize it in SEC reports or other
governmental reports or filings; and (iii) if deemed appropriate, that the
employee may be accompanied by personal counsel at the interview. A
good practice would embrace the employee/interviewee signing a written
acknowledgment of receipt of such warnings prior to commencement of the
interview. This procedure will protect against subsequent claims by the
present or former employee in litigation that he or she understood that
counsel conducting the interview represented both the corporation and the
employee personally. Such claims would prevent the corporation from
waiving the attorney-client privilege when it wishes to do so, or prevent
corporate counsel from later pursuing claims on behalf of the corporation
against the employee.5 6
555See Black, supra note 530, §§ 119.04[3], 119-40 to 119-41, The District of Columbia
Bar, Legal Ethics Committee has issued a formal Opinion spelling out the nature of corpo-
rate counsel's duty in warning interviewees in an internal corporate inquiry. See District of
Columbia Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 269 (Jan. 15, 1997) (discussing the obli-
gation of a lawyer for a corporation to clarify role in internal corporate investigation). Cf.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).556See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Higgerson, 1984 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984); United States v. Hart, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17798 (E.D. La. No. 17, 1992).
The author's law firm, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, recently was involved in litigation where
a former officer/employee interviewed by Wilmer Cutler counsel representing the company
in an internal investigation, claimed that he understood that Wilmer Cutler also represented
him personally at the interview, thereby later attempting to preclude Wilmer Cutler from
pursuing corporate claims against him in subsequent litigation. See Schlumberger Techns.,
Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553 (1 lth Cir. 1977).
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Once an internal corporate investigation is completed, and an oral or
written investigative report is duly considered by the board of directors, the
corporation must determine what use it will make of the results of the in-
vestigation. If material undisclosed facts are unearthed, they necessarily
will have to be disclosed in the company's SEC filings. If the facts trigger
other governmental or regulatory reporting obligations, e.g., to bank regu-
lators, such required reporting will have to be accomplished. But if the un-
disclosed facts are not material, e.g., a small foreign bribe for a non-
material contract in an FCPA case, and if there is no special reporting obli-
gation, what does the company do? It may choose not to publicize the inci-
dent, and instead choose to deal with the matter solely "in-house" by
terminating and/or disciplining responsible personnel, tightening internal
compliance procedures, and correcting any false or misleading books and
records. 7 On the other hand, depending on particular circumstances, in-
cluding the status of any pending or threatened DOJ grand jury inquiry,
SEC enforcement investigation, or governmental or private litigation, the
company may choose to pursue one of the government's voluntary disclo-
sure programs. 58 There have been a number of formal and informal federal
voluntary disclosure programs available to corporate America in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. The most highly visible ones include: (i) the SEC Vol-
untary Disclosure Program, which commenced in 1975 and led to the pas-
sage of the FCPA in 1977; 59 (ii) the DOJ Antitrust Division Voluntary
Disclosure Program and Corporate Leniency Policy, which began in 1978
and was reinvigorated in 1993;56o (iii) the DOJ/Departrnent of Defense
Voluntary Disclosure Program, which commenced in 1978 and was further
formalized in 1987;.561 (iv) the DOJ Guidelines For Environmental Prose-
557For an analysis of how to avoid ten common mistakes in the implementation of corpo-
rate compliance programs, see Jeffrey M. Kaplan, Designing And Implementing Corporate
Compliance Programs, 30 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. No. 21, at 249 (Dec. 10, 1997).
558See, e.g., Lynch & Underhill, supra note 527, at A-82: "ix. The Decision to Contact
the Government Concerning Findings of Wrongdoing;" Gary G. Lynch & Eric F. Grossman,
Defending the Corporation: Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME
1997, supra note 527, at A-89, A-I16 (Voluntary Disclosure Programs), and A-120 (The
Decision to Disclose Misconduct and Cooperate).
559 See SEC REPORT, supra note 3.
56 See John H. Schenefield, Address to the 17th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute 2-5
(Oct. 4, 1978) (address by the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice); Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust Enforcement: Some Initial Thoughts and Actions,
Address before the ABA Antitrust Section (Aug. 10, 1993) (address by Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST DIVISION, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10, 1993). See, e.g., Paul J. Cur-
ran & Gregory J. Wallance, Corporate Compliance: A New Antitrust Policy Assures Am-
nesty, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 18; Squeri, Minimizing Damage to Your Client Through
Corporate Compliance Programs and the Antitrust Division's New Corporate Leniency
Program, 6 CORP. ANALYST 140, 152 (Vol. 3, 1994).
561 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES REGARDING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS (July 17, 1987); see also
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cutions, which were promulgated in 1991;562 (v) the Department of Health
and Human Services' Operation Restore Trust5 3 that commenced in 1995.
XIV. CONCLUSION
Multinational corporations can expect to be confronted over the next
generation with aggressive enforcement programs by both the DOJ and the
SEC that are designed to ferret out and prosecute foreign bribery in the
criminal, civil and administrative fora. The corrupt foreign payments pro-
visions of the FCPA will continue to serve as the principal federal statutory
prescription that will provide the underpinning for most foreign bribery en-
forcement actions. So few of the elements of an FCPA bribery offense or
the defenses thereto have been analyzed to date in contested judicial deci-
sions, it is likely that increased governmental enforcement efforts will
spawn a much larger body of FCPA judicial precedent in the next decade or
so. The Triton Energy case flags many of the open issues that are ripe for
judicial determination and exposition in the next generation of litigated
FCPA bribery cases.
It is also likely that the corrupt foreign payments provisions of the
FCPA will soon be expanded legislatively in a few respects to conform to
the recent Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions 564 adopted in late 1997 by the twenty-
nine Member States of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and five nonmember countries.565 Each party to the
OECD Convention has agreed to pass such domestic legislation
as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offense under its law for
any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or though intermediaries, to a foreign public offi-
Klubes, The Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program, 19 PUB. CONTRACTS
L.J. 19 (Spring 1990).
5 2See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE ON DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR, 5-11.301 A (July 1,
1991).
563See Operation Restore Trust OIG Procedures for Administering the Pilot Disclosure
Program, 4 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 926-934 (June 12, 1995) - HHS program to curb Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud, waste and abuse is modeled after the DOD Voluntary Disclosure
Program, but is far more limited. The program is limited to five states - California, Florida,
Illinois, New York and Texas.
64 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 37 l.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
565The 29 Members of the OECD, comprising the most-developed trading states in the
world, include: United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Ko-
rea, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, Australia,
Denmark, Austria, Norway, Ireland, Finland, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, Hungary, New Zea-
land, Czech Republic, Greece and Iceland. The five nonmember countries that also adopted
the Convention are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the Slovak Republic.
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cial, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain
or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business.
The language in the OECD Convention is broader than the FCPA in
several respects, thereby necessitating legislative amendments broadening
the scope of the FCPA. For example, the FCPA applies to "issuers" and
"domestic concerns;" it does not apply to foreign subsidiaries. 567  The
FCPA will have to be broadened to reach "any person."
Article 1 of the OECD Convention, which defines the elements of the
offense of bribery of foreign governmental officials, contains not only the
FCPA's "obtain or retain business" language, but also has the phrase "or
other improper advantage." It will be necessary to add this language legis-
latively to the FCPA. The result will be to clarify that the United Brands-
type bribe for favorable tax legislation will clearly be proscribed even if not
directly tied to obtaining or retaining business. Thus, the FCPA will no
longer arguably be limited solely to procurement bribery, i.e., payment
bribes in return for business contracts, as opposed to other business advan-
tages such as tax breaks and regulatory permits.
568
Corporations running afoul of the FCPA bribery provisions will always
have potential exposure to parallel or sequential DOJ/grand jury inquiries
and SEC enforcement investigations. In most instances, it will be necessary
for the corporation to accomplish an internal corporate investigation of the
suspect activities in order to provide management and the board of directors
the necessary information to (i) assure the adequacy of corporate compli-
ance policies and procedures, and thereby protect and preserve the com-
pany's legitimate business interests; (ii) accomplish the proper discipline of
employees or agents guilty of malfeasance or nonfeasance; and (iii) reach
an informed determination whether the best interests of the entity and its
shareholders are to resist any government inquiry/enforcement action, or,
rather, to cooperate with the government in quickly reaching a negotiated
settlement. There are no black letter rules or clear guidelines that provide a
company and its counsel the precise path to pursue when major corporate
misconduct begins to surface. The competing strategic issues applicable to
the defense of DOJ/grand jury inquiries and SEC enforcement investiga-
tions, as well as related internal corporate investigations, will continue to
challenge defense lawyers representing multinational companies as our
world's markets continue to develop as part of an overall interrelated global
economy.
566OECD Convention, supra note 564, art. 1(1); see also David A. Gantz, Globalizing
Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457 (1998).567 See Gregory J. Wallance, Morality and Economic Reality Triumph: Major Victory for
U.S. as Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Goes Global, 5 Bus. Crimes Bulletin, at I (Feb.
1998).568 1d.
